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Directed by: Professor Sheldon Goldman
In the shadow of a 15 year federal battle between the Courts and Congress over how
much protection is afforded religious behavior, more than half of the states have declared the
highest level of protection either through a Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), or
through a court decision. This study finds the results of the states‘ attempts by calculating
how often actors seeking protection for a religious act win the judge‘s vote. The study‘s date
range is the eight years following the last volley in the federal battle City of Boerne v. Flores:
1998-2005. The unit of analysis is each judge vote, 3,254 in all. And the research question is
if and under what conditions are these institutional attempts actually helping religious actors
win more judge votes?
To make sure the effects of the institutional attempts are independent of other factors, as
well as to conduct exploratory research on how other factors affect religious freedom, several
controls will be used. Those controls are specifically: characteristics about the judge and
county, characteristics about the religious claimant and case, and characteristics about the
legal opinion. The results of the study show: 1) States appear to protect religious actors more
than federal courts with a 44% favorable vote-rate in the state courts. But 2) neither
legislative nor judicial attempts affect religious success, most evidence shows. Judicial
attempts can find some significantly positive results in specific models. 3) The most
explanatory predictor is the way constitutional language is used in the opinion.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case of two former drug treatment
employees who were dismissed from their privately run drug treatment center for using a
hallucinatory drug during a Native American religious ritual. Alfred Smith and Galen
Black then sought unemployment benefits from Oregon, but Oregon denied the benefits
claiming the loss of their jobs was for a legitimate reason. Smith and Black claimed that
their drug use was protected under the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. The issue in the case was whether Oregon‘s policy could infringe on
religious behavior because the state had a compelling government interest, and therefore
the plaintiffs were not entitled to unemployment compensation. Oregon would have to
prove that it had such a compelling interest and that the policy was the least intrusive way
of administering that policy. This test that Oregon would have to satisfy is referred to as
―strict scrutiny‖, and it is the most stringent standard of review a state must satisfy when
defending a law that allegedly infringes on one‘s rights.1
Early in Employment Division v. Smith, The Supreme Court granted defendants Smith
and Black their wish and recognized the controlling law as the first words in the U.S. Bill
of Rights: ―Congress shall pass no law respecting an establishment of religion nor the
free exercise thereof…‖. But whether Oregon persuaded the Court that it had a
compelling interest will never be known, because the Supreme Court apparently
understood decades of precedent on religious liberty in a new way: ―The only decisions

1

Despite the severe language, religious litigants succeeded in Free Exercise claims around one-third of the
time or less. Adamcyzk, Wybraniec, and Finke (2004, 248) and Arnold (1997, 151-52) show this. An even
more surprising estimate of a 12% Free Exercise success-rate comes from Forren (2001, 139 ff.) The
disparity between the two is discussed in the chapter on the dependent variable religious freedom.
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in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause
alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other Constitutional
protections….‖ Just how persuasive governments had to be when infringing the rights of
the religious was lowered by Justice Scalia‘s opinion for the 5-4 majority. The standard
of review, in simple terms, was lowered. And Justice Scalia did this without expressly
overturning the stronger understanding of religious freedom that emerged from several
decisions over more than fifty years, that came fully to fruition in Sherbert v. Verner
(1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972). In Smith, as quoted above, the Court made clear
that if the religious act in question was not accompanied by another civil right (free
speech or parental rights, for example), then the government needed to show simply that
the legislature had a rational interest in passing the law (referred to as the rational basis
test, the lowest of the three standards of review), rather than a compelling interest and
with a tailored alternative. Scalia‘s opinion summarizes key previous religious liberty
cases before Smith, pointing out that in each, more than simply one religious behavior
was at issue. He calls this presence of more than one civil right a ―hybrid‖ claim. That,
he writes, is when states will have to satisfy a compelling interest test.
An outcry from the right, left, and middle energized Congress to pass the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) three years later.2 The law was passed unanimously in
the House and 97-0 in the Senate, and with language that left the clear impression that

2

The introduction to Crane (1998, 236) cites fourteen articles criticizing the decision ―textually,
historically, legally, morally, socially, and politically‖ all before the 1993 Congressional response.
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Congress was letting the Supreme Court know it had made a mistake.3 But the Supreme
Court struck down RFRA as an unconstitutional encroachment on the power of the
Supreme Court to apply the standard of review it deems appropriate in constitutional
cases. This case, City of Boerne v. Flores was handed down four years after the federal
RFRA, and had the effect of leaving the lower standard of review in place for the fifty
states in terms of federal constitutional law.4
The conventional understanding of First Amendment Free Exercise jurisprudence in
the U.S. thus means only having to show that a law which burdens a religious actor is
reasonable, and does not discriminate against the religious. And unless there is a hybrid,
or an accompanying constitutional claim, the federal court can adjudicate from that point
forward.5 But this federal decrease in the standard of review does not necessarily mean a
decrease in religious liberty, as 99.7% of all court cases are not federal cases.6 They are
state cases concerning state constitutional and statutory law. And researchers have not
yet studied the state cases to determine if state and local governments are accepting the
U.S. Supreme Court‘s policy that burdens religious actors more than in the past.

3

The very title of the act implies the U.S. Supreme Court had taken away something that needed to be
―restored.‖ And if the implication was not enough, the law stated ―in Employment Division v. Smith, 494
US 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens
on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.‖ 42 USCS § 2000bb (a)(4)
4
Although to be clear, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 US 507 (1997) has no effect on federal territories as
recent case law has shown RFRA to be a valid statutory increase in religious liberty. See Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854 (1998), and the U.S. Supreme Court allowing the ruling to
stand at 525 US 811 (1998).
The most recent case upholding RFRA is Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 546 US 418 (2006), decided
February 21, 2006.
5
Before 2004‘s Locke v. Davey, the disclaimer would have read, ―unless there is a hybrid claim or the law
is discriminatory on its face.‖ But because of this ruling in Washington, where a religious actor challenged
a law that forbids a public benefit offered to everyone except those seeking a religious degree, the
disclaimer arguably grows smaller.
6
Stumpf and Culver (1992, 2), and Carp and Stidham (1996, 133).
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Surprisingly, more than half of the states seem to be rejecting a rational basis test, and are
voluntarily returning to the older standard that allows them less latitude.
Specifically, thirteen state legislatures have passed their own state-RFRA which
restores the strict scrutiny standard of review.7 Another thirteen state supreme courts
have issued rulings clarifying that their state will judge religious infractions under their
state constitutions using strict scrutiny. 8 Three more states effectively have a strict
standard by ignoring that Smith ever happened.9 And state courts in California and
Maine are allowing pre-Smith standards to continue, but explicitly reserve the ability to
change that standard until the issue seems more ―settled‖.10 But even with these
institutional efforts, the question of whether these policies are effective is unanswered.
Do these pro-religious freedom court precedents really result in more religious actor
success? The results of this model show that they do. Do state RFRAs result in higher
success rates for plaintiffs in free exercise cases?11 The results will show that they do
not. By looking into the state-level religious freedom cases, this study will be able to
describe the facets of what may be the new arena for religious freedom decisions in the
nation.
Before this study, the results of the new religious freedom policies for the nation
simply assume what is occurring in the thirty or so states that have a strict or heightened

7

State legislatures have passed RFRAs in AZ, CT, FL, ID, IL, MO, NM, OK, PA, RI, SC, TX. AL passed
an amendment to its state constitution.
8
Judicial rulings make clear that these states will use strict scrutiny: AK, IN, MA, MI, MN, OH, WI, VT.
It is very likely that the following states will use strict scrutiny, although the legal language leaves some
uncertainty: KY, MS, NY, and WA.
9
NC, MT, and KS cited Smith and yet applied the stronger pre-Smith standard of review in their
interpretation of their state constitutions.
10
Taken from Catholic Charities, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 90-91 (Cal. 2004) (finding state law
unsettled and reserving resolution of the issue).
11
Note: the words ―Free Exercise‖ are capitalized when referring to the U.S. Constitutional civil right,
whereas state level ―free exercise‖ clauses are not capitalized.
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scrutiny test, and which twenty (by default) have a rational-basis test.12 This study seeks
to systematically test that assumption. It will do so by showing that religious litigants are
not winning a larger percentage of their cases in most increased scrutiny contexts.

Literature Review
Previous research in this area supports two broad findings: empirical studies have
shown that Smith matters, although some scholars conclude that Smith hurt religious
actors and others conclude that religious actors do not succeed enough for a decrease in
success rates to be of consequence. Secondly, state cases are where the variation in free
exercise jurisprudence will (or should) occur more and more. This review of literature
will detail these findings further.
The first of the two broadly supported areas is that the Smith line of cases altered how
much protection is afforded someone exercising his or her religion. Both the rate of cases
brought and won by religious actors has decreased in federal courts.
The most conclusive evidence that Smith results in less protection for religious actors
is the drop-off in the rate of cases brought and cases won by those religious actors. The
literature is clear on this at the federal level.
James Brent found in 1999 that rulings in favor of religious actors, and the number of
those cases brought were depressed after Smith, and increased after RFRA. He revisited

12

The numbers here are unclear because the legal reasoning in some of these landmark cases is unclear.
See Laycock (2004) for a full discussion of the ambiguity. Thirty is a generous estimate, with a more
conservative estimate of perhaps twenty-five. Brief coverage of the method of classifying states for the
model is covered in the methodology section of this chapter.
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the analysis in 2003 to find if the increase held in the shadow of the U.S. Supreme Court
overruling RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), and as he predicted, it did not.13
Adamczyk, Wybraniec & Finke (2004) found essentially the same thing, adding that
their ―analysis reveals that the consequences of the Smith decision were swift and
immediate. The percentage of favorable decisions for federal Free Exercise cases
dropped from over 39% to less than 29% following Smith‖ but then ―returned to over
45% after RFRA was passed.‖14
In his 2001 dissertation, John Forren made perhaps the strongest empirical claim that
Smith mattered when he found that federal and state courts using Smith as the controlling
case ruled in favor of the religious claimant only one time out of seventy.15
Robert Drinan speculates on the effect of this in that once governments do not have to
satisfy the compelling interest test, religious actors are less likely to even bring suit. And
the drop-off rate will be unknowable because ―at some local level, zoning commissions
will quietly deny access to Jewish temples, controversial denominations or Catholic
schools. Appeals will not be taken nor will there be any public outcry.‖16
More support for this point comes from the fact that religious legal interest groups are
abandoning the Free Exercise clause altogether and instead opting for the established
strict scrutiny in the Free Speech clause. Stephen Brown‘s Trumping Religion details the
movement of Christian legal groups that have been defending their actions against
Establishment of Religion claims, and moving toward the more successful strategy of
claiming a minority status. More specifically, this Christian legal strategy finds an

13

Brent, 1999, 2003.
Adamcyzk, Wybraniec, Finke, 2004, 248.
15
Forren, 2001, 238.
16
Drinan, 1999.
14
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opportunity for legal wins when local and state governments exclude religious groups
from benefits to avoid an Establishment problem. They argue this exclusion is viewpoint
discrimination –a free speech violation. Brown shows that the successful Christian legal
strategy was to virtually abandon the religious clauses (both the defense of an
Establishment claim as well as asserting a Free Exercise claim) and call religious acts,
like worship and funding for evangelical newsletters, a Free Speech public forum issue.
―In terms of substantive victories, the free speech strategy of New Christian Right
lawyers has been far more successful than previous arguments that focused on the
religion clauses alone.‖ (Brown, 144)
The second broad area of agreement in the literature supports the assertation that state
Courts are now where religious actors can, should, and will seek the court‘s protection of
their religious freedom.
Although the federal religious freedom cases will continue (and will continue to grab
more attention) scholars see that the nation‘s religious freedom policy can and is shaped
in the state courts, barring a federal Smith overruling.
Dan Crane‘s Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age In The State
Courts showed only one year after City of Boerne that the state legislatures and courts
were taking their role in constructing religious freedom policy seriously. Six state
supreme courts had ruled that religious freedom will be kept at the highest scrutiny by
1998, and Rhode Island actually had a RFRA on the books in 1993, making the father of
American religious liberty Roger Williams‘ home state the first to enact such legislation.
John Forren‘s (2001) study showed 343 state religious freedom cases relied on state
precedent and law rather than on Smith. It should be noted that Forren ends up claiming

7

that Smith‘s ambiguities allow federal courts to still hold governments to a strict scrutiny
as often as they had before. This view is somewhat contrary to the presupposition of this
study, but not contradictory. To Forren, states have become an important venue for
religious freedom, if not the most important venue.
Gary Gildin argues in multiple articles (2004, 2000) for a renewed push for religious
liberty in the states, although he does lament the loss of a centralized arena that the
federal courts played. Richard Schragger also agrees that the local and state governments
are now logical arenas for Free Exercise cases to be decided, but unlike Gildin finds this
to be the proper arena. 17

Research Questions
This study hopes to find out how state attempts to affect religious freedom in the state
courts have fared in terms of judicial voting behavior. To answer that larger research
question with much precision means controlling for other factors that could interfere with
the relationships between judge votes and state judicial and legislative attempts to
increase religious freedom.
The control variables considered are: county-level Presidential vote, state judge
ideology, metro-area religious adherence rates, metro-area religious homogeneity,
popularity of the religion seeking protection, deviant drug or sexual behavior seeking
protection, prisoner asking for protection, economic impact of the case, free exercise of
religion language used in the opinion, establishment of religion clause language used in

17

RFRAs, whether national or statewide, are less-than optimal ―centralized blanket‖ ―religion-protecting
legislative accommodations‖ which staunch the diversity of the nation‘s religions. This in turn gets in the
way of the competitive pitting of faction against faction, perhaps allowing religion a greater influence than
the system can handle. Schragger, 2004, 1819.
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the opinion, and free speech clause language used in the opinion. The relationships of
these control variables to religious freedom are predicted and explored at length in the
study.
Put another way, the model this study constructs is:
Figure 1 List of Variables and Predicted Directions
Dependent Variable: Judge Votes for Religious Actors
Independent Variables
1)
2)

State legislative attempts to better protect religious liberty
State judicial precedents to better protect religious liberty

Predicted Direction
Of Relationship with
Religious Freedom
+
+

Independent Control Variables
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)

County-level Republican presidential vote
State judge liberalness
Metro-area religious adherence rate
Metro-area religious homogeneity
Popularity of religion seeking protection
Deviant drug or sexual behavior seeking protection
Prisoner asking for protection
Economic impact cases
Free Exercise of Religion used in legal reasoning
Establishment Clause used in legal reasoning
Free Speech used in legal reasoning

−
+
+
−
−
−
−
−
+
−
+

The dependent variable is the judge‘s vote protecting or not protecting the claim of
the religious litigant(s), and is referred to broadly as religious freedom. This probability
of a religious actor winning the vote can tell us if the states are protecting religious
freedom more or less than the federal courts. The probability of Free Exercise wins on
the federal level has been widely studied and established, as covered in the literature
review, and to be discussed further in the next chapter. But a simple comparison of the
two is a fundamental reason this study is interesting as no study has yet compiled a state
level empirical analysis.
The dependent variable, a vote for the religious freedom claim, in the end will be the
product of a logit model. This model is an appropriate way to look for multivariate
9

relationships in a dataset when the dependent variable is binary, such as it is here. A logit
model presents a dependent variable as the probability of success overall, and each
independent variable coefficient can be transformed and interpreted as the probability of
observing a success on the dependent variable. Each variable‘s beta, and resulting Wald
statistic, shows the direction and strength of the relationship to religious freedom. If a
linear regression were used on such a pool of data, serious inference problems would
result.18
The study began conceptually with two main independent variables: the political and
legal efforts to increase religious freedom. If the state legislature has tightened the
standard of review to a variant of strict scrutiny via a RFRA (Religious Freedom
Restoration Act), it was coded with a 1 in the legislative variable, and if the state court
system signaled a return to strict scrutiny, it was coded with a 1in the judicial variable. If
not these variables were coded 0. But because these simple variables proved generally
insignificant, variables capturing more complexity of the institutional attempt, both
legislatively and judicially, were constructed. Closer readings of the legal language in
the judicial attempt states, and tallies of the qualifications in the RFRA states allowed a
scaled variable to be created. That variable is explained further in the third chapter.
To find out the independent effect of both RFRAs and judicial decisions, other
variables are used as controls. Does religious freedom instead coincide with a more
religious area, a more conservative county, or the political leaning of the judge, for
example? Or are religious freedom cases better explained by the claimant being a

18

Guidance with logit modeling comes primarily from Aldrich (1984), Boorah (2002). Nixon, David C.
―Appendix B: Probit and Logit‖ in Contemplating Courts. Ed. Lee Epstein, CQ Press: Washington D.C.,
1995, were good introductions. Allison, Paul David. 1999. ―Logistic Regression Using the SAS System:
Theory and Application.‖ SAS Publishing. pp. 1-2

10

prisoner, or from a minor religion, or asking for their land or taxes back, or protection of
something ―deviant‖? Does the mention of the state or federal free speech, free exercise
of religion or establishment clause correlate with certain results?

Hypothesis 1: States with RFRAs result in more judicial votes favoring religious
freedom than states without RFRAs.
The first independent variable, tests the hypothesis that states with RFRAs will result
in more judicial votes for religious freedom than those states without RFRAs. Twelve
states have passed RFRAs: Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Missouri, Texas, Oklahoma,
Illinois, Alabama (constitutional amendment), South Carolina, Florida, Connecticut, and
Rhode Island. There is a tendency for the RFRAs passed later to have certain exceptions
as to what will receive strict scrutiny. For example, the Missouri RFRA, passed in 2004,
says that infringements on religious acts cannot be ―unduly restrictive considering the
relevant circumstances‖ rather than the Sherbert wording, ―least intrusive alternative.‖19
Missouri also lays out several acts that cannot be the subject of a free exercise claim,
such as causing physical injury to another person, possessing an otherwise illegal firearm,
failing to provide child-support and the like. The interpretation of this variable will also
allow us to see if the RFRAs passed later that are generally less protective show lower
religious freedom success rates. The predicted direction of the RFRA variable is
positive, meaning that I hypothesize that states with RFRAs protect religious litigants
more. However, Drinan (1999) hints at a complication with that prediction. If people
seeking protection for their religious act reside in a lower scrutiny state, there may be a
sharp decrease in the number of cases brought, which could mean an even higher success
19

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US 398 (1963).
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rate in these states. This incentive structure may keep the weaker cases from being
factored into the success rate in lower scrutiny states. This will be considered when the
results of this study are analyzed and discussed.

Hypothesis 2: State court precedent providing for the use of strict scrutiny or the
equivalent protecting religious freedom result in more judicial votes favoring religious
freedom than states without such precedent.
The second independent variable tests the hypothesis that states with strict scrutiny or
the equivalent affect judicial behavior. Eighteen states have a form of judicial strict
scrutiny: Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont,
Washington, Wisconsin and Tennessee. But as with the RFRA variable, a simple binary
variable may not capture enough of the variance. Five states simply ignore previous
precedent or are explicitly waiting for a better time to address the issue of scrutiny in a
religious freedom decision.20 This study will therefore attempt a scaled variable which
incorporates the difference from the strong to weak strict scrutiny states.

Control Variables
Judge & Community Variables
Hypothesis 3: County-level Republican presidential voting is associated with less
favorable religious freedom votes for religious actors than County-level Democratic
Presidential voting.
Beginning with the control variables, the third independent variable is each county‘s
Republican vote, standardized. More specifically, it is how much more or less than the

20

The complexity of this list is covered more in Laycock (2004, 211-212.)
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national average an area voted for the winner of the Presidential elections of 2000 and
2004. Those two values are then averaged.
This variable will capture the partisan tilt or political context of the geographical area
in which the judge‘s court is located. Predicting the direction of this variable‘s
relationship to religious freedom was not immediately clear because of the bipartisan
nature of the law passed. Support for RFRA in Congress was vastly bipartisan, with a
97-0 vote in the Senate, and a unanimous vote in the House of Representatives. Liberal
constituencies work towards the protection of minorities, including all religious
minorities, while conservative constituencies hear the pleas of religious conservatives,
yet, at bottom, religious liberty is a civil liberty and liberal Democratic constituencies are
more sympathetic to civil liberties than are Republican conservative constituencies.21
The variance of the issue was originally proposed as a minority versus majority
difference where a status-quo upheld the sovereignty of laws over the claims of
minorities on the left and right tails.22 But as the evidence mounted, this majoritarian
theory captured less of the variance than did the simple partisan construction.
The coding for this variable is as follows: The value of ―county Presidential vote‖ is
the county Republican vote minus the national average Presidential vote in 2000 and
2004, in percentage points, to the thousandth of a point. The predicted direction of the
relationship with religious freedom is negative, as Democratic voting is hypothesized as
being correlated with protectiveness more than Republican voting.

21

Sociologist of religion Christian Smith (1998) has done work on a theory of religious tension with the
status quo in this work with his ―Subcultural Identity Theory.‖
22
Marci Hamilton is an example of one voicing this perspective. Most recently in her 2005 book God v.
the Gavel, she asserts that Congress abdicates its responsibility by passing RFRA, in part because Congress
is institutionally better situated to investigate when exemptions to laws should be offered, rather than
courts.
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Hypothesis 4: More liberal judges will vote more in support of religious freedom than
more conservative judges.
The fourth independent variable is a measure of each state judge‘s ideology.
Religious freedom is a civil liberty, and judicial behavior research has shown Democratic
judges to be more sympathetic to civil liberties than Republican judges, but because the
vote on the bill was unanimous, a prediction for Democrats to be more protective is not
likely to capture ideology‘s effect. A better measure than party identification is used.
This measure seeks to capture the effect of a judge‘s ideology on her religious freedom
vote. The description of the variable in chapter four will elaborate. The hypothesis, then,
is that ideologically liberal judges will be more protective of religious freedom than
ideologically conservative judges.

Hypothesis 5: Judges whose courts are in high religious adherence areas will support
religious freedom claims more than judges from lower religious adherence areas.
The fifth independent variable is the religious adherence rate for the standard
metropolitan statistical area (SMSA). This variable will capture any effect an area‘s
churchgoing-ness might have on religious freedom. It is likely that the trial judges and
the appellate judges of the state either came from, or live in the area the court is in. But
apart from the likelihood of a strong correlation between judge and county religious
activity, I believe there is a case to be made regarding a context‘s influence on those
within it. In a recent federal judge voting pattern study the authors observed:
―…to our knowledge this [contextual/community] dimension has not
previously been explored in research on judicial decision-making. One
of the reasons for that neglect may be that, while correlating the judge‘s
own religious affiliation to his or her decisions may seem intuitive,
14

suggesting a connection between aggregate data about a community
collectively and individual-level judicial decisions naturally raises
questions.[] However, given that the religiosity of and religious
demographics in an area may exert a structural effect on a community
and everyone living and working therein, because ‗social context
influences human behavior,‘[] an investigation of the possible
association indeed is sensible. Because judges as human actors and
social beings live and work in a particular social milieu, the religious
context or atmosphere of that community may influence a judge‘s
perception of legal claims that implicate religion or that involve appeals
to religious adherence.‖23
I predict the relationship between adherent rate and vote for the religious freedom
claim is positive. It might be argued that religious minorities seek protection from
governmental policies, but the adherence rate largely reflects the religious majority who
put those policies into place, and therefore there should be a negative relationship. But
that intuitive answer inflates the difference between the average religious claimant and
the churchgoer, as well as proximity between the churchgoer and policy-maker. It has
been shown at the federal level that the adherence rate is positively associated with
religious freedom protective rulings.24 This is apparently because more churchgoers
identify and sympathize with religious claimants, including minority religious claimants,
rather than with the secular authorities. I will note here that the predicted performance of
the variable is less important than the fact that the variable is controlling for an
adherence-rate effect in the model testing for significance of legislative and judicial
increases in religious freedom.

23

Sisk, Heisse, and Morriss, 2004, 585. The empty brackets denote footnotes taken out of this cite. Both
cites were to Jeffrey W. Dwyer, Leslie L. Clarke & Michael K. Miller. 1990. ―The Effects of Religious
Concentration and Affiliation on County Cancer Mortality Rates.‖ Journal of Health & Social Behavior.
(31) 185, 197.
24
Sisk, Heisse, and Morriss, 2004, 589-90.
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The rate of adherents for each county is drawn from the data collected by the
Glenmary Research Center.25 The data are basically church membership and attendance
for each religious body, in each county, each decade, since 1980.26 The religion of the
adherent is not taken into account in this variable.

Hypothesis 6: The more religiously diverse the area in which the judge sits, the greater
the likelihood the judge will support the religious freedom claim.
The sixth independent variable is a religious density index for the SMSA. This
variable will capture any effect a religiously homogeneous or heterogeneous area might
have on religious freedom. Like the adherent rate, the effect will come through the
correlation between judges and the area that produced them, as well as the affect a
community has on the outcome of a case.
The prediction of the variable, like the above, posits that heterogeneous areas are
more likely to tolerate and protect religious freedom than religiously homogeneous areas.
Research on the subject shows that in the homogenous areas judges were more likely to
rule against religious symbols in public spaces.27

25

Glenmary, 2002.
Adherent is paraphrased here from Glenmary (2002): All members, including full members, their
children and the estimated number of other participants who are not considered members. If unavailable, I
will estimate the number of adherents from the known number of members. (The Glenmary estimation
procedure computes what percentage of the county‘s population a group‘s membership comprises. This
percentage is applied to the counties population for those under age 14. The membership total and
percentage of children under 14 are added together for the estimated adherent table. This procedure was
done for 67 groups.)
Further defining: The Catholic Church and some other denominations define an adherent as one that has
been baptized. Other denominations define adherents as all members; including full members, their
children, and the estimated number of other participants who are not considered members but are baptized
but not confirmed or eligible for communion but regularly attend services and other functions sponsored by
the church.
27
Sisk, Heisse, and Morriss, 2004, 591.
26
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The measure of religious density used is called a Herfindahl index, and it tells the
odds that any two random people selected will come from the same religious tradition.
Originally constructed as a way of measuring business firm density, Innaccone (1991),
and Ellison, Burr and McCall (1997) use the index with the Glenmary data to measure the
density of religious affiliations. The Herfindahl index formula is: Hj = ∑S2ij where H is
the odds of two random people from the same religious tradition meeting, S is an
individual religious denomination divided by the total number of churchgoers within the
area of analysis, ―j‖, and ―i‖ is the index of summation.
The Herfindahl index ranges from 100 –perfect homogeneity to 0 –perfect
heterogeneity. The predicted direction then is negative. This posits that the lack of
diversity in an area will result in a lower tolerance for minority faiths. And the more
judges and their communities come into contact with other faiths, the more likely it is that
those faiths will find protection from infringing laws.

Claimant Characteristic Variables
Hypothesis 7: Religious freedom claimants from minority religions will meet with less
success than those from majority religions.
The seventh independent variable is whether the religious actor seeking protection is
from a minority religion or majority religion. This variable will control for effects
associated with discrimination against minority religions. The predicted pattern is that
the farther from the mainstream the religion is, the less likely it is to win its case,28 but

28

Minority religious litigants (defined in the study as Protestant sects and cults but without further
clarification) make-up 18% of church goers yet account for 62% of Free Exercise cases, and significantly,
had a winning percentage of roughly half of Mainline Protestants. Adamczyk, Wybraniec, and Finke 2004,
245-246.
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the opposite does have some support in the most recent study as minority religions at the
lower federal level won at a higher rate than both Baptists or Catholics.29 The value of
this variable will be the metro-area level popularity of the religious tradition to which the
claimant belongs. Notice that religious tradition is not a simple denominational coding.
It is instead a categorization of denominations into families, to be explained further in
chapter four. The eight religious traditions are: Mainline Protestants, Evangelical
Protestants, Black Protestants, Catholics, Jewish, Liberal Non-traditional (i.e. Unitarian,
United Church of Christ), Conservative Non-traditional (i.e. Jehovah‘s Witnesses,
Church of Latter Day Saints), and Other (i.e. Muslims, Buddhists).

Hypothesis 8: Religious freedom claims based on sexual or illicit drug usage will be less
likely to be supported than those that are not.
The eighth independent variable is deviancy. This variable tries to capture what
happens to those who seek protection for an act that is outside of society‘s mores. The
predicted direction is negative. Deviance here will be limited to sexual or illicit drug
issues, and the discussion in the fourth chapter will further define the variable. The
variable is a dummy variable, coded 1 if it is a deviant case, and 0 if not.

Hypothesis 9: Religious freedom claims of prisoners are less likely to be supported than
claims from non-prisoners.
The ninth independent variable is whether the claimant is a prisoner or not. This
variable will capture the difference in success rate between free citizens and prisoners.
Studies have shown that in the past that prisoners lose more religious freedom cases than

29

Sisk, 2005.
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average.30 One might question the inclusion of prisoners in the model to begin with
because of its bias –it is certain to bring the success-rate down because prisoners have
fewer freedoms than non-prisoners. But the flaw in this is equating what prisoners want
and what non-prisoners want. Prisoners ask for name-changes, prayer meetings and the
ability to grow a beard –things readily available to the public. So there is no conceptual
reason for prisoners to have a lower success rate. That they do, even after the lowered
expectations, is understudied.
Those seeking religious freedoms who are incarcerated are coded 1, all others are
coded 0.

Hypothesis 10: Religious freedom claims that do not require public resources (tax money
or land usage) are more likely to be supported than those that do.
The tenth independent variable is whether the religious claimant is seeking the
government‘s tax monies or land. The argument here is that if offering protection to a
religious act does not cost the political entity any of its tax base or finite land, protection
is more likely to be offered.31 Claiming that tax and land use cases comprise the costly
cases to a government and all others are only symbolic is reductionistic, and clearly is no
way to think through legal issues in this area. But in a study which uses a statistical
model, tax and land use cases do represent a different category of case than what can be
uttered on the podium at a high school graduation or whether religious rhetoric biased a
jury. This variable will capture the difference between rulings on infinite resources

30

Lupu, 1998.
Eric Mazur (1999) makes this argument more thoroughly than others, but the more well-known is Mark
Tushnet‘s 1988 Red, White and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law. Harvard Univ. Press.
31
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versus those on finite resources by coding cases which are based on taxes or land usage 1,
and the others 0.
Legal Reasoning Variables
Hypothesis 11: When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to concern
free exercise of religion, it is more likely to be supported than if it is not.
Hypothesis 12: When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to concern
the separation of church and state (an establishment clause), that claim is less likely to be
supported by the judge than if the separation of church and state is not involved.
The eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth variables capture constitutional legal reasoning in
the case, and predict that it is used in patterned ways. If the judge mentions the state or
federal right to free exercise of religion, I predict the religious actor is more likely to
receive the protection than if the right was not brought up. This is because the judge has
already granted the religious actor something desired –the standard by which the question
will be answered. Once a question is understood as an issue of a civil liberty, it is more
likely the judge will grant that protection than if a civil liberties issue is not recognized.
Likewise, if the Justice reasons that a case is a separation of church and state
question, I predict that protection for the act is less likely to occur. This is because
disestablishment clauses often prevent governments from granting religious actor
requests because they may appear to be preferential in comparison to other religions, or
they may appear to advance the religion in question, or they may entangle the state in an
area deemed off-limits by the state or U.S. Constitution.
The argument behind both of those predictions is not unlike a common reading of the
two religion clauses themselves. That reading understands the two clauses to be in
tension. Establishment clauses forbid governmental policies which benefit religion, but
free exercise clauses protect religious action, which itself benefits religion. Judges then
20

get to make the decision of who gets the benefit claimants seek: the religious claimants or
their opponents. These variables posit a correlation between the legal basis for the ruling
and who won.

Hypothesis 13: When the religious freedom claim is coupled with a free speech claim it
is more likely to be supported than if it is not.
The third legal reasoning variable and thirteenth variable overall is a dummy variable
for whether the claimant is making a free speech claim along with a claim for the
protection for the religious act. This strategy of coupling (or solely using) the Free
Speech Clause is a phenomenon largely caused by the decrease in the protective power of
the Free Exercise Clause after Smith, and introduction of hybrid cases. If the act in
question can be understood as a symbolic free speech claim (a civil right that is protected
with a higher standard of review) then it makes sense that the claimant would try to get
his or her case deemed a free speech case. Stephen Brown‘s Trumping Religion details
this legal strategy among the religious.32 His work shows persuasively that if a case is
considered a Free Speech issue, the probability of a win increases sharply.

Examples of

such U.S. Supreme Court cases are Agostini v. Felton, Lamb’s Chapel v. Center
Moriches, and Rosenberger v. U. Va.33 where excluding the religious from public forum
benefits is deemed unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.
Free speech cases are coded 1, free exercise cases are coded 1, and establishment
cases are coded 1, with all others 0, predicting a positive relationship in the first two, and
a negative in the last.

32
33

Brown 2002. See also Brownstein (1999).
521 US 203 (1997), 508 US 384 (1993), and 515 US 819 (1995), respectively.
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Data Sources
Assembling the dataset of hundreds of religious actor cases was facilitated by the use
of the Religion Case Reporter (RCR), a digest which daily combs through local, state and
national religion cases via both Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis. 34 Religious case digests go
back to 1963, and this current digest is the sole digest after Campbell University‘s
Religious Freedom Reporter ceased printing the same year (1998) Martin Fisch began his
Religion Case Reporter.35 The search string he uses each day to continue work on the
digest is proprietary, but with more than 1,600 topics of cases, it is likely that the search
errs on the side of breadth. Supplemental LEXIS searches and following the cited line of
cases within RCR cited cases resulted in very few additions to the dataset.
The cases are selected from the eight years during 1998 through 2005, beginning in
the first full year after Boerne v. Flores. States which went to strict scrutiny during that
time can be analyzed for an effect before and after that change. The model will account
for that change and include cases from pre-RFRA or judicial increase states in the
appropriate manner. For the twenty or so states which are either under a rational basis
test or the prevailing test is not clear, the whole of their free exercise cases will be
reviewed going back to 1998.

A further word on the predictions is necessary. The study is asking whether a state
legislature restoring strong religious freedom will matter, or whether a state supreme
court restoring a high bar to clear for infringing on religious freedom will matter. Some

34
35

Other researchers using the Religion Case Reporter include Rebecca French (2003)
Found at www.paradigmpub.com
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studies essentially gamble on higher significance scores, and soothe the sometime loss of
that gamble by stating that insignificance is still a finding. It strikes me that this study is
interesting with either outcome. If state institutions trying to increase religious freedom
are unsuccessful, then it begs the question of if not them, what could increase religious
freedom? Is religious freedom simply a random occurrence in courts across the nation?
If on the other hand, the state institutions are successful and religious freedom in those
states is more protected, what are the contours of that success?

Case Selection
The rules governing case selection are laid out here, and following that is the
discussion of how the study determined that a religious freedom issue was involved.
This study analyzed 3,254 judge votes in 1,230 religious freedom cases.
The unit of analysis is each judge‘s vote in a dispute when someone asks the court for
protection of a religious act. Regardless of the stated issue or controlling law, whether it
is state or federal constitutional or state statutory, civil or criminal law, the case selection
criterion is whether an actor asks the court for protection of a religious act.
This study includes more than explicitly free exercise decisions, and does so for three
reasons. The first is because state opinions are, as reproduced in LEXIS-NEXIS, may
employ loose usage of religious freedom language. Thus being too rigid, it may fail to
capture the full scope of the data available for testing.
The second reason, related to the first, is that constitutional law and statutory laws are
especially hard to untangle in this area, and this is compounded by a lack of
standardization and clarity among state opinions.

23

The third and most important reason this study is not confined to formal free exercise
of religion decisions is due to an incentive judges have to base decisions which deny
religious actors protection on bases other than the constitutional right to free exercise of
religion. For example, if a judge has reached the decision that a Catholic diocese must
turn over documents for investigation into a criminal matter, the judicial opinion
explaining that will be much easier to write if the primary bases are criminal rules of
evidence rather than the right of religious organizations to be left alone.
A problem with gathering case data that explicitly deal with free exercise issues is
that the judicial opinion is the only data source that is available at every court level of this
study. For a federal study, litigant briefs and amicus curiae briefs would be useful in
determining whether free exercise issues have been raised. But because party briefs are
not, for the most part, available in state cases, and because interest groups understand that
a state amicus brief has one-fiftieth of the jurisdictional range of a federal amicus brief,
state-level amicus briefs are also largely absent.
To ensure that all relevant cases are included in the dataset, if a religious act is
detected from the fact pattern in the opinion, I include that case and assume that the
religious claimant asked for protection.
The cases selected for inclusion are thus those where a religious issue is explicit or
implicit. Examples of implicit religious claims include:
1) Preemptory strikes are used on potential jurors because of their identified religious
tradition.36

36

People v. Martin, 64 Cal. App. 4th 378 (1998), Upheld.
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2) There are 34 cases where either the judge, the prosecutor or the defense attorney use
religious language on the public record and it is the subject of an appeal.37 There are
also three cases where a judge acts religiously outside of the court, writing editorials
or letters to editors, and his or her neutrality was questioned.38 If the appeals of these
cases are construed as government officials seeking protection for their words in
court, they are selected for coding here, even though the primary issue is better
understood as an establishment one. Once we leave the realm of legal reasoning and
allow fact patterns to decide which cases are to be studied, accepting all the cases
drawn in by a widely cast net means keeping all cases where someone seeks
protection for a religious act.39 See numbers 4) and 5) below for further clarification
of this rule.
3) Jurors stricken during voir dire because their religious belief or simply their
denomination was cited as conflicting with their role as jurors are selected here, even
though the specific juror-to-be is not the one bringing the case. In all fifty-eight of
these votes, it is the defense or prosecution attempting to have a decision against their
clients reversed. But nonetheless, it falls squarely under the case selection method of
this study, ―an actor seeking protection for a religious act.‖ Note that narrowing the
selection to those who performed the act, or ―seeking protection for their act‖ would
complicate the selection system in all cases of religious groups. Or put another way,

37

In three cases where it was brought up, defense counsel was upbraided for using religious language in the
same manner as a judge or prosecutor.
38
In these 37 cases, the religious act was protected 26 times, giving them a high win-rate of 70%.
39
For example, Alabama Supreme Court Justice Roy Moore was sued for beginning court sessions with a
prayer. Since he was the party rather than the court, for example, the case was coded. 711 So. 2d 952
(1998)
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this study seeks to illuminate how often the courts protect religious behavior overall,
rather than a specific person‘s religious behavior.

Examples of cases which were not included:
1) If the actor seeking protection is a state or local government rather than an individual.
2) If the actor seeking protection is an individual clearly representing a government. An
Attorney General being named as the party in an establishment case is an example of
this.
3) If both parties could seek protection for a religious act, the case was excluded. For
example, when members of a church are suing each other for control of the
congregation or building.
4) If the judge explicitly states no religious issue was raised, the assumption of a
religious issue must be dropped, and so these cases were not coded.
5) Churches seeking property through adverse possession.40
6) If there are two religious acts to be protected, both equally important and distinct, and
the court grants one but not the other, there is no easy way to code the outcome of
that vote, so the case is not selected for coding.

Derived Cases
As I coded cases I noticed that most of the data I was drawing from each case were
also available for the decisions which led up to the appellate case I was reading. The

40

Fulkerson v. Van Buren, 60 Ark. App. 257 (1998) is an example of a church claiming squatters‘ rights.
But, the inverse is a case that is coded: Walsh v. St. Mary's Church, 248 A.D.2d 792 (1998) where a
church cemetery may be taken by adverse possession, the church asked for the court to protect its free
exercise insulation from the state and the state‘s rules governing real estate, to no avail.

26

outcomes, the judge, the decision date, the parties, the county –almost all of this
information was given in the first few paragraphs of the opinion. I collected these data.
The pertinent information for the cases that came before the one I was reading that were
not available were the legal reasoning variables (whether the judge relied on free
exercise, establishment or free speech clauses). Religious tradition of the claimant stayed
the same, as did the essential facts of the case, and most importantly, whether the lower
courts ruled for or against the religious actor.
A total of 538 cases were derived from the eventual appeal which was published in
LEXIS.41 So these derived cases a) add a generous portion to the dataset, and more
importantly b) allow analysis of the lowest level of courts, which is effectively
impossible without them.
When an opinion was from an administrative court, tax court or zoning board
decision, no case was inferred. Only the three levels of state judicial courts were coded:
Court of Last Resort (or Supreme Court), Intermediate Appellate, or Trial/District Court.
Cases were selected only from 1998 until 2005, but derived cases go back almost six
years to February 1992. There are 258 judge votes that fall before 1998, and are used in
the descriptive analysis. Only cases from 1998 until 2005 are used in the model, as they
are the cases which fall after states were clearly allowed to afford less religious freedom.
I see two benefits, and two questionable effects from using the method just described
to assemble the dataset.

41

Those 538 cases make up 44% of all the cases. But since the 538 derived cases are generally lower
courts with smaller judge panels (mainly one judge), only 696 judge votes are cast in these derived cases.
Which makes the derived votes 21.4% of the overall judicial participations.

27

The first benefit is the obvious increase in information. Without the derived votes,
the range of this study would be forced to change from state courts to ―state appellate and
courts of last resort‖, thus leaving easily available information unanalyzed.
The second benefit is as a correction to the appellate bias that occurs when one has to
rely on LEXIS-NEXIS and case digests. Furthermore, it is more accurate to note that the
study is not of religious actor success in the state courts, but rather, religious actor
success for cases published in LEXIS-NEXIS. By deriving cases, all three levels of state
courts are represented and can be analyzed with much more confidence than if this study
simply took what the online legal databases gave. I do note below how the shape of state
cases are distorted by this method.
There are two issues connected to these inferred cases that may bias the data. The
first is the possibility that deriving cases means oversampling from judges or states more
likely to lay out the case history. But this is unlikely as appellate opinions in general
typically detail the case history. Indeed, it is embedded in America‘s legal culture, so this
possible bias seems very unlikely. A look at the derived cases by state confirms this. I
calculated each state‘s percentage of the overall cases, and compared that to the state‘s
percentage of overall derived cases to find that no state varied by more than a couple of
overall percentage points. New York has 7.3% of the overall cases, and is the most
overrepresented of the derived cases with 9.6% of them, for a difference of 2.3% overall
percentage points. Washington state is the most underrepresented as its 5.7% share of
overall cases drops to 3.3% of inferred cases. 48 of the states did not vary by a full
percentage point. So it appears that there is no state inflation or depression of derived
cases and votes worthy of attention.
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A second concern is that this method of data collection will introduce a bias toward
cases more likely to be appealed. Three hypothetical examples of this type of bias are a)
those funded by rich claimants with no financial incentive to stop appealing, b) cases
which appear to be good political vehicles and are funded by interest groups, and c) cases
seen by prosecutors as good policy vehicles. Although this issue is legitimate, it is hard
to imagine any substantive bent this bias would cause regarding the goals of the study.
Wealthy litigants are likely to tilt more conservative on economic issues, but that is not so
clear for social issues, and since a simple partisan difference does not appear to explain
much of the difference in perspectives on religious freedom anyway, this possible bias
seems benign. Interest groups exist on both sides of the political spectrum, as well as
representing majoritarian or minoritarian interests. And a concern with how state
attorneys general bias the sample is mitigated by the fact that state attorneys general do
not have the discretion to appeal cases that the U.S. Solicitor General does.42 This is
related to the fact that attorneys general ―normally argue cases before the state supreme
court only when a state agency is involved in the case.‖43 This means there are weaker
norms in the states to pursue politically advantageous policies via their attorneys general.
The benefits of 1) increased data, and 2) greater representation of courts of general
jurisdiction appear to outweigh the negative aspects of 3) possible demographic bias, or
4) bias toward the more ―appealable‖ cases.

42
43

Carp and Stidham, 1996, 109.
Ibid.
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Chapter Outline
Chapter Two undertakes the explanation of the dependent variable, the judge‘s vote
for the religious freedom claim. A brief history of both constitutional and statutory
religious freedom is followed by some descriptive statistics drawn from the cases. I will
discuss the federal win rate and cumulative state win rate in this chapter.
The third chapter focuses on the legislative and judicial independent variables. In the
legislative, I will mainly describe differences among the twelve state laws. A pattern to
the RFRAs weakening religious freedom will be addressed here. That is, the earlier
RFRAs in Rhode Island and Connecticut were without disclaimers, but more and more
disclaimers showed up until the last two states that adopted the rule (Pennsylvania, then
Missouri) qualified the increased scrutiny when religious freedom claims are made in
more than a dozen ways. Whether other differences among the states play a role in those
qualifications, and how this pattern will be dealt with in the model are also discussed.
In the judicial variable, I will discuss how most of these states are intentionally
raising the religious freedom bar, but a couple are waiting for the issue to settle more, and
still others have not clearly addressed the national Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence at all.
Explaining the contours of the twenty states that have increased scrutiny on laws
infringing religious acts, and then taking that explanation and operationalizing the
variable will be goal of the chapter.
The fourth chapter details the three other sets of control variables: the judge and
context variables, the claimant variables, and the legal reasoning variables. The fifth
chapter runs and analyzes the model. The sixth chapter concludes the study.

30

CHAPTER 2
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS RELIGIOUS ACTOR
SUCCESS IN STATE COURTS
Definition
The goal of this study is to shed light on how religious freedom is faring in the state
courts, and a simple calculation of how often religious litigants get or do not get
protection for their religious act is the backbone of the answer here.
But using the outcomes of only those cases deemed free exercise of religion cases has
drawbacks. One being that a judge is the one who declares whether a case is a religious
freedom case, not some objective criteria. Another is that state level free exercise of
religion cases are specifically flagged as such.44 Determining whether the subjective
judge even meant for the case to be understood as a religious freedom case can take a
deep reading, and even then disagreement on whether it is a religious freedom case or not
is still going to occur.
Because of these reasons, religious freedom here is not limited by judges or any legal
reasoning within the opinion. Instead, the fact pattern of cases will be used to find actors
seeking protection for what they claim are religious acts. Each vote in these cases is the
unit of analysis for this study. If the actor has enough patience, energy and money to
make it into a courtroom in his or her quest for protection of a behavior they see as
religious, this study is curious about the outcome.
Characteristics of the Dependent Variable
This definition has the benefit of 1) avoiding any judge bias that may exist in the
recognition of what constitutes a religion and if the act is worthy of protection as
44

Headnotes, offered in all federal decisions, are offered in only a very small minority of state cases.
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religious. 2) Avoiding the very subjective work of deeming a case a religious freedom
case. Some subjectivity still exists in asking if the facts of a case present an actor seeking
protection for a claimed religious act, but that subjectivity is much less. And 3)
standardizing effects of judge quality, level of court jurisdictional differences, and legal
differences (statutory versus constitutional.)
Two costs of this approach are 1) accumulating the cases with a unique method. But
as detailed in the previous chapter, the Religious Case Reporter has made this collection
possible. And 2), which in hindsight has proven very expensive, is the lack of
comparison to the existing literature. Conclusions drawn here will be on cases with
religious actors, rather than on the standard actors in religious freedom decisions.
History
A brief look at the legal and sociological definition of religion serves as support for
not wading into the decision to determine one faith as being religious and not others.
In sociology, a definition of religion that is neutral and fairly settled states that it is
any system of beliefs and practices concerned with ultimate meaning and that assumes
the existence of the supernatural. This came after decades of definitions that were too
narrow and without enough variance (religion as monotheistic, or religion as even
exclusively Christian,)45 or too broad (including Marxism, or ―secular humanism‖.)46
In case law, the first instance of trying to define religion, or better, to limit others
from claiming it when the court disagreed, was in Davis v. Beason47 (1890). It likewise
began as a monotheistic, suspiciously Protestant-looking definition, and because of
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Wybraniec, 1998, 71.
Stark and Bainbridge, 1985, 3-8.
47
133 U.S. 333
46
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qualifications and what is likely prose born out of the difficulty Justice Field found after
committing to defining religion, the clarification goes on for pages and cannot here be
quoted.
Although the courts have clarified that the 1890 description is no longer controlling,
they still leave us with only an impression of what religion means, and that ambiguity is
explicit: ―The Supreme Court has never established a comprehensive test for determining
the ‗delicate question‘ of what constitutes a religious belief for purposes of the First
Amendment‖.48
Increasing diversity in the U.S. in the 20th century meant the assumption of a
personal, singular God laid out in Davis would give way in religious freedom issues
brought by Hindus, Buddhists and others. That diversity would find its limit in 1968, in
U.S. v. Kuch,49 as the Neo-American Church, whose church key is a bottle opener and
whose motto is ―Victory Over Horseshit‖, was denied the same tax immunities as other
religious traditions.
Kuch came in between two Vietnam conscientious objector cases, the first of which
held that ―while the ‗truth‘ of a belief is not open to question, there remains the
significant question whether it is ‗truly held.‘‖ The defendant in U.S. v. Seeger50 (1965)
was ―without a belief in God, except in the remotest sense,‖ yet the Court granted his
request for a religiously based statutory exemption from fighting due to the religious-like
sincerity he felt for his ethical standards. Seeger was upheld five years later in U.S. v.
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Smith v. Bd of Commissioners 827 F.2d 684 (1987)
288 F. Supp 439 (D.C. 1968)
50
380 U.S. 163
49
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Welsh51 (1970), despite Welsh‘s complete removal of any doubt that he was an atheist,
which Seeger left open. Outside of the conscientious objector statute, a New Jersey
school district offering classes on the Science of Creative Intelligence/Transcendental
Meditation (SCI/TM) was ruled an unconstitutional advancement of religion despite the
denial of being religious.52 The latest word on what religion means in courts may be in
Smith v. Board of Commissioners53 (1987) as the plaintiffs sought an establishment ruling
against textbook companies which advanced ―the religions of secularism, humanism,
evolution, materialism, agnosticism, atheism, and others‖ to no avail.54

Political research on this topic has not come up with a unique understanding of
religion and simply borrows from law and/or sociology.
This study‘s generous take-the-claimant-at-their-word method on the definition of
religion appears to be unique in studies of this type.

Summary of the Empirical Analysis
The unit of analysis used in the model is each judge‘s vote, and there were 3,254 of
them. 1,458 votes were for the religious actor versus 1,796 against, making the chance of
a religious freedom vote 44.8%.
Success Rates
One of the most important conclusions the study can offer is the simple success rate
of the 1,230 cases: 45%.55 The success rate over the same period for specifically Free
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398 U.S. 333
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3rd Cir. 1979)
53
827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987)
54
In general, see McConnell, Garvey and Berg (2002).
52
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Exercise of Religion federal cases is shown in the graph below. Note that the comparison
is not exact since the state cases here are not limited to Free Exercise of Religion cases.
Table 1 Comparison of Federal and State Religious Freedom Voting Success Rates
60%
50%
40%

Federal: Brent Data

30%

Federal: Adamcyzk,
Wybraniec, Finke Data
State: Concluded Here

20%
10%
0%
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Brent (2003, 558) specifically finds that the success rate prior to Smith was “approximately one third of all”
Free Exercise claims, and that 1993-1997, the years between RFRA and Boerne saw a “return to pre-Smith
rates.”

The difference between the Brent and Adamczyk, Wybraniec and Finke studies has to
do with Brent only collecting U.S. Court of Appeals cases versus all federal cases for the
other. But different search strings and coding play a role as well.
The successful vote rate of this study looks more like the Adamczyk, Wybraniec and
Finke data, but if in these data we take a look at only the cases when the Free Exercise
clause was mentioned as part of the reasoning, the success rate drops to 35% in 1,339
votes, which splits the difference between the two studies.
The counter-intuitive nature of the drop in success for religious actors when the judge
uses Free Exercise language is discussed more in the model analysis.

55

The remarkable similarity between the vote-rate and the successful case rate (44.8% and 45%) comes
from the fact that very few judges dissent (only 3.5% of the overall case dataset) which is not a unique
finding for religious issue cases, as consensus generally prevails on state courts.
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Time and Religious Freedom
There is no significant linear pattern to the overall date range and vote outcome.56
This outcome is somewhat surprising when one considers that over the time period
several states enacted legislation and issued rulings attempting to enhance religious
protection. It seems logical that a positive correlation would result. But perhaps the lack
of significance and negative direction occur because the institutional attempt can also
occur in the other direction (precedent accepting the rational basis standard or RFRAs
voted down or vetoed.)
September 11, 2001 marks a possibly interesting moment for religious actors in court,
and the moment does not disappoint. Pre-9/11, the success rate is 46% in 1,975 votes,
and post-9/11, the rate drops to 42%, and the dip is significant at the .05 level. But the
shallow perception of what causes this dip –Muslims losing cases –is not supported. In
fact, Muslims and other minority religions in an Other Religion category see their success
rate more than double. 15% favorable vote-rate in 248 votes prior to the terrorist attacks,
and a 35% favorable vote-rate in 164 votes after the attacks, an increase that is significant
at the .001 level. And the reduction in cases for the Other religious category is exactly
the same rate as the overall data from pre- to post-9/11.
Number of Religious Claimants and Religious Freedom
Women fared a full 25% better than men as religious claimants, and the increase is
significant at the .05 level. It is speculation, but that difference could be due to societal
perceptions of women as more vulnerable and hence, in need of more protection. But no

56

The direction of the correlation score, though, is -.033, and approaches significance with a p value of
.062.
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support is found for this speculation as controlling for Republican voting does not alter
those findings, nor does controlling for cases in the South.
When analyzing this variable, though, I noticed a pattern occurring with the missing
claimant-gender data. That data had a success rate that was very significant and very
much higher than the parties that were coded with a gender. The commonality among the
missing data were that there were too many claimants to give it a male, female or ―male
& female‖ coding, which occurred with three or fewer claimants. In other words, the
uncoded claimants were too large to code in that way. All of this is best understood as
the size of the claimant(s) having an effect.
When the religious party was small enough to have a coded claimant gender, the
chance of success was 33%. Claimants with no coded gender (because they were
churches or organizations mainly, although in two cases the judge never referred to the
sex of the claimant) won 59% of the votes cast. With around half of the votes in both
categories, this sharp decline in protection is significant at the p < .001 level.
The easiest explanation for that decline is the likelihood that financial resources and
interest group assistance are more abundant when the size of the group or size of the issue
are reflected in a larger pool of religious actors. Nonetheless, that a single litigant can
leap into a category which wins 78% more by seeking out likeminded litigants is an
important finding from the study.

The several insignificant variables included the level of court, whether there was a
dissent in the case, whether the case was an appeal, unpublished, or a derived case, and
how many judges heard the case.

37

The relationship of the model variables with the dependent variable religious freedom
will be detailed as they are discussed.
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CHAPTER 3
INSTITUTIONAL ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two ways states are attempting to increase
religious exercise rights: legislatively through a state- or mini-RFRA, and judicially via
precedent. This chapter constructs three sets of variables. The first set is referred to as
the basic variables, and are dummy variables for either increased scrutiny or not.
The second set captures how much the states actually wanted to increase religious
freedom in a scalar variable. Delving into the elements of the state RFRAs and decisions
shows quite a bit of variance within them, which enables this more nuanced, complex
version that does significantly capture more variance.
The third set of strict scrutiny variables focuses on the difference the increase made
by coding pre- and post-institutional moves. It was necessary to have this time-series set
because the previous two versions are not able to adequately focus on what happens in
specific contexts before and after an increase. But it was necessary to have the previous
two because this focused version has too much missing data for the models to run.

Introduction
It is interesting to those who do not follow the courts that the story does not end with
Boerne. That the states can seemingly thwart the intentions of the U.S. Supreme Court is
of particular interest. Part of this is because those non-court-followers forget that states
can increase civil liberties when the federal government elects not to. And a second part
of it is that the press has done a poor job of covering the story of half the nation‘s states
attempting to increase religious freedom, probably due in part to the difficulty of telling
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the story in the usual way. 57 This topic of judicial federalism and legal tests are not in
great demand from readers, and it asks for prior knowledge that understandably scares
away reporters and editors (because it scares away readers, that is).
The states did not subvert a national policy of decreasing religious freedom, per se.
They instead chose not to accept a federal grant of power. That power being that the U.S.
Supreme Court will not require states to justify injuries to religious actors with the
strongest test (unless religious liberty is coupled with another civil liberty, creating a
hybrid right). What the states are doing is now clearly seen as offering more civil
liberties under their own statutes and constitutions than the U.S. Supreme Court mandates
under federal constitutional law.

Set One: The Basic Dummy Variables
Judicial
States which offer more protective civil liberties judicially do so by interpreting the
state constitution as requiring the strict standard crafted in Sherbert. Like the stateRFRAs, these decisions have a conceptual starting point with Smith, because before then
a strict scrutiny ruling would be redundant, although there were several states that
expressly clarified that their constitution was in agreement with the federal standard on
religious freedom. Unlike the state-RFRAs though, state court rulings can either choose
to address the issue explicitly (Vermont clarified that their constitution ―protects religious
liberty to the same extent that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act restricts
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Even the best reporters and sources tend to gloss over the issue rather than inform. See 6/27/97
―Religious Freedom, Still at Risk‖ New York Times, editorial, Section A, p.28; Column 1. And Linda
Greenhouse‘s 7/15/97 ―Laws Are Urged to Protect Religion‖ New York Times. Section A, p.15, Column
1; National Desk.
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governmental interference with free exercise…‖), or more likely, with some reservation.
States can use the known language ―compelling interest‖, or they can alter it as
Massachusetts did in using ―sufficiently compelling to justify‖58 or as Alaska did in using
―state interests of the highest order.‖59 And so where legislatures aim to mirror RFRA,
the less deliberative and more insulated courts tend to take a more nuanced way to
increasing religious freedom.

The basic judicial dummy variable is a collection of the states that researchers in this
field list as those increasing scrutiny, although there is some disagreement. The
preeminent scholar on this topic, Douglas Laycock sees 10 states‘ courts as having
increased the standard of review, along with 5 more states which likely have signaled an
increase.60 Three more scholars have done work in this area: Gary Gildin lists eleven
states overall, James Hanson lists only six states.61 The difference between the scholars
is not explained by time, as all the researchers published in 2004, although one case
decided in 2004 is missed on one of the three lists.62
The simple dummy variable is constituted by the following. The five states noted by
all three scholars are MN, OH, WA, WI, and MA.63 MI, AK, and NY were mentioned by
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Massachusetts Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (1994)
Larson v. Cooper, 90 P.3d 125 (2004)
60
See Laycock (2005), Hanson (2004), and Crane (1998)
61
See Gildin (2004), Hanson (2004), and Crane (1998)
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Alaska‘s Larson v. Cooper, 90 P.3d 125 (2004)
63
People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990);
Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039 (Ohio 2000); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174
(Wash. 1992) (en banc); State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996); Attorney Gen. v. Disilets, 636
N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994) for Laycock and Hanson, but Society of Jesus of New England v. Boston
Landmarks Comm’n, 564 N.E. 2d 571 (Mass. 1990) listed for Gildin.
59
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two of the scholars.64 VT and IN were only mentioned by Laycock, yet the language
from the cases is compelling.65 Gildin cites MT, NC, and KS, as does Laycock with
some reservations, but not enough to justify leaving them out of the basic variable.66
CA and ME have signaled that they used a strict standard in a single case at hand, but
are reserving the final standard on the issue until the law is more settled nationally, and
so they will not be considered as more protective in this simple variable. Nor will KY,
MS, and TN, although each of them had their courts interpret their state laws as
mandating a strict standard of review prior to Smith: 1979, 1985, and 1975, respectively.
This is because KY and MS have not clarified the law in the decades since, and
Tennessee has accepted the more lax standard offered by Smith without explicitly
overturning the previous lower court language.67
Thirteen states, therefore, are in the simple increased scrutiny variable: AK, IN, KS,
MA, MI, MN, MT, NC, NY, OH, VT, WA, and WI.
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People v. DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993) listed by Hanson, McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d
723, 729 (Mich. 1998) (compelling interest), by Laycock. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n
874 P. 2d 274 (Alaska 1994) listed by Gildin, and Larson v. Cooper, 90 P.3d 125, 131 & n.31 (Alaska
2004) listed by Laycock. Rourke v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 603 N.Y.S.2d 647, 649-50 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1993) ("least restrictive compelling-interest test"), aff'd, 615 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472-73 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) ("legitimate state interest which outweighs the negative impact upon his religious freedom") listed by
both Laycock (2004) and Gildin (2004).
65
Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 852-53 (Vt. 1994) ("The Vermont Constitution protects religious liberty to
the same extent that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act restricts governmental interference with free
exercise."); City Chapel Evangelical Free Inc. v. City of South Bend, 744 N.E.2d 443, 445-51 (Ind. 2001)
(specifically overturning the trial court‘s use of the rational basis test and protecting the religious actor,
although not formulating the test that governs.)
66
MT, NC, KS ―follow[] more protective precedents and simply ignore[] Smith‖ (Laycock, 2004, 212).
―See State v. Evans, 796 P.2d 178 (Kan. App. 1990); St. John's Lutheran Church v. State Comp. Ins. Fund,
830 P.2d 1271 (Mont. 1992); In re Browning, 476 N.E.2d 465 (N.C. App. 1996)‖
67
Tennessee v. Medicine Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734, 762 (Tenn. App. 2001)
(Tennessee‘s protection of religious exercise ―is the same as that provided by the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment.‖)
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Legislative
States passing a RFRA are doing it in exactly the same way the Congress did it in
1993. They take the exact language from the protective Warren Court ruling in Sherbert
v. Verner (―compelling state interest‖ and ―least intrusive alternative‖) and they
statutorily create a standard which Smith said the U.S. Constitution did not require.
Might the state supreme courts rule that these acts are unconstitutional breaches of the
state‘s separation of powers? Possibly, but it is not likely. It depends on each state‘s
constitutional provisions on legislative abilities to craft legal standards. But more than
that, it would be a unique ruling: remember that Smith was not a separation of powers
decision, it instead was an issue of the Congressional ability to require states to follow the
strictest scrutiny. It was a fourteenth amendment question about federalism, not an issue
of the constitution‘s articles.
The initial information regarding which of the states had passed restoration acts and
their construction, effective dates and operation was drawn from a few general sources.68
States are all coded as 0 until they pass a RFRA, at which point they are coded 1.

Set Two: The Scalar Variables
Judicial
The vagaries of these decisions make the attempt at ordinal level measurement
worthy. This section will discuss the levels of protection offered by precedent, and then
order the states accordingly.

68

Porto (2005), Laycock (2005), Crane (1998), and NCSL (2000) LEXIS searches in state codes and laws
were used to complete the information for this variable.
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There are eight states that are clearly adjudicating religious freedom cases with strict
scrutiny of the law: AK, IN, MA, MI, MN, OH, VT, and WI.69 In all of these states, the
court of last resort has explicitly addressed the federal decreased standards and explicitly
indicated a return to the compelling interest standard with the least restrictive alternative.
There are four states that are likely holding themselves to a strict standard, but the
legal precedent is less clear because it has not confronted Smith explicitly, or has lower
court rulings which are contradictory and not yet clarified: KY, MS, NY, and WA.
Two states, CA, and VA, are considered the least clear because they have not
discussed the federal leniency of Smith and they have not clarified contradictory lower
court decisions. California has recognized the lower court conflict recently, but even in
the recognition, chooses not to resolve it. In the same case the supreme court chooses to
rule with strict scrutiny, as it has before, but chooses the standard almost incidentally.
―In a case that truly required us to do so, we should not hesitate to exercise our
responsibility and final authority to declare the scope and proper interpretation of the
California Constitution's free exercise clause. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 4.) Here, however, we
need not do so.‖ ―…In other words, we apply strict scrutiny.‖ 70
The Virginia intermediate appellate courts have multiple times used compelling
interest reasoning but the Supreme Court has not yet recognized or rejected that standard.
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See Laycock (2005) and Crane (1998). These articles provided two major sources of information for
state level free exercise doctrine.
70
Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, Department of Managed
Health, 85 P.3d 67, 91 (2004).
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Six states are clearly not strict scrutiny states according to their own reasoning, but do
afford religious actors an intermediate or heightened level of protection:71 AR, KS, NC,
NE, ME, MT.
On the opposite end of the spectrum are four states who have made clear via
precedent that they will judge free exercise of religion cases with only a rational basis
standard: IA, NH, OR, TN.72
Which leaves fourteen states that leave it unclear how religious actors are to be
treated in their courts (minus the known RFRA states to be discussed below): AR, CO,
DE, GA, HI, LA, ND, NJ, NV, MD, SD, UT, WV, WY.73
There are three updates for 2005. First, the Arkansas Court of Appeals relied heavily
on the most protective federal case Sherbert v. Verner, but never explicitly detailed the
state‘s acceptance of the compelling interest standard with least restrictive alternative
when ruling for the unemployment compensation of a Sabbatarian in Guaranteed Auto
Finance, Inc. v. Director,.74 The lack of explicitness, but reliance on the bellwether case
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Heightened scrutiny is a standard found in between the lower rational basis test (is the regulation rational
and legitimately administered) and the strict scrutiny test (is the regulation compelled, and has it been
narrowly tailored.) Heightened scrutiny asks if the regulation in question is important and furthered by
substantially related means.
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Hope Evangelical Lutheran Church v. IA Dep’t of Revenue, 463 N.W.2d 76, (Iowa 1990). ―The Free
Exercise clause therefore does not require this state to grant the appellant an exemption from its generallyapplicable sales and use tax.‖ In re Petition of Smith, 652 A.2d 154, 160-61 (N.H. 1994). Oregon got the
controversy started by denying Galen Smith‘s unemployment claim in 1990, and upheld that denial and
rational basis in Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor, 903 P.2d 351, Oregon 1995. State v. Loudon, 857 S.W.2d
878, 882-83 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (applying the Smith standard as synonymous with its Pack standard),
and see also Tennessee v. Medicine Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734, 762 (Tenn. App. 2001).
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Note that this list is not produced by my research as much as by my listing the states left after the
previously mentioned legal scholars‘ groupings for increased and decreased states.
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2005 Ark. App. LEXIS 600 In the preformatted pagination, p. 7 ―The Supreme Court in Sherbert held
that the lower court's ruling denying [*7] the claimant benefits forced ‗her to choose between following the
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.‘ 374 U.S. at 404. Additionally, our opinion in Haig
cites to Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 67 L. Ed. 2d
624, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981), where the Supreme Court, relying on Sherbert, held that the denial of
unemployment-compensation benefits violated the claimant's First Amendment right to the free exercise of
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moves Arkansas one column into the heightened category, but not fully into the strict
scrutiny categories.
Second, Nebraska, which was considered a heightened scrutiny state, clearly accepted
the rational basis standard in a March 2005 decision on religious exemptions to
immunizations.75 ―Free exercise of religion does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability‖ and those laws
―need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest‖. Nebraska is therefore
moved two columns and understood as a rational-basis state from April through the end
of the dataset.
The third update involves Washington state shifting one column to a less clear
category because of language in Washington v. Gonzalez. ―Mr. Gonzalez does not argue
Washington‘s Constitution affords greater protection than the United States
Constitution.‖ Although the language does not negate a strict scrutiny, it casts doubt on
that by stating that it will not be offered since it was not brought up.76

religion. In that case, the Court stated that ‗where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate
his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free
exercise is nonetheless substantial.‘ Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.‖
75
Douglas County v. Anaya, 269 Neb. 552, 561
76
2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 614, 621-22
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States

Coding &
Category

Table 2 Scaled Judicial Variable
Clear Strict
Scrutiny

Less Clear
Strict
Scrutiny

Least Clear
Strict
Scrutiny

At Least
Heightened
Scrutiny

3
KY
MS
NY
WA

2
CA
VA

1
AR
KS
NC
ME
MT

4
AK
AL
IN
MA
MI
MN
OH
WI
VT

Unclear

Rational
Basis

0
CO
DE
GA
HI
LA
ND
NJ
NV
MD
SD
TN
UT
WV
WY

-1
IA
NE
NH
OR

If the states are ordered in the following way, then we have an ordinal level
representation of state supreme court respect for religious freedom, which I posit will
capture more of the variance than the simple dichotomy found in the basic version.
Table 3 shows the favorable vote-rates in each category.
Table 3 Scaled Judicial Variable Category Successful Vote-Rates
States Scaled by Degree of Judicial
Increase

Mean
Religious
Actor Case
Outcome

N

Rational Basis

.22

165

Unclear

.47

1412

Least Protective Judicial Increase

.42

236

Least Clear Strict Scrutiny

.43

215

Less Clear Strict Scrutiny

.45

546

Most Protective Judicial Increase

.47

680

Total

.45

3254

The states that have made clear through their court system that they are accepting the
federal lower standard are clearly ruling at lower rates. And the categories of judicially
increased states climb in steps from the least to the most protective. The outliers are the
Unclear states, which rule as protectively as the most protective increased states. But
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because they are ―unclear‖, and there were no expectations for their behavior, the scaled
judicial variable appears to capture much of the variance it attempted to capture.
Because there is a clear category of states which have accepted the lax standard to act
as a foil against the states which have increased the standard, a variable which codes the
Unclear states as missing can give the study a clearer idea of how the judicial policies
affect outcomes.77 A quick analysis of this variable shows that it is in the predicted
direction (as the variable with the Unclears coded 0), but unlike the full Scaled Judicial
variable, this one is significant at the .001 level, with a correlation score of .09.
A fuller consideration of the role of the Unclear category in these variables comes at
the integration of these scaled variables in the latter half of this chapter.

Legislative
The state RFRAs look extremely similar because they all were derived from the act
passed by Congress. Even Connecticut‘s and Rhode Island‘s restoration acts, which were
passed only months after the Congressional RFRA, and years before Boerne would make
them noteworthy, use exactly the same legal language and triggers as the national law.
Two years after Boerne struck the national RFRA, five states had passed their own
RFRAs. Two more state RFRAs were passed the following year, meaning more than half
of the acts were passed within three years of Boerne.
Like in the judicial description above, I will detail how a basic version of the RFRA
variable is constructed, then I will attempt a more informative scalar version based on the

77

The same cannot be created for the legislative variables as the No Legislation category serves as the
reference category, and measures the proximity of the legislatively increased states to the non-legislatively
increased states.
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differences in the state RFRAs and what they say about the state‘s willingness to protect
religious freedoms.

Taking a look at these derivative laws, one sees several recurring legal themes. These
recurring themes are laid out here, and following their description is the chart that moves
the states to more or less protective categories based on these points.
1. “Substantial” Burden? The earlier two RFRAs along with Alabama‘s
constitutional amendment refer to a burden of religious exercise as the subject. The U.S.
RFRA and all later RFRAs instead referred to a ―substantial‖ burden as the injury. Idaho
and Arizona go further and state ―‘substantially burdened‘ is intended solely to ensure
that this chapter is not triggered by trivial, technical or de minimis infractions.‖78 For
coding purposes, AL, RI and CT all not using the limiting term are considered more
protective. Use of ―substantial‖ or ―substantially‖ is considered the norm, and the Idaho
and Arizona clarification that the term is meant to reduce possible claims puts them in a
less protective category.
2. “Sincere” Religious Exercise? Akin to the use of ―substantial‖, two states limit
the religious exercise to only those that are sincere.
3. “Compulsory or Central” Religious Exercise? Of the seven times religious acts
are described as ―compulsory or central to a larger system of beliefs‖, it is to broaden the
protection offered. For example, from Arizona‘s act, ―‘Exercise of Religion‘ means the
ability to act or refusal to act in a manner substantially motivated by a religious belief,
whether or not the exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious

78

Idaho Code §73-402 (5), and the Arizona statute: A.R.S. §41-1493.01 E.
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belief.‖ In the six positive occurrences of this concept, the phrasing is exactly the same.
In the one limiting use of the concept, Pennsylvania defines a substantial burden as, in
part denying activities ―which are fundamental to the person‘s religion.‖79
4. Range of Applicability. Although the phrasing differs, in ten of the laws, the list of
governmental bodies the law covers is seemingly exhaustive. In two, Texas and
Pennsylvania, there is an explicit exemption for the courts. In the Texas act, once a
remedy or punishment is given by the courts, that remedy or punishment is not then
subject to the least restrictive alternative.80 The Pennsylvania act goes further. ―This act
shall not apply to actions of the courts of this Commonwealth or to any rules of procedure
or to common law adopted by the courts of this Commonwealth.‖81 Texas and
Pennsylvania are therefore penalized in the chart which follows.
5. Attorney’s Fees. Pennsylvania is the one state to forbid reimbursement of
attorney‘s fees, unless ―the actions of the agency were dilatory, obdurate or vexatious.‖82
The six other states mentioning attorney‘s fees do so to compel payment of them if the
government is shown to be at fault. And further, in four of the six acts the reverse is not
true: the government will not be reimbursed if the religious actor does not succeed in
making the case. Forbidding reimbursed fees is coded a minus, the absence of language
is not coded, mandating fees to claimant is one plus, and mandating fees to claimant, yet
not if claimant loses is two pluses.
6. Notification and Remedy Limitation. Two states lay out a series of procedural
steps one must go through before bringing suit. Those two states are Texas and

79

Pennsylvania Statutes 71 §2403 (3)
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §110.003 (c)
81
71 §2406 (a)
82
ibid. §2405 (4)(f)
80
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Pennsylvania. The general procedure is a written notification to the offending body and
one (PA) or two (TX) months time to allow for a remedy from that body. Both states
offer exceptions to this limitation. Although codifying the procedure is beneficial in a
number of ways, taking the decision out of the hands of the judge is a limit on the
protection offered religious actors.
7. Statute of Limitations. Only one state adds a statute of limitations to their act.
Texas disallows claims older than one year, and it will be considered a less protective
RFRA because of this clause.
8. Waived Immunity. Two states add an explicit statement waiving the immunity
public officials may rely on in cases against them in the official capacity. Most states
(eight) simply include in the definition of the government ―officials, and those acting
under color of state law.‖ Two states seemingly hold onto the immunity by not including
single individuals in their definition of government. I consider those states less
protective, and the states offering an explicit clause revoking immunity to be more
protective.
9. Other limiting Clauses. There are several unique clauses in five of the laws that
limit the protection offered. Those limits are grouped into issue areas, rather than taken
singly, and each issue area limitation will count singly against the RFRA. So for
example, PA gives a separate clause to limiting the effect of its RFRA on motor vehicle
licensing, motor vehicle registration, financial responsibility for vehicle accidents, and
others. All of these will be grouped into a traffic issue area and counted as one limitation
Pennsylvania wrote into its law.
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Note that the assumption here that all limiting and protection clauses are equal and
interchangeable is admittedly reductionistic. But the general idea of comparing
derivative laws by how many limits and protections they have written into them is
conceptually sound.
Table 4 Comparison Of Features Within The State-RFRAs

“Substantial” burden?

RI
„93

CT
„93

+

+

FL
„98

→
IL
„98

Chronological flow of Acts
SC
AZ
TX
OK
„99
„99
„99
„00
–

“Sincere” religious act?
Religious act “compulsory
or central”?

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

Statute of Limitations

–
–
–

83

83

–

84

+

85

+

–
–

+
2–

–
–

+
–

Waived Immunity

MO
„04

–

–
+

PA
„02

–

Notification and Remedy
Limitation

Other limiting clauses

ID
„01

–

Range of Applicability
Attorney‟s Fees

→
NM
„00

+
–

86

–
9–
87

5–
88

Illinois has one additional limitation. The O‘Hare Expansion exemption means airport construction is
not liable for any cemetery based claims. §775 ILCS 35/30
84
South Carolina‘s act does not affect inmates, meaning they are still governed by separate law.
85
Texas has two additional limits to its law: a) post-trial remedies are no longer open to suit, b) pecuniary
damages capped at $10,000
86
Oklahoma specifies that their act does not authorize ―same sex marriages, civil unions, or the equivalent
thereof.‖
87
Pennsylvania has nine additional limits: a) no court can award monetary damages, b) correctional
facilities use a ―reasonably related to legitimate penological interests‖ test, c) Act does not apply to drug
offenses, d) traffic offenses, e) health care licensing, f) health and safety regulations in public buildings, g)
health care facilities regulations, h) construction codes, or i) requirement to report abuse.
88
Missouri has five additional limitations: a) ―least restrictive alternative‖ in all other RFRAs changes to
―not unduly restrictive‖. B) Act does not protect causing physical harm, c) possession of illegal weapons,
d) not paying child support, or failing ―to provide health care for a child suffering from life-threatening
condition.‖ E) Inmates are subject to ―legitimate penological interests‖, but are protected insofar as an
opportunity to pray, reasonable access to clergy, reasonable dietary requests, use of religious materials not
violent or profane.‖
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The logic of Table 5 assumes that the minimalist laws of RI and CT, which allow
courts plenty of latitude in deciding how to craft religious freedom, are neither more or
less protective and that the grants of specific protection are better.
The ordering of the state RFRAs and the distance between them is:

1

0

-1

-2

-4

-5

-14

States

AL
FL

CT
IL
RI

AZ
ID
SC

NM
OK

TX

MO

PA

Coding

RFRA
Limiters

Table 5 State RFRA Coding

16

15

14

13

11

10

1

The coding should be interpreted as steps above legislatively doing nothing. PA, with
the most limited RFRA, still enacted a restoration act.
Alabama, because it is a constitutional amendment and thus takes 3/5ths majorities in
each of its two houses of its legislature, as well as a passed referendum, is placed in the
most protective RFRA.
Notice from both Tables 5 and 6 that there is a clear tendency for the state RFRAs
passed later to have more limitations written into them. The last two written, make up the
two least protective. The first four written make up the four most protective.
This correlation with time is fairly clear, but it is not unrelated noise that will throw
off the analysis. It is part of the explanation for weaker RFRAs. In other words, that
states slower to restore liberty are also more likely to write limiting clauses is clear, and
trying to factor out that precondition might distort the analysis. Unfortunately, this study
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cannot go into the details of how the eager and reluctant states drafted the legislation, and
what effect time had on that legislation. As passage of state restoration acts tapers off,
though, that study grows more likely.
Table 6 displays the pro-religious actor vote-rate in these RFRA categories shows
less-than-clear results of the variable.
Table 6 Scaled Legislative Variable Vote-Rates
States Scaled by Degree
of Legislative Increase
No Legislation

Proportion of Votes
Favoring the
Religious Actor

N

.44

2386

Least Protective RFRA

.51

152

10

.52

86

11

.41

123

13

.63

41

14

.29

84

15

.51

204

Most Protective RFRA

.42

178

Total

.45

3254

The correlation between protectiveness and votes favoring the religious actor are in
the predicted positive direction (perhaps unexpectedly after a look at table 6), but it is not
significantly positive.

Standardizing the Two Scaled Versions
If we assume that judicial and legislative methods of increasing religious freedom are
conceptually equally effective, then the two variables can be standardized.
Superimposing the legislative and judicial orderings of states onto a single figure means
simply collapsing the sixteen RFRA categories into the four judicial scrutiny categories.
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1

0

-1

Clearly Strict
Scrutiny

-2

-4

-5

Less Clear Strict
Scrutiny

-14

Least Clear
Strict Scrutiny

At least
Heightened
Scrutiny

Unclear

Rational
Basis

The nine most protective state RFRAs then fall into line with the most protective state
supreme courts. Texas and Missouri, because of their several limitations are grouped
with the less state supreme courts, and Pennsylvania ends up in the least increased
category.

Adding an Executive Branch Indicator
One last factor that can illuminate this scaling of states into more or less protective
categories is whether the state‘s executive branch has acted in a public way on this
matter.89 The ready-made example of this is filing an amicus brief for one of the sides in
the watershed case of Boerne, and nineteen states did this. Six states filed in support of
upholding RFRA,90 and thirteen filed in favor of overturning. 91 States which filed for
upholding RFRA move one column in the direction of more religious freedom, and those
filing against move one column away, or to the right.
These three indicators (judicial, legislative, and executive) are only loose and
imperfect indicators of the state branch‘s support for religious freedom.

89

―Executive branch‖ here is used somewhat loosely, as the Virginia amicus brief was filed by the state
legislature.
90
CT, MA, MD, NY, VA, TX.
91
AZ, CO, DE, FL, HI, ID, OH, MI, NV, NH, NC, OK, PA. Notice that five of these thirteen states
eventually passed their own restoration act. Two had their supreme court interpret an increased religious
freedom after their amici brief, and one had ruled the same before their amici brief. Eight of the thirteen
states supporting an overturning of RFRA are now considered more protective of religious freedom than
not.
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Table 7 Integrated, Scaled Protectiveness Variable
Const‟l
Amendment
Level
AL
CT
MA

3

Most
Increased
Religious
Freedom
AK
IL
IN
NY
MN
NM
RI
SC
TX
VT
WI

More
Increased
Religious
Freedom
AZ
FL
ID
KY
MI
MO
MS
OH
OK
WA
VA

Less
Increased
Religious
Freedom
CA

Least
Increased
Religious
Freedom
AR
CO
KS
ME
MT
UT

Unclear
GA
MD
NC
ND
NJ
PA
SD
TN
WV
WY

Rational
Basis
DE
HI
IA
LA
NE
NH
NV
OR

2
1
0
-1
-2
The last row represents the coded value in this scaled variable.

-3

Four states in the graph have been moved. Colorado and Utah moved one column to
the left because both states have passed laws which protect the religious use of land.92
Michigan and Louisiana were moved one column to the right because they both
considered restoration acts and did not pass them because of a lack of democratic
support.93 One might question putting LA and MI in the last column because they did not
pass a bill, but consider again that the federal law was passed unanimously in both the
federal House and Senate. The distance between those two states and an imagined mean
then warrants at least a one column correction.
The District of Columbia, not discussed above, is coded in the data as having a
legislative attempt at increasing religious freedom in September of 2000 when the U.S.
Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLIUPA).

92

Colo. Rev. Stat. 29-1-1201 (2005) effective date Aug. 2, 2000, and Utah Code Ann. § 63-90b-101 et seq
(2006) effective date May 2, 2005.
93
Maryland and Louisiana considered acts in their legislatures and after some consideration, did not pass
the act. This differs from other states which passed restoration acts yet had them vetoed, as in California
and Illinois. Note that in the Illinois case the veto was overridden, and California‘s Supreme Court
intimated that it would rule in a way consistent with the act Governor Gray Davis vetoed. See Runyon,
Cheryl, Kelly Anders, and Susan Parnas Frederick. December, 2000. ―Religious Land Use—State and
Federal Legislation.‖ NCSL State Legislative Report. Analysis of State Actions on Important Issues. 25
(14)
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RLIUPA is a more constitutionally sound version of RFRA as its reach is clearly
delineated and its jurisdiction over federal lands and statutory acts is without dispute.
Further, it is recognized by federal courts as avoiding common pitfalls.94 Because of that
delineation, though, DC resides with CA in the Less Protective Category and is coded 0
after passage (and -3 before).
Note that because of different criteria for the simple increased variable, the scaled
institutional variable, and the integrated variable that states can be coded in what looks
like contradictory categories. NC is an example of that. The scholars agreed that the NC
courts are attempting to clarify a strict scrutiny standard, if barely. The criterion for the
scaled judicial variable, though, put NC outside of strict scrutiny and into a heightened
scrutiny category. And finally the integrated variable which considered NC‘s amicus
brief for overturning RFRA moved it one column away from religious freedom, putting it
in the unclear column. The state court system is attempting to exert power, as is the
executive branch. VA is another example of a silent supreme court stopping it from
being coded as increased in the simple variable, but a willing executive and lower court
system place it in the ―more increased religious freedom‖ category. All of these can
coexist. The coding hopes to capture the real interplay between the branches, and if the
simple variable looks incongruous to the scaled variable, then it may be a sign of the
messiness of the institutional situation.
Unintentionally, table 7 is balanced with 25 states in the more increased columns, and
25 states in the less increased columns. But because states are coded as ―unclear‖ prior to

94

Cutter v. Wilkenson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) RLIUPA does not violate the Establishment clause, but the
Congressional ability to enact RLIUPA has not here been answered. See Zietlow, Rebecca. 2006.
Enforcing Equality: Congress, the Constitution, and the Protection of Individual Rights. NYU Press. p.5
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passing a RFRA or issuing a precedent, the average context from which a vote was cast is
-.15, and the histogram from this variable is severely bimodal.

Set Three: Time-Series Variables
This third set of variables for the institutional attempts to increase religious freedom
is the time-series set.95 They are created to get at some of the variance with more
precision than the other two sets of variables. The other two sets do not speak as directly
to the research question as these variables can. For example, we can see from them that
judicially increased protection states are more protective than non-judicially increased
protection states, but not whether those states that increased scrutiny judicially actually
changed after they did. As it turns out, if you focus solely on the judicially increased
states and the states that were to join those judicial states, to keep the example going, that
they did not get any more protective at all, if a simple comparison of vote-rates is to be
the measure.
That brings the question of why this time-series construction was not the primary
construction for the study. The answer is because these variables have too much missing
data. There are only 341 votes cast in states that will eventually pass a RFRA, and 370
votes cast in states that will have strict scrutiny handed down by the state supreme court.
Both forms of logit models in SPSS exclude missing data from the model ―listwise‖ or
―modelwise‖ rather than ―pairwise‖96, which means a loss of too much information not to

95

Note that ―time-series‖ here is used loosely and is not referring to the more sophisticated autoregressive
models often associated with that term. Even the question of what causes the move to increase cannot be
addressed here due to the size of the project. This set will simply compare the before and after
performances of increasing states.
96
This will be covered more in the last chapter of the dissertation.
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have the broader versions above, even if they cloud the pre-increased picture. To be sure,
the other two variables do incorporate the pre- and post-increase effects in their analysis.
But this specific signal is much weaker there, and this construction clears away some
noise from that signal.
All states which have at least one vote before and after their increase in scrutiny make
up the pool of data. There is a judicial specific, a legislative specific, and an overall
variable with this construction. Also created were time-series scaled variables, which are
simply the scaled variables limited to those states which have at least one vote before and
after increasing scrutiny.
There are 678 votes from states before increasing scrutiny, and 723 votes after
increasing.
The judicial states included here are: AK, AR, CA, IN, MI, and OH. There are 337
votes before the precedent, and 243 after.
The legislative states included here are: AL, AZ, FL, ID, IL, MI, NM, OK, SC, and
TX. CT and RI have no votes prior to their unique RFRAs. There are 341 votes before
passing the RFRA, and 569 after.

Results of These Variables
In a second important finding from the dissertation, neither the basic constructions
nor the scaled single variable correlate with winning in a statistically significant way, or
even in the predicted direction. The time-series variables did show significance, and it
was in the wrong direction. And it bears repeating here that instead of a letdown, this is
very interesting in the wider understanding of the topic: states that try to increase
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religious freedom find that judges rule in favor of religious actors no more than in states
that are explicitly not trying.
Performing as predicted is the scaled judicial variable with the unclear category coded
as missing.
The time-series variables show that pre-judicially increased protection states had a
favorable vote-rate of 48% before, and 44% after. The legislative states had a favorable
vote-rate of 53% before, and 41% after passing a RFRA. This puts the overall favorable
vote-rate for states prior to increasing scrutiny at 50%, and after increasing scrutiny at
42%. And with 1,401 votes, the odds of this -.086 correlation score being random are
.001. The effect of changing from dummy to scaled variables does not mitigate the drop.
On the most basic level, before controlling for socio-legal factors, the overall basic
variable, the basic legislative variable, the overall scaled variable, and all the time series
variables failed to show that they matter to religious actor success, at least in the way
they had hoped.

Focusing more on the single scaled variable, compare the two most protective and
two least protective classifications and the results still hold true: a success rate of 45.2%
in 976 votes in the most protective versus a success rate of 46% in 1,404 votes in the least
protective.
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Table 8 Crosstabulation of Voting and Scaled Protectiveness
Religious Actor Case
Outcome

Integrated,
Scaled
Variable

Total

Lost
168

-3

Count

-2

% within Integrated,
Scaled Variable
Count

-1

% within Integrated,
Scaled Variable
Count

0

% within Integrated,
Scaled Variable
Count

1

% within Integrated,
Scaled Variable
Count

2

% within Integrated,
Scaled Variable
Count

3

% within Integrated,
Scaled Variable
Count
% within Integrated,
Scaled Variable
Count
% within Integrated,
Scaled Variable
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Won
69

Total
237

70.9%

29.1%

100.0%

592

575

1167

50.7%

49.3%

100.0%

106

75

181

58.6%

41.4%

100.0%

44

32

76

57.9%

42.1%

100.0%

351

266

617

56.9%

43.1%

100.0%

464

355

819

56.7%

43.3%

100.0%

71

86

157

45.2%

54.8%

100.0%

1796

1458

3254

55.2%

44.8%

100.0%

The predicted linear pattern does not show up, but the scaled variable is capturing
some behavior that is not random.97 The -3 states show vote-rates significantly below
average, and the 3 states show vote-rates significantly above, as predicted.98 -1, 0, 1, and
2 states all show the steady climb in vote-rates predicted, even if they do not occur at
significant rates. And if in fact, when I control for the category which appears to buck
the results, all directional signs are in the predicted direction. That category, as in the
judicial section above, is the -2 states.
Discussion of the ―Unclear‖ Category
The -2 category has 40% more votes than the second most populated category, and
has a favorable vote-rate significantly higher than the average (.067***). This is not as
surprising as it may appear, as conceptually the category is better understood as the
―unclear‖ states rather than the second-to-least protective states, although that distinction
is lost in the coding.
An analysis of the states in the category show that the states that go on to increase
their scrutiny have an above average pro-religion vote-rate:

97

Chi-square and Likelihood ratio tests show a significance of p<.001, supporting a nonparametric pattern
to the data.
98
-.088***, and .045** correlation scores, respectively.
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Table 9 Category -2 States and Their Pro-Religious Vote-Rates
States Ranked by Vote-Rates,
and States that will later increase their scrutiny are in bold face
State's 2 letter
abbreviation
ID

Religious
Actor Case
Outcome
1.00

Votes
4

OK

.92

12

MD
NM

.88
.67

34
9

TX

.64

36

IL

.63

16

MO

.62

61

CO

.61

33

ND

.61

23

WV

.57

14

GA

.56

80

NJ
FL

.54
.53

99
15

NC

.53

60

CA

.52

166

MI

.52

21

PA

.51

152

IN

.49

35

AL

.42

12

OH

.40

99

WY
AK

.36
.33

11
12

KS

.32

31

AZ

.20

25

NE

.14

44

TN

.14

36

SC

.13

15

SD

.08

12

Total

.49

1167
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894 of the 1,167 votes are cast by judges in states that will increase scrutiny before
2005, and the win rate from those states in this category is 47%. But it is also below the 2 category average, which means the truly unclear states are more protective than the
states that will later declare themselves more protective. These states which have not
signaled a more or less protective policy vote to protect religious actors 57% of the time
in 273 votes. That many votes would make this group of unclear states larger than four
of the scaled categories, and the 57% favorable vote-rate would make it the most
protective category.
When these unclear states are controlled in the analysis, correlation scores for the
simple variable gain the predicted direction (which they did not have before), and the
scaled variable gains significance at the .05 level (with a correlation score of .035).
These unclear states do not strengthen or weaken the predicted institutional
performance as much as they add another dimension. When states attempt to increase
religious freedom, they protect more than the states which decide against increasing
religious freedom. But the institutionally clear states fare worse than the states which do
not have a clear policy.
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Even though it is somewhat post hoc, it is conceptually sound to code these
institutionally ambiguous states as missing from a variable that hopes to capture the
effects of institutional ability, as was done in the judicial variable. As in there, the
referent for this variable will not be harmed by bracketing off these unclear votes and
allowing the votes from the states which have accepted the rational basis test to serve as
the reference category for the institutionally increased state votes. Therefore the scaled
variable was altered to not include the 273 votes from the eight states without an
institutionally clear direction.
To summarize the scaled institutional variable: it takes into account 1) the legal
language in judicial attempt states, 2) legislative expansions or limiters of protection in
the RFRA states, and 3) no longer includes the states which have chosen not to act via
their governmental institutions.
This new variable is a significant predictor of a positive vote with a correlation score
of .037*. A comparison of means shows that the variable is performing more predictably
as well:
Table 10 Institutional Attempt States, Scaled by Degree of Attempt
Does Not Include Institutionally Ambiguous States
Religious
Actor Case
Outcome
.29

Least Protective

N
237

-2

.46

865

-1

.45

210

0

.42

76

1

.43

617

2

.43

819

Most Protective

.55

157

Total

.44

2981
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The -2 category is still a default category where states are placed before their
institutional attempt. Seeing the results of voting with these pre-institutional attempt
votes taken out of the table is simply a matter of deleting the -2 category.
Does this creation of a meaningful variable negate the simple outcome that
institutional attempts appear to be ineffective? Not realistically. That a variable can be
created with a predictable direction and modest significance and strength should not lead
one to the conclusion that institutions matter. The battle to get to this point may be more
telling.
The higher sophistication and controls in the model will be able to shed more light on
whether the institutional move caused the higher success rates, or if the states in the
higher categories were sociologically or politically predisposed to vote for more
protection regardless of the category they were put in.

A description of how this variable relates to the control variables will be handled in
the next chapter as each control variable is discussed.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CONTROL VARIABLES: JUDGE AND COMMUNITY, CLAIMANT, AND
LEGAL VARIABLES

This chapter details the construction and basic descriptive results from each control
variable, as well as other information that was gathered.
The following is a list of all the information collected for the dataset.
Figure 2 All Variables in the Dataset
Case Characteristics
1. Name and citation
2. Date
3. Level of Court
4. Whether it was an appeal
5. Whether it was published
6. Whether the entry was derived from
another case
7. If the religious actor won the vote
Claimant Characteristics
8. Claimant gender
9. Number of Claimants
10. Religious tradition of claimant
11. Claimant-area religious tradition percentage
agreement
Issue Characteristics
12. Drug related
13. Sex related
14. Private education
15. Public education
16. Tax
17. Land use
18. Cost of Claim
19. Government employee
20. Free speech raised
21. Establishment clause raised
22. Free exercise of religion clause raised
Judge Characteristics
23. Judge Name
24. Judge Gender
25. Judge Race
26. Judge political party identification
27. Judge ideology score
28. Judge religious tradition
29. Dissenting votes
30. Size of the majority
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State
31. State institutional response toward religious
freedom
32. Method of increased religious freedom, if
appropriate
33. Scaled value of institutional attempt to
increase religious freedom
Geographic Characteristics
34. Region of the country
35. (3 classifications)
36. Metro-area
37. Metro-area population
38. Metro-area religious traditions totals
39. Metro-area religious adherents totals
40. Metro-area religious adherent-rate
41. Metro-area religious homogeneity rate
42. County population
43. County Adherents totals
44. County Adherent-rate
45. County Homogeneity rate
Political Characteristics
46. County Vote totals for W. Bush, Gore and
Kerry in 2000 and 2004
47. County Rate of Vote for W. Bush in 2000
and 2004
48. Normalized Presidential Vote Rate 2000,
2004
49. County Political Majority – Judge
Agreement

A Note On Multicollinearity
Before beginning the description of each control variable, I will note that
multicollinearity with the institutional variables appears in some of the control variables,
and even seems to be embraced! But that is not the case. Significant results abound,
which is in part due to having 3,254 iterations of a social phenomenon. Sometimes the
correlation values reach above .25, but generally they stay below .1, which seems
acceptable. But the transparency is an effort to get beyond the figures and to allow the
simpler descriptions to create the impressions that the reader will take into the model
analysis and away from the study.
Table 11 Search for Multicollinearity between Increased Scrutiny
and Judge & Community Variables
County
Vote
(Repub.)
Increased Scrutiny

Pearson
Correlation
N
Pearson
Correlation
N
Pearson
Correlation
N
Pearson
Correlation
N
Pearson
Correlation
N
Pearson
Correlation
N
Pearson
Correlation
N
Pearson
Correlation
N

Judge
Politics
(Liberal)

Metro-area
Adherent-Rate

Metro-Area
Homogeneity

-.147**

.299**

.039*

.051**

3254

2387

3254

3254

.097**

-.093**

.039*

.054**

3254

2387

3254

3254

-.228**

.373**

.009

.010

3254

2387

3254

3254

.174**

-.159**

.020

.051**

3254

2387

3254

3254

-.263**

.304**

-.041*

-.004

3254

2387

3254

3254

-.231**

.238**

.215**

.162**

1842

1447

1842

1842

-.233**

.299**

.225**

.262**

3254
Integrated, Scaled
-.233**
Increased Scrutiny, No
Institutionally Ambiguous
2981
States
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

2387

3254

3254

.317**

.297**

.269**

2195

2981

2981

RFRA Increased Scrutiny

Judicially Increased
Scrutiny
Scaled RFRA Increased
Scrutiny
Scaled Judicially
Increased Scrutiny
Scaled Judicially
Increased Scrutiny, w/o
Unclear States
Integrated, Scaled
Increased Scrutiny
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In table 11 are the ―Judge and Community Variables‖, which are the most sensitive
when it comes to collinearity with the institutional independent variables as these are the
only variables that could be endogenous, or could generate those institutional variables.
For example, liberal judges could be the reason state courts declare strict scrutiny, or
many Republican counties could be driving the RFRAs. The other control variables
(types of cases, types of language used in cases, claimant characteristics) can not bear
that explanatory weight. So it is with these four that special consideration was given in
the form of 1) diagnostics such as a) variance inflation factor tests, b) the use of
Eigenvalues and condition indices, c) watching for low tolerances for each variable, and
d) variance proportions. 2) A focus on whether the goodness-of-fit tests or other
coefficients alter in inordinately large ways as these variables are added and dropped, 3)
sensitivity to the significance or goodness-of-fit test scores with different models (scores
which jump around with small changes can be a sign of more serious multicollinearity),
4) consider altering the model to use a conditional stepwise method which will drop
variables which are not adding enough to the explanation (and which will likely cure
some of the redundancy), and 5) simply keeping track of the performance of variables in
the descriptive chapters and making sure they have a similar effect within the model.99
The best way to go about solving multicollinearity or endogeneity is by adding
strategic cases or constructing external variables that would break the multicollinearity.
That is a true statement, and it makes me think of a line from Jim Bouton‘s Ball Four:
"Going over hitters is something you do before each series, and
before we went against the mighty Angels, Sal Maglie had a great
hint for one of their weak hitters Vic Davalillo. 'Knock him down,
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See Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000)
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then put the next three pitches knee-high on the outside corner,
boom, boom, boom, and you've got him.'
"Everybody laughed. If you could throw three pitches, boom,
boom, boom, knee-high on the outside corner, you wouldn't have
to knock anybody down. It's rather like telling somebody if he'd
just slam home those ninety-foot puts he'd win the tournament
easily."100
Which is to take the scenic route to writing that the silver bullet cases or variables
never materialized, and the fear of redundancy still exists. So dealing with it is a function
of performing the diagnostics above and swallowing that it will not be cured, but the
irritating symptoms can likely be kept to a minimum.

Judge and Community Variables
County Party Vote for 2000, 2004
Hypothesis 3: County-level Republican presidential voting is associated with less
favorable religious freedom votes for religious actors than County-level
Democratic Presidential voting.
Each county‘s distance from the average national vote is what this variable is
capturing rather than each county‘s partisan tilt. Since the national RFRA in 1993 was
fully bipartisan, the variance here was originally posed as a center and periphery issue, or
between the status quo and those on the extreme left and right. So construction of that
original variable was a matter of averaging the deviation from the national presidential
votes in 2000 and 2004, and having that number be an absolute number by squaring it
and then taking its own square root.101
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Bouton, Jim. 1970. Ball Four: My Life and Hard Times Throwing the Knuckleball in the Big Leagues.
New York: World Publishing Co.
101
The construction of the variable for the model is the absolute number. Some of the descriptive
discussion still takes into account the variable before the negative or positive sign is taken away, thus
allowing the study to explore the difference between Republican areas and Democratic areas.
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Although that construction of the variable did perform in significant and largely
predicted minoritarian ways (the exception was that legislative RFRAs are more
majoritarian than even the states which did not attempt an increase) the variable which
kept the partisan distinction performed better. And coming to the partisan variable was
not a matter of fishing for results or happening to see more significance there. It instead
was seeing the culminating evidence that left-leaning politics was the friendlier context
for religious litigants.
So the county Presidential vote variable was constructed by averaging the votes in
2000 and 2004 and allowing the national average for the two years (51.5% Republican)
and more Republican than average counties are coded as each point above that average,
as well as less Republican than average (read Democratic) counties are coded as their
point value below that average. So for example, San Francisco county is coded -33, as
their Presidential votes for both elections averaged out to be around 18.5% for the
eventual President, or 33 points more Democratic.102 Utah county, UT, voted 37 points
more Republican than the nation, and so is coded with a positive 37.
Results
The variable shows less than 10% of the counties in the nation are represented in this
study: 282 of the 3,077. Because of the disproportionate number of state capital counties
counted due to state supreme (which are less Republican areas, although not more
populated, interestingly), the variable has an average vote against President W. Bush
rather than for him. The values specifically are 58% of the vote against him in 2000 and
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The most Democratic area was the District of Columbia with 39 and 41 points more Democratic than the
rest of the nation.
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56% in 2004, compared to the popular vote total of 49% and 52%, respectively. To be
sure, it is the national popular vote that is used as a benchmark in the variable.
Does county voting correlate with a judge‘s vote for religious freedom? The answer
is yes, and in the predicted direction.
Table 12 County Voting and Religous Freedom
County Vote Variable,
cut into 20% Categories
Most Democratic Quintile

Successful
Vote Rate
.53

N
677

2nd Quintile

.45

638

3rd Quintile

.42

640

4th Quintile

.46

692

Most Republican Quintile

.38

607

Total

.45

3254

Is county politics related to whether or not the state has attempted to increase
religious freedom, and the method used? Yes, and in line with the predicted Democraticfriendly theory. Increased Counties were 8 percentage points more Democratic than the
average Presidential vote, and in the non-institutional increase contexts, the average was
only 4 percentage points lower than average. (Remember that the overall dataset has an
average of 6% more Democratic.)
The method of increasing actually matters more than the increase itself, though.
Judicial attempt states are 10 percentage points more Democratic than the rest of the
dataset (which means 16 percentage points more liberal than the national average), while
Legislative states are more majoritarian at 3.6 percentage points more Democratic.
The integrated scaled institutional variable also correlates significantly and negatively
with majoritarian voting. The two most protective categories are 11 and 19 points more
Democratic, while the two least protective categories are 6 and 3 points more
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Democratic.103 But these conclusions are not clearly supportive of the theory. This is
discussed further below under ―Conclusions‖.
Republican voting also correlated positively with the time-series institutional
variables, and this is most likely due to some heavily democratic states having both
judicial and RFRA policies in place earlier .
Did protective voting differ in these institutional contexts? Yes, the data support the
theory. I compared the average county-vote in each institutional context (no institutional
attempt, an attempt, legislative attempt, judicial attempt, seven scaled categories of
protectiveness) broken up into both wins and losses. That makes 12 opportunities to see
if the more favorable context was also the more minoritarian. All 12 supported the
theory.
Republican counties tend to be in states with judicial selection systems closer to the
voter (partisan and nonpartisan elections) than Democratic counties, which tend to be in
states with gubernatorial or legislative appointment systems and merit-based systems.104
Population and Republican voting are negatively correlated. This is true for metroareas: -.41***, but also at the county level: -.2***. Against the conventional wisdom,
the rate of religious adherents is negatively correlated with Republican voting: -.2***.
This remains true even after controlling for the Northeast: -.08**.
Conclusions
Do the data solely support the notion that a pro-religious freedom attitude is therefore
more Democratic and less Republican? No. Two points complicate an easy assessment.
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The significance of all of the county-voting and institutional attempt associations is at the .001 level.
Correlation scores are .07* and .07* for the Republican, electoral judicial selection systems, and -.16***
and -.19*** for the Democratic, more insulated judicial selection systems.
104
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One, the legislative attempt to increase religious freedom is occurring in more
Republican areas than the areas that do not attempt an increase at all. Two, the integrated
scaled variable is showing the shape of the data: parabolic rather than linear. The most
protective category is more Democratic, but the least protective category is at the
average. The most Republican septile in this scale from -3 to 3 is at -1, or in the middle.
Although the patterns do lean toward a left-leaning predilection toward religious
freedom, the pattern is clearly not linear.

Judge Politics
Hypothesis 4: More liberal judges will vote more in support of religious freedom than
more conservative judges.
This variable captures and controls for the judge‘s political leanings. It does so by
using a measure of judge ideology derived from judge preferences (past votes, party
identification and media account) and state ideology at the time of the judge‘s ascension.
This measure, referred to as PAJID for party adjusted ideological measure, is a scaled
measure of the most conservative judges at 0 to the most liberal at 100.105 This measure
was an easy choice over simple political party identification because a) it is much more
informative, and b) because it standardizes what this study wants to capture across the
fifty states. A simple political party identification is a good measure of ideology within
states: Democrats are vastly more liberal than Republicans in limited areas, but a Texas
Democrat is not more liberal than a New England Republican. PAJID nationalizes the
measure.
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Brace, Langer and Hall, 2000.
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An inconvenience and possible issue with using PAJID scores are that they are only
available for court of last resort judges, and around two-thirds of the dataset are judges
beneath that level. So after a painstaking collection of party identification among the
intermediate appellate and district level courts, the decision was made to extrapolate a
PAJID based on the state and party ID. When a judge party identification was known, his
or her state‘s PAJID average for that party was assigned to the judge. The average was
taken from the whole PAJID database, which includes virtually all of the judge-years
from each state‘s supreme court from 1970 to 2005, which has 12,785 cases.
Collecting the Judge‘s Political Party
Collection of this information was a large task and began in hard copy, continued to
online sources when needed, then judicial selection systems were used if the previous two
were not fruitful. The sources were searched in this order: Lists of state judge
characteristics provided by Donald Songer and Rorie Spill Solberg.106 Serial sources
included, in order: The American Bench, CQ Judicial Staff Directory107, LEXIS searches
in both the specific state sources, as well as a legal news search. If those sources did not
turn up a judge‘s party identification, a search string was typed into Google with the full
name of the judge (with and without the middle initial), the state name, ―judge AND
(Democrat OR Republican)‖.108 If this search turned up more than a few pages of results,
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Both authors generously provided the datasets which produced Songer and Tabrizi (1999) and Bratton
and Spill (2002).
107
This annual source is more than a simple telephone directory. It lists party identification, oftentimes
when the American Bench does not. It also regularly lists when service began, and when it expires,
undergraduate and law schools and graduating years, appointing governors, if appropriate, and oftentimes
more.
108
To be sure, the search for judge John D. Doe in Massachusetts looks like the following:
(“John Doe” OR “John D. Doe”) Massachusetts judge (Democrat OR Republican)
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which was often the case with common names, I cut off my search at the fourth full page
of results.
Political contributions of or to judges came next, from one of two sites: The Center
for Responsive Politics, or The Institute on Money in State Politics.109 If they had
donated more than two hundred dollars to solely one of the political parties or solely to
bellwether party organizations (Chambers‘ of Commerce were Republican and Unions
were Democratic), I coded them as identifying with that party.
Deriving a party identification from the judicial selection system of several states is
possible, but is a much more complex undertaking than it sounds (and that it has been
treated in the literature) not just because of the differences in selection systems, but
perhaps mainly because of the differences among similar selection systems. A lengthy
discussion of these complexities and how party identification was taken from each
individual state follows.

Deriving an Ideological Tendency from State Judicial Selection Methods
There are five different ways states can pick judges: partisan election, nonpartisan
election, gubernatorial appointment, legislative appointment, or via a Merit based system.
The American Judicature Society counts half of the states and D.C. as having a merit
based system, which, in effect, means having a judicial nominating commission which
has some insulation from partisan patronage. The amount of insulation differs widely.
Some states allow the Governor to appoint the whole nominating commission, and even
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The source for federal contributions was the website for The Center for Responsive Politics,
www.opensecrets.org. The source for state-level political contributions was the website for The Institute
on Money in State Politics, www.followthemoney.org.
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then not having to choose the nominees it recommends.110 Other states mandate that their
nominating commission have party balance, regional balance, gender and racial
proportionality, and in Montana, even industry representation.
Gubernatorial and Legislative Appointment systems are largely misnomers as four of
the five states which employ it also allow another branch or commission a veto power
over the choice.111 And the fifth, Virginia, has recently written senatorial courtesy into
the senate rules, and is further beginning to include local citizen nominating
commissions, and a newly created joint judicial advisory committee.112 So objectively,
no states only allow their governor or legislature to pick judges. But governors often
make interim appointments, and that ability is taken into consideration below.
Nonpartisan and Partisan elections are the methods for the twenty one remaining
states –eight partisan elections, and thirteen nonpartisan. The seeming clarity of those
labels evaporates as one digs further into selection systems. Alabama has partisan
elections yet goes to some lengths to hide the parties of lower court judges. And on the
other side, Michigan and other nonpartisan states have their judges begin their campaigns
at the party‘s state convention.113
There seems to be a strange independence of being able to find a judge‘s party
identification and the selection system of the state. Data can be hard to find in partisan
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GA, MN, ND, and WI all allow the governor to ignore the nominating commission, and the judges are
not confirmed by the legislature. This begs the question of whether ―merit‖ describes the basis for judicial
selection in these states.
111
These four states are: CA, ME, NJ, and NH. Note that South Carolina is often put into this category,
but because a judicial merit selection commission plays a large and structured role in the selection of judges
in the legislature, I label SC as a merit based state.
112
http://www.ajs.org/js/VA.htm
113
Idaho, Minnesota and Washington also have explicit partisan electioneering, and Mississippi continues
to have clear issue advocacy in their judicial elections, all despite have a judicial selection system in place
which tries to insulate the judges from partisanship.
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election states (less than 20% of lower court judges are identifiable in Illinois and
Michigan), and easy to find in states which, at least nominally, try to distance the
judiciary from partisanship (more than half of the merit states had 3/4ths of their judges
identifiable, and seven of them had 90% or more identifiable.) This could be a function
of differences in reporters, or simply a lack of legal/political reporting, as well as a
difference in the legal etiquette (or adherence to the etiquette) of a state.114 Nonetheless,
it is noteworthy and hints to the larger findings of this study: states which try to achieve
a political goal may not be any more successful than the states which do not try, or even
have the opposite goals.
All of the above is written to introduce the chart below. Judges with unknown party
identifications selected in a system which allows ideological influence, be it merit based
or not, will be coded as the ideology of the institution doing the choosing –governor,
legislature, or nominating commission.

Whether a selection system allows ideology enough influence is, as constructed here,
simply a search for more than 50% of the decision making power. For example, when
governors can appoint a majority of the nominating commission, and there are no other
checks on that power, that is considered as enough influence to allow the Governor‘s
party to substitute for the judge‘s. If there was legislative confirmation of that pick, in
this example, then the state slips back into the category for which party identification is
not implied, unless the Governor and legislature are of the same party.
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In a phone conversation with a legal reporter in New Jersey, which has a Gubernatorial appointing
system, the reporter was fearful of the reaction he would face from the clerks at the Supreme Court building
if he relayed appellate judge parties to others.
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Table 13 State Judicial Selection Systems and Coding Judge Party Identification
State

Selection Method

Alaska

Merit System

Arizona

Merit System

Colorado

Merit System

Connecticut

Merit System

Delaware

Merit System

District of
Columbia

Merit System

Hawaii

Merit System

Idaho

Nonpartisan Election

Indiana

Merit System

Iowa

Merit System

Kansas

Merit System

Kentucky

Nonpartisan Election

Mississippi

Nonpartisan election

Missouri

Merit System

Nebraska

Merit System

Nevada

Nonpartisan elections
Gubernatorial
Appointment

New Jersey
New Mexico

Merit System

New York

Merit System

North Dakota

Nonpartisan election

Oklahoma

Merit System

Considerations
Minority of nominating commission
appointed by governor and legislature,
and constitutional language forbids
political considerations
Nominating Commission and nominees
may not have more than 60% majority of
one party
Nominating commission may not have
more than a bare partisan majority
Nominating commission has party
equality and Senate confirmation
Constitutional Clause mandates partisan
balance in state courts
U.S. President picks from nominating
commission list of 3 names, with Senate
confirmation
Governor chooses from nominating
commission list, with senate confirmation
Governor fills vacancies with choice from
partisan controlled nominating
commission list (the de facto method of
judicial selection)
Governor appoints a minority of
nominating commission and is confined
to their list. Gubernatorial appointment
for lower court.
Governor appoints a minority of
nominating commission and is confined
to their list
Governor appoints a minority of
nominating commission and is confined
to their list
Governor chooses from nominating
commission list to fill vacancy

Party Derived
From Selection
Method?
No

No
No
No
No
No
No

No

Appeals: No
Trial: Yes

No

No
No
No

Governor appoints a minority of
nominating commission and is confined
to their list. Gubernatorial appointment
fills vacancies at circuit level
Governor appoints a minority of
nominating commission and is confined
to their list

Appeals: No
Trial: Yes,
appointment
No
No

Ideological balance and senatorial
courtesy control, de facto
Nominating commission may not have
partisan majority
Governor appoints a minority of
nominating commission, and needs
senate confirmation

No
No
No
No

Nominating commission may not have a
partisan majority
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No

Rhode Island

Merit System

South Dakota

Merit System

Tennessee

Merit System

Utah

Merit System

Vermont

Merit System

Virginia

Legislative
Appointment

Wyoming

Merit System

Alabama
Arkansas

Partisan Election
Nonpartisan election

California

Gubernatorial
Appointment

Florida

Merit System

Georgia

Nonpartisan Election

Illinois
Louisiana

Partisan election
Partisan election
Gubernatorial
Appointment

Maine
Maryland

Merit System

Massachusetts

Merit System

Michigan

Partisan election

Minnesota

Nonpartisan election

Montana

Nonpartisan election

New
Hampshire
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina

Merit System
Nonpartisan election
Partisan election
Nonpartisan election
Partisan election
Legislative
Appointment

Governor chooses from nominating
115
commission list.
Nominating commission must not have
more than a bare majority among its
partisan members
Legislature appoints a nominating
commission from lists provided by legal
organizations and Bar
Nominating commission is vastly
appointed by governor, but cannot
appoint more than a bare majority, and
needs legislature confirmation
Nominating commission, with senate
confirmation
Local party structure and state senators‟
appoint, legislature confirms with
deference to senatorial courtesy.
Governor chooses from nominating
commission list
Governor fills vacancy without check.
Governor fills vacancy without check
Governor, with three-member
commission on judicial appointments
confirmation
Majority of nominating commission is
chosen by governor, with no legislature
confirmation
Governor fills vacancies with advice from
nominating commission (the de facto
method of judicial selection)

No
No

No

No

No
No
No
Yes, appointments
Yes, appointments
Yes

Yes

Yes, appointments
Yes
Yes

Governor appointment unless 2/3rds of
senate vetos
Majority of nominating commission
appointed by governor, with senate
confirmation
Governor may accept advice from
nominating commission, Governor‟s
Council confirms
Governor fills vacancies with advice from
nominating commission
Governor fills vacancies with advice from
nominating commission
Governor appoints a majority of
nominating commission, which fills
vacancies with senate confirmation
Governor nominates, and elected
“Executive Council” appoints
Governor fills vacancies without check
Governor fills vacancies without check
Governor fills vacancies without check
A legislatively composed Judicial Merit
Selection Commission offers candidates
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Yes
Yes, if agreement

Yes
Yes, appointments
Yes, appointment
Yes, if agreement
Yes
Yes, appointment
Yes, appointment
Yes, appointment
Yes
Yes

Prior to 1994, judicial selection was made by Gubernatorial appointment with no realistic check against
that power. Judges selected under that method will have an unknown political party substituted with that of
the Governor.
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Texas

Partisan Election

Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin

Nonpartisan election
Partisan election
Nonpartisan election

for a voter before the whole legislature.
Governor fills vacancy with senate
confirmation
Governor fills vacancies without check
Governor fills vacancies without check
Governor fills vacancies without check

Yes, appointment,
if agreement
Yes, appointment
Yes, appointment
Yes, appointment

Gubernatorial And Legislative Appointing Systems
Party identification for judges can be taken from the appointing governor or
legislature in appropriate states: California, Maine116, New Hampshire, South Carolina
and Virginia. New Jersey judges, although appointed by the governor, will not take his
or her party for reasons spelled out below in state specific comments. The earliest
appointing Governor for the judge will be the one dictating the party assigned to the
judge. This is because that is where the most discretion exists for the governor, and when
the closest correlation between the governor and judge ideology exists. Later
reappointments of already sitting judges has less discretion, or a certain inertia which
limits the influence of the chooser.
California has a gubernatorial appointive selection system tempered by a veto ability
vested in a nominating committee. That committee is composed of the state‘s chief
justice, the attorney general, and the senior presiding justice of the court of appeal of the
affected appellate district.117 Defenders of the California system might quibble with the
descriptor ―gubernatorial appointive system‖ rather than ―merit system‖, but The Book of
the States makes the same distinction.118 State Supreme Court Justices Joyce Kennard
and Janice Brown are two examples of Justices logged as the party of the appointing

116
117
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Independent party Governors Angus King or James Longley offer no information for this decision.
http://www.ajs.org/js/CA_methods.htm
Published by the Council of State Governments, volume 37, 2005.
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governor (Governors George Deukmejian and Pete Wilson, in this case) because of the
lack of official voter enrollment data.
California voters amended the constitution to prohibit partisan labels in nonpartisan
office holder elections (judgeships, mainly) but that provision was stricken by the federal
Ninth circuit court four years after it was passed, in 1990.119 Since then, studies have
shown that financing judicial elections in this state which attempts to limit political
influence in those elections has sharply increased. No campaign finance laws are in place
for judicial elections. That these elections in California are comparatively competitive,
relying on a link between the appointing governor‘s party and judge‘s party is therefore
sound.
An empirical test of this method of assigning a political party shows that the
appointing governor is a fine proxy for political self identification. There are 40
instances in the CQ Judicial Staff directory which list both a party identification and an
appointing governor for the judges of the 2005 California Court of Appeals. The party of
the judge and appointing governor were in agreement 37 times, for a 92.5% agreement
rate. There are 105 judges on those appeals courts, yet information on either appointing
governor or on party identification were available on only 88 of them. The judges lean
Republican by more than 2 to 1 at 67.8%, and when a party was given that tilt is stronger,
at 78% Only one self-identified Democrat was appointed by a Republican. This leads to
the conclusion that using the appointing governor, even with California‘s merit based
controls in place, is a fine proxy.
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Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1990)
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New Hampshire has a partisan elected, yet independent executive council which has
the ability to confirm appointments.120
New Jersey‘s governor‘s choice goes through a senate confirmation, and further, is
governed by state-senatorial courtesy, which is rare in states.121 New Jersey also has a
custom of partisan or philosophical balance for all of the state courts, despite the party of
the appointing governor. So when the governor makes an appointment, instead of
allowing his or her party to be the prime factor, the party or philosophy of the departing
Justice seems to be the determining factor.122 The NJ supreme court has a balance of
three liberals and three conservatives, along with a Chief Justice that aligns with the
ideology of the appointing governor.123 For all of these reasons, appointing party will not
be used in determining a judge‘s political tendency.
Virginia is the last state which selects judges by the legislature without another
branch‘s check. Party members at the local levels vet candidates and make
recommendations to a joint committee of the state house and senate. The legislature
allows candidates to pass through from there without much deliberation (―locality
courtesy‖). For this reason, the legislative majority cannot be used to infer which
direction a judge tilts.
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http://www.ajs.org/js/NH_methods.htm, and information for a majority of the executive council:
http://www.nh.gov/council/, and http://www.nh.gov/council/councilors.html. Luckily, the one judge from
New Hampshire in the dataset had party agreement between the governor and executive council.
121
http://www.ajs.org/js/NJ_methods.htm. The New Jersey State Bar Association‘s official statement of
the judicial selection system and recommended reform of senatorial courtesy:
http://www.njsba.com/activities/index.cfm?fuseaction=judicial_selection
122
New Jersey State Collections Librarian Deborah Mercer recommended a newspaper article as an
example and explanation of this unofficial judicial selection bias. Tom Hester‘s ―Politics Blocks Efforts to
Fill Judge Vacancies‖ The Star-Ledger. May 8, 1994. News Section, Final Edition.
123
http://www.ajs.org/js/NJ.htm
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If the legislature is not in session, the governor appoints to fill vacancies, which are
then subject to a vote at the next legislative session.124 This ability to reject gubernatorial
appointments is a large enough check so that the governor‘s party will not be used as a
proxy for the unknown judge‘s party. But if there is party agreement in both houses of
the legislature, majority party will proxy for judge party identification when it is
otherwise not known.
Merit Selection Systems
Party Identification Not Taken From Selection System
Twenty-one of twenty-five states with merit systems select judges in such a way that
party cannot be taken from the appointment.
States
Alaska, like many or most merit selection states, tries to keep a judge‘s political
leaning insulated. So, for example, Alaska has an online site for the judicial council
which makes selections. Ideology and political leaning are, not surprisingly, missing
from the information available on each judge.
Alaska‘s system goes further than simply making it difficult to find a judge‘s political
party. For the judge to be retained from one six-year cycle to the next, he or she must fill
out a questionnaire with questions such as ―during your most recent term as a judge, have
you: … c) held office in any political party? … e) held any other local state or federal
office?‖ Although Alaska does not explicitly prohibit political activity (seventeen states
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http://www.ajs.org/js/VA_methods.htm
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do125), a likely and intended result of this line of questioning is to dampen judges‘
partisan activity.
Arizona statutorily forbids a judicial nominating committee from nominating more
than 60% judges from the same political party.126
Colorado judicial selection consists of the governor‘s choice from among the
candidates selected by a nominating committee, which is limited to having a majority of
no larger than one on the 14 member committee, plus the chief justice. Colorado has
passed statutes which limit a judge‘s use of campaign language, campaign activity, and
even knowledge of where their funding came from.127
The Connecticut judicial selection system has a nominating committee, which is
limited to an equal number of Democrats and Republicans, provides the governor a list
from which s/he chooses a nominee, and the legislature confirms.
The District of Columbia has its judges appointed by the President of the United
States from a list of three given by the nominating commission, which bears little direct
relationship to that President as s/he appoints only one member of the seven. The senate
also confirms the choice.
Missouri‘s commission, the original merit system, has controls for geographical
dispersion, lawyer and non-lawyer status, and political minority and majority controls
built into its membership.128 But circuit court judges are appointed by the governor
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AL, CT, HI, IN, KS, KY, MD, MN, MO, NE, NV, NM, NY, ND, OK, TN, and WY.
This comes from the American Judicature Society‘s site on the judicial selection method of Arizona:
http://www.ajs.org/js/AZ_methods.htm.
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http://www.ajs.org/js/CO_elections.htm
128
http://www.ajs.org/js/MO_methods.htm
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without check (except in four counties129), so lower court judges, if appointed, and if no
other source identifies a judge party, the governor‘s party will substitute.
Nebraska‘s thirty-three nominating commissions (one for each district in the state)
limit the ability of the governor in the number of appointees to each commission, the
party makeup of those members, and in forcing a decision from the list of at least two
names they submit to him or her.130
New Mexico‘s nominating commission must equally represent the two major parties
of the state, and the governor appoints only a minority of the commission. But at the next
general election after appointment, the judge must win reelection via a partisan election,
and after that, all elections are nonpartisan. If the judge is unopposed, he or she must win
at least 57% of the vote.131
New York has one of the more insulated merit systems, as there are party controls,
geographic controls, and membership appointed by the executive, judiciary and
legislature. Judges go through the process again at the end of their terms rather than a
retention election. But to be considered by the nominating commission, judges must win
seats in lower level courts, which means partisan elections.132
Rhode Island‘s is the most recent merit-based judicial selection system, passed after
some judicial scandals in the early 1990s. The governor now appoints a minority of the
nominating commission, and has the pick confirmed by both the state House and Senate.
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Clay, Jackson, Platte and St. Louis counties use judicial nominating commissions unique to each county,
with enough controls to prohibit using the governor‘s party as a proxy.
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http://www.ajs.org/js/NE_methods.htm
131
http://www.ajs.org/js/NM_methods.htm
132
http://www.ajs.org/js/NY_methods.htm

86

Unless the legislature and governor appointed before the change to a merit selection
system in 1994, and have party agreement, party will not be taken.
Utah‘s governor appoints 7 of the 8 members on the judicial nominating commission,
but s/he is restricted from appointing more than 4 from the same party. And further, the
senate confirms the governor‘s choice from the nominating commission‘s list. So no
substitution is used for a missing judge‘s party identification.133
Vermont‘s merit selection system disperses partisan sway in a number of ways, one
of which is allowing all the attorneys licensed to practice in Vermont a vote on the
membership of the judicial nominating commission. The governor only picks two of the
eleven members, and the senate confirms the choice.134

Merit Selection Systems
Party ID Taken from Appointing Gov. or Legislature
There are four states which have selection systems in place that do control for purely
partisan based appointments, but appointing governor or legislature have enough
influence over judicial appointments to make use of the information when searching for
judge‘s party identification.
States
Florida chooses to have a nominating commission for each jurisdiction. One statewide committee for the Florida Supreme Court, a commission for each of the five
appellate districts, and a commission for each of the twenty judicial districts, making 26
nominating commissions in all. But all nine members of each of those commissions are
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http://www.ajs.org/js/UT_methods.htm
http://www.ajs.org/js/VT_methods.htm
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determined by the governor. That power is limited by the Florida Bar offering a list from
which four of the members of each commission are drawn, but there are no further
restrictions. The governor chooses the judge from the list provided by the nominating
commission.135
Florida passed a diversity requirement in 1991, requiring these commissions to have
at least a one-third make up of gender, ethnic or racial minorities. A federal district court
struck the law as an equal protection violation in 1995.136
Although Florida tried to limit the campaigning of judges for their retention elections,
the federal courts struck rules which governed a limit on the time spent raising and
spending, airing views on disputed legal and political issues, and direct public
associations with the political parties.137
Massachusetts has a selection system which is considered a merit system, but the
governor is not bound to choose from the list provided by the nominating commission,
and the whole membership of that commission is appointed by him or her, and serves
solely at his or her pleasure. The Governor‘s Council, a geographically disbursed elected
board has a confirmation power once the governor has made a choice, but this limitation
is not strong enough to alter the likelihood that judges will generally align with the
governor‘s political preferences.138
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http://www.ajs.org/js/FL_elections.htm
Mallory v. Harkness, 895 F.Supp. 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
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American Civil Liberties Union v. The Florida Bar, 744 F.Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990), Zeller v. The
Florida Bar and the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, 909 F.Supp. 1518 (N.D. Fla. 1995), and
Concerned Democrats of Florida v. Reno, 458 F.Supp. 60 (S.D. Fla. 1978), respectively.
138
http://www.ajs.org/js/MA_methods.htm See also the official website of the Governor‘s Council found
on the mass.gov website.
136
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Maryland‘s merit based system includes a nominating commission of thirteen, nine of
which are selected by the incoming governor, although that pick is subject to senate
confirmation.
Whether South Carolina has a merit selection system or not is a matter of some
disagreement as the state would claim that it does, but most experts disagree. 139 The
legislature votes on the three or fewer candidates offered by a Judicial Merit Selection
Commission. The ten member commission has its members chosen by the Speaker of the
House (5 members appointed), President Pro Tempore of the senate (3) and the chair of
the senate judiciary committee (2 appointed.) Six of the ten must be from the current
legislature.
Nonpartisan Elections
Thirteen states overall use nonpartisan elections. Six of them do not allow any
information to be drawn regarding judge party ID, but seven fill vacancies in such a way
which does allow party ID to be substituted.
Georgia fills all judicial vacancies via a gubernatorial choice from a nominating
commission list. But a) that commission is populated by the governor with no
restrictions on its membership, b) there is no limit or quota for the quantity of names on
the list, and c) the governor is not bound to pick from this list.140 Because there are no
controls in place regarding partisan influence, judges chosen by this method will be
coded as the party of the appointing governor. But having written that, denoting judges
chosen by Zell Miller and Roy Barnes as Democrats over a recent twelve year span is
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Both The Book of the States, and The American Judicature Society says it makes appointments by
legislature
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likely to be a poor indicator of ideology when compared with other states. This is an
example where the power of PAJID over party identification is clear.
Kentucky uses nonpartisan elections as its judicial selection system, but when a
vacancy arises, the governor picks a replacement from a list of three names provided by a
nominating commission. The nominating commission is made up of seven members,
four of whom are appointed by the governor, and the remaining three being the Chief
Justice and two lawyers picked by the state bar.141
Although Michigan judicial elections are nonpartisan at each level, supreme court
nominees come from the party conventions.142 The State Bar of Michigan offers a ranked
list of candidates for vacancies, but the governor is not limited in choosing from the list
in filling the vacancy.
Minnesota fills vacancies by gubernatorial appointment. Although a commission on
judicial selection offers a list of three to five names, the governor is not bound by this list.
And the commission is solely for the district courts, rather than appellate or supreme
court, although some governors have asked for advice on those two levels as well.143 But
because the governor appears to have limitless institutional power when filling vacancies,
the party of the appointing governor will substitute for the judge when other not
available. Reform Party Governor Jesse Ventura will not be a basis for any classification.
Mississippi changed from partisan elections of judicial candidates in 1994 to
nonpartisan elections. The change did little to alter one of the most competitive states for
judicial seats. Laws prohibiting the parties from donating to or endorsing a judicial
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http://www.ajs.org/js/GA_methods.htm
http://www.ajs.org/js/KY_methods.htm
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http://www.ajs.org/js/MI_methods.htm
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http://www.ajs.org/js/MN_methods.htm
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candidate were overturned in 2002, but campaign financing laws governing judicial
elections remains largely intact.
Montana fills vacancies with a gubernatorial pick from a list of three to five names
provided by a nominating commission, and then confirmed by the senate. The governor
names a simple majority of the seven member commission, but because of other
limitations144, party will serve as a proxy only when the party of the governor controls the
legislature.
North Dakota fills vacancies via a nominating commission appointed in equal parts
by the Chief Judge, Governor, and President of the state bar. The governor‘s choice is
constrained to picking from the list, calling a special election, or reconvening the
commission for another list. Therefore the governor‘s party will not substitute for judge
party identification in appointments.145
Ohio allows the parties to nominate, support and fund judicial candidates before the
nonpartisan elections. Filling vacancies is solely left to the Governor, without check.
Though past governors have picked from a small list provided by the leadership of both
parties from the court‘s locality.146 This presumably ensures smoother transitions from
appointment to election.
Oregon has nonpartisan elections, but they also allow the governor to fill vacancies
without any checks, so likeminded judges have an incentive to retire after an election,
allowing the governor to appoint their replacement, which is in fact common.
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Interestingly, the governor must appoint four people from various ―industries, businesses or
professions‖. http://www.ajs.org/js/MT_methods.htm
145
http://www.ajs.org/js/ND_methods.htm
146
http://www.ajs.org/js/OH_methods.htm
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Washington‘s nonpartisan elections often look no different than partisan elections
with issue advocacy and financing coming from ideologically predictable sources. When
vacancies arise, the governor appoints a judge to sit until the next general election. Since
there are no controls on that choice, gubernatorial party will substitute for appointed
judges.
Wisconsin‘s governor fills vacancies with the help of a nominating commission s/he
populates, but by which s/he‘s not bound. Appointments also stay in office until the next
retention election without another justice running.147 So appointing governor party will
substitute for unknown judge party identification.
Partisan Selection System
Eight states use partisan elections, and interestingly, these states have more protective
procedures in place to limit the influence of voters when filling vacancies. For example,
Pennsylvania has two-thirds senate confirmation, Louisiana calls a special election,
Illinois has their Supreme Court fill the vacancy, and Texas has a simple majority senate
confirmation.
North Carolina was a partisan election state until recently: 1996 for limited
jurisdictions, 2001 for general jurisdictional courts, 2002 for intermediate appellate
courts. The state is the first to move to voluntary public financed judicial elections.
Because the governor can fill vacancies without a check, appointed judges whose party
cannot otherwise be determined will be coded with the party of the governor.
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http://www.ajs.org/js/WI_methods.htm
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Pennsylvania fills vacancies with a gubernatorial-chosen nominee whose
confirmation requires a super majority of two-thirds of the Senate, thus gubernatorial
appointing party will not count as a proxy for judge party identification.148
Texas fills vacancies by gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation.149
When the party of the governor and that which controls the senate is the same, it will be
used to substitute for the party of the judge if it is unknown.

When the CQ Judicial Staff Directory mentions a judge‘s ―service beginning‖ in
November or January of a given year, and there is no other information to go on, it will
be assumed the judge was elected. Both dates are offered in the directory for judges who
were elected, when crosschecked against The American Bench. This is a helpful
assumption because if service begins in others months, and no other relevant information
is available, it will be assumed the judge was appointed to a vacancy, and party can thus
be determined if no other information is available.
Missing Information
The missing data do have a relationship to political culture and selection system. In
states that take the judicial insulation from politics seriously, as in Missouri, the press
releases from the state, the reporting on cases and judges themselves are shorn of any
reference to their politics. This means that party identification could be coded for judges
responsible for only 13 of the 86 votes cast by Missouri judges. Yet other states with
merit systems do not have the same political culture, and so party ID is easier to come by
(e.g. New York with 87% party known). Some states with partisan elections, strikingly,
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http://www.ajs.org/js/PA_methods.htm
http://www.ajs.org/js/TX_elections.htm
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have a Missouri like hesitancy to talk about the direct connection between the party and
the judges (New Jersey with just over a third known), while other states with partisancontrols in place still flaunt it (Mississippi with almost three-quarters known).
In the model, missing data in the Judge Politics variable appears to be slightly
correlated with the more insulated selection system, as is expected. See table 14 below.
But with the average deviation being 0.6 percentage points for the five categories, the
difference appears to be one that will not bias inferences drawn from the data with Judge
Politics coded.
Table 14 Analysis of Missing & Available Judge Party ID Data for Possible Bias

Type of Judicial Selection
System
Partisan election

N for
the
Dataset
Overall

% of
Overall
N

N where
Judge
Ideology
is
Collected

% of
Collected
N

N where
Judge
Ideology is
Not
Collected

% of
Missing
N

% of
National
Population

760

23.4%

568

23.8%

192

22.8%

27.6%

Gov or Leg Appointment

515

15.8%

403

16.9%

112

13.3%

22.3%

Nonpartisan election

642

19.7%

459

19.2%

183

21.7%

14.5%

Combined Merit

813

25.0%

592

24.8%

221

26.2%

22.9%

Merit

524

16.1%

365

15.3%

135

16.0%

12.8%

Total

3254

100.0%

2387

100.0%

843

100.0%

100.0%

The last column is an interesting for comparing how many people live under each
judicial selection system and how many judge votes are cast. Since the collection of state
cases here is putatively claimed to be the population rather than a sample of a population,
that there is a large difference between the last column and proportions in the study does
not question the integrity of the dataset.
Analysis
After all that, the end result is that just under three-quarters of the votes cast in this
model can be coded. 2,381 votes from 1,380 judges were associated with a party, leaving
873 votes from 506 judges without a reliable association.
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56% of the judges self identify as Democrats150, and the average PAJID score for the
overall model is 50.05.151 The average PAJID scores for district courts at 51.5, for
intermediate appellate courts at 50.3, and for courts of last resort the average PAJID is
49.5. But since Democratic party identification is significantly higher at the COLR
(59%) than at the intermediate or district level (53% and 54%), the PAJID differences are
likely sullied by the derived numbers assigned to lower court judges based on their party
identification.
Justifying the amount of energy spent on the construction of this variable, it captures
more of the variance in religious freedom than the simple judge party identification does.
Judge politics has a .05 correlation score in the liberal direction, significant at the .001
level.
Judge Politics and the state‘s attempt to increase religious freedom are positively and
significantly correlated as well. The average PAJID score in states which attempt the
increase is 54.6, and in the states which do not attempt an increase, the average PAJID is
43.5.152 Eleven PAJID points is larger than the middle quintile of the spread.
States which attempt to increase via the judicial branch have significantly more
liberal judges (PAJID score of 58), and states which go through RFRAs have
significantly more conservative judges (46). States which do not attempt to increase
religious freedom at all have the most conservative judges (43). And the scalar version of

150

The national average Democratic party identification for state trial judges was reported in 1980 to be
55% by John Paul Ryan. American Trial Judges: Their Work Styles and Performance. New York: Free
Press. Chapter 1 and Appendix B, as cited in (Stumpf 1998, 156)
151
The PAJID score mean for the supreme court justices is 49.62, and the mean for those scores
extrapolated from parties is 50.42
152
This difference is significant at the .001 level.
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institutional protectiveness continues to corroborate the positive relationship between
judge liberalness and institutional response to religious freedom: .299***.
The clarity of direction in those results may lead to an oversimplified interpretation,
though. Is conservatism at home in the no-attempt states, while liberalism at home in the
increased scrutiny states, with RFRA states as the middle? A linear interpretation of the
interplay between Judge Politics and states increasing scrutiny may yield a cleaner
relationship where one likely does not exist.
The overall time-series institutional variable which correlated with conservative
counties also shows a tilt toward more conservative judges by 2 PAJID points, and with a
date range of the last 1990s to the mid-2000s, an era where Republican voting was high;
this is not surprising.
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Table 15 Judge PAJID Score Characteristics
0 (Most Conservative) to 100 (Most Liberal)
Mean Judge PAJID

N

Winning Votes

51.3

1058

Losing Votes

49.0

1329

No Institutional Increase

43.6

993

Institutional Attempt to Increase Religious Freedom

54.7

1394

Legislatively Increased

46.4

427

Judicially Increased

58.3

967

Rational Basis States

46.4

178

Prior to Institutional Decrease or Increase

44.1

574

Least Protective Increased States

46.9

157

Level 0 Protection States

51.3

43

Level 1 Protection States

45.8

449

Level 2 Protection States

56.2

669

Most Protective States

73.0

125

Total

50.3

2195

Male

49.4

1819

Female

52.2

564

Conservative Non-Traditional Judges

10.1

21

Evangelical Protestant Judges

37.7

56

Mainline Protestant Judges

45.2

186

Black Protestant Judges

35.1

13

Catholic Judges

56.5

210

Jewish Judges

65.6

60

West Coast

56.5

352

Mississippi Valley

33.3

375

Interior

45.2

670

South Atlantic

37.6

303

Northeast

66.1

687

Total

50.0

2387

Other interesting findings here include a very strong pattern of judge religious
tradition and PAJID scores in expected directions. Conservative non-traditionals (mainly
Mormons here) showed the strongest tendency to be more conservative with a correlation
score of -.46, followed by Evangelical Protestants at -.27, and Mainline Protestants
following at -.219. Black Protestant judges, perhaps surprisingly because of a strong
tendency of African Americans to identify as Democrats, show a conservative correlation
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with PAJID at -.13. Catholics and Jewish judges, again surprisingly, have the same
strength and liberal direction of correlation with PAJID at .324 and .329, respectively.
All of these relationships are significant at the p<.001 level except Black Protestants who
are significant at the p<.01 level.153

Metro-Area Religious Adherence Rate
Hypothesis 5: Judges whose courts are in high religious adherence areas will support
religious freedom claims more than judges from lower religious adherence
areas.
The objective of this variable is to understand the effect, if any, a metropolitan area‘s
church attendance and membership has on religious freedom, and to control that effect in
the model. No research has been done on the relationship of religious freedom to
religious adherence rates prior to now.
The variable is a simple ratio of each metropolitan area‘s religious adherents and the
population of that metro area.154
The number of adherents comes from the Glenmary Research Center‘s publication,
Religious Congregations & Membership in the United States 2000. The Glenmary data
come from a ―report containing statistics for 149 religious bodies, providing information
on the number of their congregations within each region, state, and county of the United
States. Where available, also included are actual membership figures (as defined by the
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There are 68 Evangelical Protestant judges, 198 Mainline Protestant judges, 13 Black Protestant judges,
210 Catholic judges, 60 Jewish judges, and 21 Conservative Non-Traditional judges.
154
Information on metropolitan areas comes from both the Glenmary data as well as the U.S. Census
website, found at www.census.gov.
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religious body), total adherents, and average attendance.‖155 It is a questionnaire based
data collection with statistical extrapolations for select religious traditions.156
Adherent is defined by Glenmary as ―all members, including their children and the
estimated number of other participants who are not considered members; for example, the
‗baptized,‘ ‗those not confirmed,‘ ‗those not eligible for communion,‘ ‗those regularly
attending services,‘ and the like.‖157 Adherent is a better unit of analysis than church
membership because membership is not a standardized concept. Baptism, for example,
can be symbolic or it can be the definition of membership itself. Asking denominations
to report back on total adherents standardizes the concept. Glenmary extrapolates from
information on the questionnaire. So for example when a denomination reports only
membership, and it is a denomination which only counts adults, Glenmary takes a county
based child-rate and extrapolates how many adherents the church has.
What I refer to here as a ―metro area‖ is formally the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) derived from the 1990 census, to better fit the Glenmary data, defined as an
urbanized area with 50,000 or more inhabitants. Metropolitan Divisions, or nested
metropolitan areas within metropolitan areas, are not analyzed in this study.158 There
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Glenmary 2002, vii.
The Glenmary data note a bias in their collection which is likely to undercount historically African
American denominations. Those five denominations, along with 136 other identifiable denominations did
not participate in the study. These 141 denominations total an estimated population of 31,040,360, or more
than 10.2% of the population in 1990.
157
Glenmary 2002, xv.
158
Standard definitions of metropolitan areas were first issued in 1949 by the then Bureau of the Budget
(predecessor of OMB), under the designation "standard metropolitan area" (SMA). The term was changed
to "standard metropolitan statistical area" (SMSA) in 1959, and to "metropolitan statistical area" (MSA) in
1983. The term "metropolitan area" (MA) was adopted in 1990 and referred collectively to metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs), consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs), and primary metropolitan
statistical areas (PMSAs). The term "core based statistical area" (CBSA) became effective in 2000 and
refers collectively to metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas. This is taken from the U.S. Census
website‘s ―About Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas‖,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/aboutmetro.html
156
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were 361 metro areas in the 1990 census. The units of analysis for Glenmary, and the
smallest geographic units for metro areas, are counties.
For areas that do not fall in metro-areas, which occurs around 8% of the time, the
ratio for the county will be used.
Since much of this data was transcribed by hand, reliability tests were needed to catch
errors. That test is a comparison of the variable to each metro area‘s constituting
counties‘ adherence rates. So for example, the Chicago metro area‘s adherence rate (the
constructed variable with possible errors) was compared to the sixteen counties which
comprise this metro area, as defined by the census. By creating a repeating formula for
subtracting the SMA rate from the county rate for each case, I could then sort by that
difference, and analyze the top and bottom 100 cases or so to make sure they were
transcribed correctly and are diverse counties rather than mistakes.
Results
The results of this collection show that adherence rates around the nation range from
a low of 22.5% to a high of 93% and have a mean of 49.6%. When the vote occurs in an
area which is not a metro area (247 votes in 115 cases) the county‘s adherent rate is used
in lieu of the metro area. The county adherence rate looks very much like the metro rate
in range, but is 2 percentage points higher in average. The adherent rate for the nation as
a whole is 56.8%, so the metro areas and counties involved in this study tend to fall in the
areas with fewer adherents. That is related to the locations of supreme (and oftentimes
intermediate appellate) courts in state capitols, and those state capitols having unique
demographics that correlate with lower adherence rates. The data appear to support this
explanation as adherent rates decrease for courts located at the capital.
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The relationship of adherent rates to religious freedom is positive and significant:
.055 and p<.01. The relationship of adherent rates to states‘ attempts to increase religious
freedom is also positive and significant (.04*).
The interaction between the institutional attempts and winning votes is also positive
and significant. Adherent rates are higher than average in 1) legislatively and 2)
judicially increased winning contexts, and 3) in 10 of 14 possible contexts in the scaled
institutional variable.
In short, the more religious an area is, the more favorable the courts tend to be.
Table 16 Metro Adherent-Rate Characteristics, from Lowest to Highest

Favorable
Vote Rate
.43

Percentage
of Votes
from All
Increased
Scrutiny
Contexts
.52

Percentage
of Votes
from
Legislative
Attempt
Contexts
.13

Percentage
of Votes
from
Judicial
Attempt
Contexts
.39

N

690

690

690

Mean

.44

.53

.20

N

614

614

614

Metro Adherent-Rate, cut
into 20% Categories
Lowest Adh-Rate
2nd Quintile
3rd Quintile
4th Quintile
Highest Adh-Rate
Total

Mean

Judge
PAJID
0
(Conserv.)
-100
(Liberal)
49.9

Percentage
of County
Voting for
George W.
Bush in '04
.42

690

551

690

.32

49.5

.43

614

472

614

Mean

.39

.39

.14

.24

40.5

.49

N

665

665

665

665

426

665

Mean

.47

.75

.24

.52

52.8

.43

N

662

662

662

662

489

662

Mean

.50

.55

.16

.39

56.9

.41

N

623

623

623

623

449

623

Mean

.45

.55

.17

.37

50.0

.44

3254

3254

3254

3254

2387

3254

N

Judge Politics shows a significant relationship that appears to be parametric. The
positive correlation score (.09) means that it tilts toward higher adherence rates with more
liberal judge vote on a religious actor, but moderate adherence rates are better seen as the
pole for conservative judges, rather than the lowest adherence rates.
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And county presidential party also shows a parabolic shape. It has a negative
relationship to Republican voting, but support for Candidate W. Bush was lowest in the
metro areas with the least and most adherents, and rose as those rates moderated.
It does bear repeating that Republican voting does not have a linear, or even positive
relationship with the rate of adherents in an area. This is not contradictory to one of the
more referred to statistics in Presidential elections over the last few elections –that
church-going correlates strongly with Republican voting; but it certainly seems contrary
to it.
The same pattern occurs at the county level with adherent rates: very significant and
comparatively strong Democratic correlations with the more religious areas. The most
likely explanation for this relationship is the evidence correcting a stereotype that the
South or Southwest is the most religious areas of the country. In fact the Catholic
Northeast has the highest adherent-rate if you parcel the nation into the South, the North
and the West. Further, if you categorize the nation into the more political geographic
mix, you find the Catholic Northeast still is quite a bit higher than the rest of the nation.
Table 17 Metro-Area Religious Adherent Rate by Geography
MetroAdherentRate
.385

Political Geography
West Coast

N
442

Mississippi Valley

.521

500

Interior

.496

1014

South Atlantic

.414

346

Northeast

.562

952

Total

.496

3254

It is worth noting here that the Glenmary data do make statistical adjustments for
nominal and/or non-practicing Catholics, so that they are not considered adherents in
their data.
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Metro-Area Religious Homogeneity Index
Hypothesis 6: The more religiously diverse the area in which the judge sits, the greater
the likelihood the judge will support the religious freedom claim.
Similar to the last variable in that it predicts that an area‘s religious make-up will
have an effect on religious freedom, this variable will capture how religiously diverse an
area is. The prediction for that relationship is for religious freedom to find more friendly
treatment in more diverse areas. But to be clear, the research here is fairly exploratory,
and the study holds that religious diversity in an area will matter, more than it holds that
it will matter in a negative and linear way.
The method I used to construct the variable was to take the population of each
religion (or ―religious tradition‖, explained in the next variable) and calculate the odds of
two random people being from the same tradition. That calculation is called a Herfindahl
Index, and it was first used in business research measuring area industries for
monopolies. Herfindahl indexes range from perfect homogeneity at 1, to perfect
heterogeneity at 0. The index is a sum of the squared adherent-rates of the religious
traditions. More specifically it is Hj = ∑S2ij where S is the specific religious tradition
divided by area j‘s adherent population (i is the index of summation.)
The reference category, or the denominator, is the population of adherents rather than
the whole population. So in other words, the interpretation of the index will be the odds
of two random people chosen from the area‘s adherents, not the area as a whole. This is
done with the attempt to control for the multicollinearity that could exist between this
measure and the adherent rate without this control in place.
Results
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In the most diverse counties and metropolitan areas, the odds of randomly selecting
two people that are either Mainline or Evangelical Protestants, Catholic, Orthodox or
Other are about 1 in 4. Compare that against Provo, Utah where those odds are 96%.
Provo has 325,000 Mormons and only 7,000 other adherents from all other faiths. Provo
is so homogeneous that if you counted their 37,000 non-adherents as a religious
grouping, the area would still be in the top five most homogeneous areas.
The variable has a positive skew, and a mean of .417.
Table 18 Religious Homogeneous to Heterogeneous Areas
Metro area or County
Metro Provo, UT
Franklin County, LA
Lawrence County, MS
Clinton County, NY
Metro Salt Lake City, UT

Herfindahl Score
.96
.87
.84
.78
.75

mean

.42

Metro Missoula, MT
Whitman County, WA
Coconino County, AZ
Metro Anchorage, AK
Ravalli County, MT
Washakie County, WY

.27
.27
.27
.26
.25
.25

How does religious homogeneity relate to religious freedom? The answer is
positively and significantly, with a correlation score of .06 and the pattern unmistakable
with p<.001. Winning contexts had around 1¼ percentage point more homogeneity than
losing context.
State institutional response sees a similar relationship, positive and significant (.01
level), and increased states show around a percentage point more homogeneity than states
that do not attempt an increase. The institution used mattered, as legislatively increased
states were 1.8 percentage points above the no-attempt states, which is significant, and
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judicially increased states were .7 of a point above the no-attempt states, which was not
significant.
The scaled increased scrutiny variables are significant, but do not appear to be linear.
Only the integrated, scaled single variable shows a progression toward more homogeneity
as the protection from the state increases.159 The Herfindahl score of the 157 votes cast
in the most protective category of states is .56, and that average is higher than the 90th
percentile in the spread of Herfindahl scores.
Increased scrutiny contexts saw voting stay with the positive pattern. Judicially
increased contexts looked the simplest, with lower success rates jump rise sharply in the
last quintile which gave it its positive correlation. Legislative context voting rates varied
by homogeneity quintile, but without much reason. Put the two together and the parabola
shows up again. Higher success rates at the most heterogeneous and homogeneous
religious contexts, and average-to-low scores in the middle.
Table 19 Religious Homogeneity and Increased Scrutiny Voting Results
Metro Religious Herfindahl Index
Vote-Rate
Most Heterogeneous Quintile
N
Vote-Rate
2nd Quintile
N

NonIncreased
States
.43
378
.39

Increased
Scrutiny
States
.45
293
.40

Judicially
Increased
States
.44
213
.44

Legislatively
Increased
States
.49
80
.27

283

383

300

83

Vote-Rate

.52

.44

.45

.44

N

281

386

208

178

4th Quintile

Vote-Rate
N

.45

.41

.42

.38

293

334

215

119

Most Homogeneous Quintile

Vote-Rate
N

.45

.53

.52

.56

283

385

276

109

Vote-Rate

.45

.45

.465

.43

1473

1781

1212

569

3rd Quintile

Total

159

N

.262 correlation score, and p<.001.
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Like in the adherent-rate, table 19 shows a parabolic pattern with the least and most
homogeneous areas having more votes occur in increased contexts. The most
homogeneous areas have the most increased scrutiny contexts. There are negative
patterns between homogeneity and majoritarian (or Republican) voting, which likely has
something to do with the effect of the Catholic Northeast‘s most homogeneous rate in the
nation outweighing the other areas.
Table 20 Metro-Area Homogeneity Index by Geography
Herfindahl Rate

N

West Coast

.36

442

Mississippi Valley

.38

500

Interior

.40

1014

South Atlantic

.37

346

Political Geography

Northeast

.48

952

Total

.417

3254

Both the strength and significance of the patterns for favorable voting in the
integrated institutional variable decrease when the effect of the Northeast is controlled in
a partial correlation, but they are still a significant -.06*.
Although it is speculative and this study is not the place to answer the question fully,
another possible answer as to why homogeneity correlates positively with religious
freedom rather than religious diversity could be the feeling of security religious traditions
would feel as they make up larger proportions of an area. If that security did in fact exist,
offering religious exemptions to policy would be less threatening to the religious order
than in more heterogeneous or competitive environments.
Note that a correlation score between this homogeneity index and the metro adherent
rate shows that multicollinearity is likely going to be an issue in the model. There is no
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conceptual reason that the rate of adherents and the religious diversity of an area should
be so strongly correlated: .485***.

Conclusions for the Judge and Community Variables
The predictions held true as county politics and left leaning judges were more
protective of religious actors. Religious adherence supported the prediction here as
higher rates led to more protectiveness. And religious homogeneity defied the prediction
as it was the context for more protectiveness, not heterogeneity.

Claimant Variables
Popularity of the Religion Seeking Protection
Hypothesis 7: Religious freedom claimants from minority religions will meet with less
success than those from majority religions.
This variable will control for the effect on religious freedom due to the religion of the
litigant and the religious tradition of the surrounding area. The actual coding and
construction of this variable comes after a lengthy discussion.
This variable was originally conceived as simply a coding for the claimant‘s
denomination or maybe a dummy variable for whether the claimant was in a minority (on
the national level) religion or not. The dummy variable gives away too much
information, and the denominational variable is beholden to American denominations
which have evolved enough as to make the quantity and diversity of that variable too
great for it to convey enough meaning.
Constructing a middle way between the dizzying array of Protestant denominations
and a way of understanding their proximity to and from the status quo has been an area of
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interest in sociology for years. But since the field has yet to crown one classification as
the standard, this study chooses an ordering laid out by Steensland in 1999160 and referred
to as ―religious traditions.‖ The Steensland classification lays out eight large groupings
of similar believers, with denomination being only one of several indicators of who is
going into which group. So a Baptist that is evangelical and reads the Bible with a
literalist understand is grouped with likeminded Lutherans, and Lutherans and Baptists
that are neither evangelical nor fundamentalist are grouped elsewhere as well. The eight
religious traditions are: Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant,
Catholic, Jewish, Conservative Non-Traditional (CNT, and Mormons are an example),
Liberal Non-Traditional (LNT, and Unitarians are an example) and an Other category,
which includes Buddhists, Native Americans, Muslims, and others.
The benefits of this type of ordering, to be sure, are bringing the quantity of
categories into a manageable number, and having a sophisticated method for classifying
believers.

160

Steensland and et al., (2000) has the list of all the denominations and how they are classified,
reproduced here in Appendix B.
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Figure 3 Largest Denominations Within Each Religious Tradition, 2000
Mainline Protestant
United Methodist
Evangelical Lutheran
Presbyterian Church, USA
Episcopal Church
American Baptist Churches in the US
United Church of Christ

Evangelical Protestant
Southern Baptist
Assembly of God
Lutheran Church –Missouri Synod
Churches of Christ
Christian Churches
Independent, Non-Charismatic

Black Protestant
Church of God in Christ
National Baptist Convention, USA
National Baptist Convention of America
African Methodist Episcopal Church
Progressive National Baptist Convention

Other
Jewish
Muslim
Baha‟i
Native American
Pagan

Liberal Non-Traditional
Unitarian, Universalist
United Church, Unity Church
New Birth Christianity
National Spiritualist Assoc. of Churches
New age Spirituality

Conservative Non-Traditional
Church of Latter Day Saints
Jehovah‟s Witnesses
Christian Scientists
Christadelphians
LDS –Reorganized

This construction of the variable had some exceptions. More than one coding of
religious traditions was possible in eleven cases. In nine of those cases, a parent of a
religious tradition is asking the state to stop the other parent from teaching or educating
the children in a different religious tradition. The parent asking the state or city to stay
out of the matter gets coded as the party seeking religious freedom. Or to be more clear,
the coding in these cases is of the litigant seeking to teach or raise a child in a religious
way, rather than the litigant asking the state to stop that religious behavior.
The description of this construction of the variable follows. Evangelicals were the
most litigious religious tradition with almost a third of all the known religious litigants.161
Catholics were the subjects of almost a quarter of the votes, followed by the Other
category with 13%, Conservative Non-Traditional with 8%, Mainline Protestants with

161

Most unclassified traditions were simply not mentioned in the case, but some were left blank because
more than one tradition was asking for protection, as in a case where multiple churches were fighting the
placement of a landfill. Robertson v. City of High Point, 129 N.C. App. 88 (1996)
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7.6%, Jewish with 4.2%, Black Protestants with 3.3%, and Liberal Non-Traditionals with
only 16 votes cast in their cases were the fewest, and .5% of the database.
Table 21 Characteristics of the Religious Tradition of Claimant

Judge
Votes

Percentage of
the dataset‟s
known
religious
traditions

Proportion of
the Nation‟s
Religious
a
Adherents

Religious
Freedom
Success Rate
43%

CNT

265

10.0

3.4%

EP

849

32.0

23.0%

41%***

MP

247

9.3

18.6%

64%***

BP

108

4.1

12.0%

49%

Catholic

620

23.4

35.0%

57%***

Jewish

137

5.2

2.3%

57%

16

.6

1.0%

75%**

Other

412

15.5

1.3%

23%***

Total

2654

100.0

Total, with missing

3254

‡

‡

LNT

45.6%
44.8%

** Significant at the p<.01 level.
*** Significant at the p<.001 level.
a
(Finke and Scheitle 2005) Glenmary puts the number of uncounted or non-adherents at around 50% of the
nation, so a column showing a simple percentage of the nation of each religious tradition would not be
comparable to the other columns.
‡
Inferences suffer from a small sample size for both LNT and BP. Specifically, determining whether a
claimant was from a historically black protestant denomination was difficult and largely relied on the
denominational name mentioned in the opinion, which did not occur with enough regularity to make this
estimate less reliable. So the accuracy of the Black Protestant votes is such that inferences should only be
drawn with care.
Changing the unit of analysis from votes to cases shows only a nominal difference. Each tradition‟s ratio of
cases at the highest, middle and lowest levels of court appears similar. The cases missing a claimant‟s
religious tradition, though, appear to be moderately overrepresented in the courts of last resort. A fact that is
explained by the selection method of inferring cases. If the COLR case mentioned the tradition, the inferred
cases inherited that tradition. If the COLR case does not mention the tradition, and the root cases are not
published, they also missed the information.

Notice the traditions that are over- and under-represented. Mainline Protestants are
litigants only about half of the time their national proportion suggests. Catholics and
Liberal non-traditional denominations also appear in court at lower rates than their
population suggest. On the other hand, Evangelicals appear in court about 50% more
often than their population suggests, Jewish litigants 100+% more, Conservative nontraditionals about 300% more often, and Other Religious actors appear in court 15 times

110

more often than their proportion of the nation, and all four of those rates are significant
increases.
Recent research on lower federal court decisions sheds some surprising light on this
dynamic by showing that Catholics and Baptists succeed at lower rates than minor
faiths.162 That is worth repeating: minority faiths won more often than the popular faiths
in the Sisk sample. The authors surmised that judges ―may be more fearful of the
cumulative effects of accommodating claims for accommodation by mainstream or nearmainstream religionists‖ rather than fearing the social effect from a minority religion.
This is an interesting finding, and should be untangled from the general drift of research
which supports the conventional understanding that minorities do not fare as well.163
For the population of state cases shown in Table 23 (second below), the success rate
column does not support these findings as Catholics and Mainline Protestants fare much
better than average. Perhaps more tellingly, the Other Religious category fares vastly
worse than others. If the Muslims are disaggregated from the Other category, they show
a 30% successful vote-rate, leaving the remaining Buddhists, pagans, Native Americans,
and other believers with a 21% favorable vote-rate.
But in line with the Sisk findings, Evangelicals do fare worse than average. And
generally the more conservative faiths on the spectrum fare worse. If you order the
religious traditions in the following ad hoc ranking from conservative to liberal: CNT,
EP, MP, BP, Catholic, Jewish, LNT, then the favorable vote-rate is negatively correlated
with a score of .132, and significant at the .001 level. If Black Protestants mark the
center, the three more conservative traditions win 45% of their votes, and the three

162
163

Sisk, 2005.
See Brent (1999) and Lupu (1998)
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traditions to the left of it win 58% of their votes. Even more supportive of the argument
is the fact that the win rate on the right is heavily bolstered by Mainline Protestants,
which is largely not understood as a conservative group.
Geography matters in this question of whether majority/minority status affects the
initial step of bringing the case. To be clear, do the religious traditions bring more cases
when they are a minority in an area or when they are in the majority? Evangelicals find
their two highest favorable vote-rates in the two regions where they are the most
prevalent: the South and Midwest; while the Northwest is both their least populated area
and area of least success.164
Catholics have more than a third of their votes come from the Northeast, their most
populated region, and also find their success rate above their (and its) average. Their
lowest success-rate comes in the South, where there is also a dearth of Catholics.
Jewish actors are vastly centered in the Northeast, and that is where they find their
highest success rate (61%). In their three least populated regions, they find their three
smallest success-rates.165
Mainline Protestants, on the other hand, do not see these same regional patterns, and
instead actually show something like the opposite. They show a higher success rate
among their three lowest populated regions than they do in their most populated
region.166

164

40% of Evangelicals reside in the South, 24% in the Midwest, and the proportion of favorable votes are
47% and 49%, respectively. Only 4% of Evangelicals are in the Northwest, and they win 29% of the time
there.
165
40% success rate, albeit with only 35 votes.
166
A third of MPs reside in the Midwest, yet receive less than 50% favorable votes there, while only 20%
of MPs live scattered throughout California, the Northwest and Southwest, and their favorable vote-rate
among those regions is 69%. The most noteworthy region for Mainline Protestants is the Northeast, where
they won 96% of 76 votes cast in 25 cases. These results are significant at the .001 level.
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But this majoritarian-favored pattern does seem stronger than not. When the religious
traditions are summed, the Northwest has the fewest adherents of these six regions, and
also has the lowest success rate. The Northeast has the most adherents, and also has the
highest success rate.167 True to the pattern, the Midwest is second in both adherents and
success rate, and the Southwest represents both the middle point for adherents and
success rate of religious actors.
All of which leads to a more rigorous testing of the question of whether more popular
religions get better treatment. A variable was created for the percentage agreement
between the claimant and metro area, or county if not in a metro area. This new variable
is constructed by collapsing CNT and EP, MP and BP, LNT Jewish and Other, to make
them comparable to the religious tradition data available for metro areas and counties,
which are limited to only four religious traditions: EP, MP, Catholic and Other.168 The
created variable has a mean of 28.7% agreement, but is skewed toward less agreement
with a median of 24% agreement and with a full quarter of the votes on claimants with
less than 10% agreement.
This variable supports the assertion that popular religions do indeed receive more
favorable treatment. The correlation between agreement and favorable vote-rate is
positive, .12 and clearly a pattern (p<.001). A comparison of vote outcomes shows that
protective votes occur in contexts with an average of 32% agreement between claimant

167

Of the 952 votes cast in the Northeast, 51% were for the religious actor. Of the 2,302 votes cast
elsewhere, 42% were for the religious actor. That 9 percentage point difference represents an increase of
more than 20% over the non-Northeast areas. Also supportive of the point, the two religious traditions that
do not find a higher success rate in the Northeast are Evangelicals and Conservative Non-Traditionals –two
traditions that are not very well represented in the region.
168
Although the Glenmary data explicitly accept the Steensland classification of religious traditions
(http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/RCMS_Notes.asp) on a metro- and county-level, the full eight
families of religions are not available.
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and area, while votes against the religious actor occur in contexts of 26% agreement.
This variable then is the control variable for capturing the effect of claimant‘s faith in the
study. Table 25 below reports this significant finding.
Table 22 Claimant-Area Religious Agreement Success Rates,
in Ten Equally Sized Groups
Favorable
Vote Rate
.24

N
270

2nd Least Claimant-Area Agreement

.34

266

3rd decile

.51

278

4th decile

.47

318

5th decile

.42

211

6th decile

.54

263

7th decile

.41

288

8th decile

.52

235

9th Most Agreement decile

.53

265

Most Claimant-Area Agreement

.57

265

Total

.45

2659

Claimant-Area Religious Agreement
Least Claimant-Area Agreement

Factoring in whether the state attempted to increase religious freedom shows
claimant-area agreement was highest when states made a legislative attempt (or
majoritarian), less agreement when there was no attempt, and the least amount of
agreement when the attempt was judicial (or minoritarian), 34% to 29.7% to 25%
respectively. The inverse of that phrasing may be more telling: a lower rate of minority
religious actors are showing up in court in the states which have increased religious
freedom through the statehouse than in the judicially increased states, and that is even
less than the states which attempt no increase at all.
Winning in the institutionally grouped states follows the same pattern: winning
contexts have higher agreement than losing ones.
Factoring in level of court shows that lower courts are more likely to have agreementfavoring votes, and this is not surprising as lower courts have less insulation from public
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pressure and less accomplished judges. All three levels of courts show more favorable
votes when agreement is higher, and less agreement when the vote is lost.
Factoring in geography, all regions show the same pattern, with the Pacific Rim
showing the least favorability for popular faiths (2.4 points difference between agreement
in votes won versus lost) and the South showing the most (10 points difference).***
Although interestingly, the state of California does not show the pattern among wins and
losses, but has a higher overall agreement than every region at 35%.
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Table 23 Claimant-Area Religious Agreement
Claimant-Area
Religious
Agreement

Claimant-Area
Religious
Agreement
in Winning
Contexts

Claimant-Area
Religious
Agreement
in Losing
Contexts

34%

40%

29%

478

221

257

Mean

30%

34%

26%

N

1161

509

652

Mean

25%

26%

24%

N

1020

479

541

Mean

29%

32%

26%

878

385

493

Mean

28%

32%

25%

N

1304

587

717

Mean

30%

34%

26%

477

237

240

35%

34%

36%

115

49

66

30%

34%

28%

350

121

229

32%

37%

28%

Context of Judge Vote

Legislative Attempt

Mean
N

Neither Attempt
Judicial Attempt

Supreme Court

N
Intermediate Appellate
District or Trial

N
CA

Mean
N

Northwest

Mean
N

Southwest

Mean
N

South w/o TX

Mean
N

Midwest

Mean
N

Northeast

Mean
N

Total

255

111

144

31%

37%

28%

432

170

262

27%

31%

24%

700

332

368

26%

29%

23%

807

426

381

Mean

29%

32%

26%

N

2659

1209

1450

The pattern does not hold at the national level, though, where the simple religious
traditions are the unit of analysis. Catholics were the tradition with the most agreement
with their area by far at 50.2%, and not surprisingly, LNT at 6%, along with both Jewish
and Other Religious at 10.5% had the least agreement. Yet Jewish and LNT claimants
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won at higher rates than Catholics. Mainline Protestants won almost two-thirds of their
votes, yet had only average agreement with their area.
But the Other Religious category‘s least agreement and lowest success rate should not
be overlooked, and drives most of the patterned variance in this variable.
Judge‘s religious tradition, comfortingly, does not show any overt favoritism or bias
with claimant religious tradition.
In conclusion, claimant religious tradition is much less explanatory when the
claimant‘s context is not considered. The level of agreement between the two appears to
explain a large amount of the variance in the data. It positively correlates with appearing
in the court as well as receiving the favorable vote. This is true in each level of court and
in each geographic region, and in all three institutional contexts: legislative, judicial, and
the no attempt states.

Deviant Behavior
Hypothesis 8: Religious freedom claims based on sexual or illicit drug usage will be less
likely to be supported than those that are not.
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the predicted
dampening affect on the likelihood of winning the vote when asking the court to protect
something that is against societal mores. Deviancy is limited to sexual or drug related
acts. It is logical that someone asking for protection of an already celebrated right, like
the freedom to express one‘s beliefs, will get a friendlier treatment in court than, for
example, someone asking for protection of hallucinatory or polygamous rites.
The method of constructing this variable involves further defining deviancy as the use
of schedule 1 controlled substances, or sexual acts which are either illegal or largely seen
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as immoral in public opinion polling. The variable is a dummy variable where a deviant
act is coded 1 and its absence is coded 0.
Clarifying examples of deviant behavior include:
All claims of sexual abuse.
Sexual relationships occurring with one‘s counselor, even if consenting.
Gay and lesbian relationships which are the subject of a case. Although I note
here that while acceptance of gays is increasing, a majority of Americans still
see it as deviance.169
Sex outside of an existing marriage. Claims of adultery satisfy what this variable
hopes to capture, which again is an act society deems unacceptable. While the
frequency of broken marriage vows is clearly an issue, 90.7% of the nation
classifies extramarital sex as ―always‖ or ―almost always wrong‖.170
Cohabitation or sex between unmarried people (of legal age) is not coded as
deviant here because attitudes about it are such that a majority (62.4%)
believe it is ―sometimes wrong‖ or ―not wrong at all‖.171
Alcohol was not considered deviant here.
Results
Deviancy was coded in 852 votes in the dataset, or 26%, which is much higher than
was expected. The higher than expected number of votes is not explained by a large
proportion of these cases occurring at Supreme Court levels with larger panels of judging

169

In the 2004 General Social Survey, 60.3% of respondents answered that same sex sexual relations are
―always‖ or ―almost always wrong‖, compared to 29.7% answering ―not at all wrong‖. This variable is a
simple inference from public opinion and should not be construed as anything more.
170
Ibid.
171
Ibid.
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and hence more votes. In fact, the cases were decided significantly more at the lower
levels.172
That more than a quarter of the votes are deviant instead appears to be inflated by the
large number of sex abuse claims brought against the Catholic Church over this time
span. Indeed, 92.5% of the deviant cases were coded that way because of sexual reasons,
versus the 7.5% which are drug related.173
It bears repeating. Almost a quarter of the votes (24.2%) in this dataset on religious
freedom involve cases concerning actors accused of a deviant sexual act.
The cases for this variable are populated by males mostly, as they received 85% of
the deviant case votes, which is significantly higher level than the overall rate of males in
the dataset which is 81%*.
Even more surprising than the large number of deviancy cases may be the outcome:
deviancy was correlated with an increased success rate, not a depressed success rate.
Religious actors in these cases enjoyed a 53% favorable vote-rate versus non-deviants‘
43% success rate, a pattern significant at the .001 level. This boost in win-rate is not true
of the drug related deviancy, as they received favorable votes only 22% of the time,
which is half of the non-drug related case rate. So it is the 55.5% favorable vote-rate of
the sexually deviant cases that buoys the high deviancy rate.
One explanation for this is that during the increased number of cases brought against
churches regarding sexual abuse, litigants‘ and the publics‘ sense of outrage may have

172

24% of votes are at supreme courts, 27% at the Intermediate Appellate, and 30% of deviant cases at the
district court. This linear pattern is significant at the .05 level.
173
And in those drug related cases, only four of the 64 votes came from religious traditions that were not
from the Other category. Those four votes came in one case on a medicinal marijuana plea brought by a
Messianic Jew. Minnesota v. Pederson, 679 N.W.2d 368, 5/18/04
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fostered an overreach on their legal claims. But the application of law in a court and the
direct effect public outrage can have legislatively are two different things. That outrage
can motivate actors to spend the money to initiate cases with excellent social or political
arguments, but without a good legal argument. Regardless of the explanation, this is the
description of the state cases regarding religious actors.
The two institutional variables are significantly correlated with deviancy in the
predicted direction: states which have attempted to increase religious freedom find more
deviancy cases being brought.174 But this is deceiving, as the sexual cases are inflated
enough to raise the overall rate to significance in the positive direction even though the
drug related cases are slightly depressed in the increased states, if not significantly.
The success rate in the increased states was another ambivalent point of comparison:
higher win-rates in these states for the sexual cases, and significantly lower rates for the
drug cases even in these increased states. Sexual cases had a successful vote-rate of 57%
in institutional states, and 53% in the no-attempt states. Drug related cases had an 11%
success rate in 38 votes in the increased states, and a more-than-tripled successful voterate in the no-attempt states (38%, albeit in 26 votes.) In the sexual cases, judicial states
were most protective, legislative around average protection, and no attempt states had the
lowest success rate. The drug cases did not have enough iterations to support a comment
on these classifications.
The actors in both types of deviant cases were patterned. Only Liberal NonTraditionals were not significantly correlated with deviant cases. Jewish, Black

174

The correlation score is .07, which is significant at the .001 level. But this is wholly driven by the
sexual deviant cases (21% of no-attempt state votes, and 27% of increased attempt votes), as the drug
deviancy cases are not brought significantly more or less.
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Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, CNTs, and Other religious all were negatively
correlated with sexual deviancy.175 Mainline Protestants had a positive correlation score
of .147 and Catholics a positive score of .325, one of the highest scores of any
relationship in the model. Other religious actors were the only tradition positively related
to drug deviancy.
Catholics were the actor subject to a deviance vote 44% of the time, and those actors
received protective votes 61%* of the time. Mainline Protestants were the most protected
religious tradition with a protective vote-rate of 68.5%** in 127 votes. The Other
category was again the least protected, and by a significant margin, winning only 25% of
the votes cast in their cases. But this pattern has more to do with the Other religious
category being effectively the only category for the drug use cases, which made up more
than two-thirds of their votes in this deviant category.
Liberal judges vote to protect the subjects of these deviant cases more than
conservative judges. The average Judge Politics score for a winning vote is 53, and the
average score for a vote against is 45. Eight PAJID points is enough to cover the middle
20% of the dispersion of the variable, to give the reader an idea of that gap.
Judge gender, judge religious tradition and area partisanship all show no significant
relationships with deviancy
The geography variables show that where there were more deviant cases, the win-rate
was higher. The Midwest and West and the nation‘s interior all show higher rates of
deviant cases than their population suggests, along with a higher win-rate. The South
shows depressed numbers of cases and an overall depressed success-rate. The Northeast,

175

All but CNTs had their negative correlation score over 1, and the significance for all of them was at the
.001 level.
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with its large population of Catholics, the largest plurality of these cases, shows a
strangely depressed number of cases but a higher win-rate.
Deviant cases tended to win in areas with higher adherent rates and with a more
homogenous religious makeup, which was the general pattern for those two variables, but
counter-intuitive for this morally loaded variable. This would seem to be the Catholic
effect, but strangely, controlling for Catholic claimants does not support that theory –it is
still positive and significant, and in fact grows more positive and significant.
Instead, the only significant denominational explanation that can be supported by the
data is that evangelical areas had negative correlations for both cases heard and successrates, which serves to bolster the adherent rate and Herfindahl effects elsewhere. But
even that is not enough for a full explanation.

An important conclusion for this variable is that deviancy here is really two forces at
work, each very unique and not easily coupled together. One version of deviancy had
inflated appearances in the increased religious freedom states, and higher success rates.
The other was the mirror image of that. Both effects should be held constant for the
model.
But the larger conclusion as to why sexual deviancy performed the way it did is left
with the speculation that began the description of these results: sensational aspects of
clergy sex cases do not make for good legal arguments, and in fact can make a not-guilty
verdict more likely.
Claimant religious tradition, judge characteristics, and the religious contours of the
immediate area all showed significant patterns as well.
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Prisoner Cases
Hypothesis 9: Religious freedom claims of prisoners are less likely to be supported than
claims from non-prisoners.
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the effect that being a
prisoner has on the chance of winning a religious freedom issue. The variable is a simple
dummy variable where being incarcerated is coded 1 and not being incarcerated is coded
0. Here are the clarifying disclaimers: Those on probation are not considered prisoners,
nor are those who are being prosecuted for an act committed while they were free, even if
they are now in prison.176 The trial for the crime that put the claimant in jail is not
considered a prisoner case, as they were free when they committed it. If convicted at the
trial phase, the appeal is not considered a prisoner case, minus two exceptions. The first
exception is if a new and reasonably independent issue arises in the appeal177, and a
second exception is for separate sentencing trials that occur in capital cases.178
Research done in 1999 found that although federal prisoner cases increased with the
passing of the federal RFRA, they did not keep up with the rise of overall civil liberties
cases from the same period.179
Results
291 votes, or 9% of the dataset, are prisoner cases. As expected and as supported in
other research showing that prisoners win at lower rates, their favorable vote-rate here is
16%. That is around a third of the overall favorable vote-rate for the dataset.

176

Hawai’i v. Adler, 2005 Haw. LEXIS 425, while incarcerated, the claimant made the case that his
cannabis usage prior to being arrested was religious is not here considered a prisoner case.
177
An example is Williams v. State of Mississippi, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 236, where a drug possession
conviction appeal has the prosecutor ask the accused if he is Muslim, perhaps to introduce bias. The appeal
of that stricken question was considered a prisoner case.
178
New Mexico v. Clark, 128 N.M. 119
179
Berg, 1999.
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The prisoners are vastly (96.5%) men, even more so than the 81.4% rate the database
has, and the difference is significant at the .001 level. The rate of women incarcerated in
the states is around 5%, so these numbers are not over representative.180
Prisoner cases appear in increased scrutiny states almost 2 to 1 over non-increased
states, and the increased state proportion is driven by the judicial states with more than
70% of the increase state cases.
Do higher success rates follow the more hospitable judicial states? Yes, judicially
increased states protect the religious petitioners 24% of the time, legislative states protect
them 18% of the time, and no-attempt states protect them 5.6% of the time.
The difference between the increased and not-increased scrutiny states is highly
significant, and possibly even understated. Not only are prisoners quadrupling their odds
when moving to an increased state court, but it stands to reason that the not-increased
state cases are the theoretically stronger cases since fewer are being brought to court.181
The integrated increased religious freedom variable clarifies the correlation. In the
four categories of least protective states, prisoners won 8% of their votes. In the 3 most
protective categories, they won 22% of their votes. All of these relationships are
significant at the highest levels.
Of the known religious traditions, the Other religious category was overrepresented
by close to a factor of four, with 59% of the prisoner cases, despite having only 15% of
the overall votes. Every other religious tradition was underrepresented, due to inflation
of the Other Religious category. But interestingly, and against the prediction, the Other
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Statistical Abstract of the United States. 116th Edition. ―No. 351. State Prison Inmates –Selected
Characteristics: 1986 and 1991‖, p. 219
181
This comment makes a number of assumptions, such as religious prisoners are normally distributed and
there is a winnowing factor to cases brought. Both of which are logical assumptions.
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religious actors received higher than the average favorable votes: 21%. Evangelicals, the
second most likely religious tradition for claimants in the prisoner cases had the highest
success rate at 26%. Between those two traditions, 40 of the 45 overall pro-prisoner
votes occurred.
Judge gender, race, and religious tradition all do not show any significant patterns
with prisoner cases, but judge politics does correlate with vote outcome on prisoner cases
with a correlation score of .261, which is significant at the .001 level.
Geography also showed significant correlations with the prisoner votes. Using a
North, South, West scheme, the South voted 40% more than their dataset
votes/population would suggest, and have favorable vote-rate less than half of the
average: 7%. Or if one uses a geographical classification with more categories, the
Southwest, South and Midwest grab 57% of the votes, and vote to protect the prisoners at
8%. Those are all significant at the .001 level.
The conclusions of these results are that prisoners receive substantially less protection
for their religious behavior, but that a) liberal judges, b) states which have attempted to
increase religious freedom judicially and c) the Atlantic coast and Pacific Northwest have
higher rates of favorable votes than judges not in these categories.

Economic Order Cases
Hypothesis 10: Religious freedom claims that do not require public resources (tax money
or land usage) are more likely to be supported than those that do.
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the effect of cases
which ask the courts to award either money or land to the religious actor. The argument
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is that awarding a religious actor a symbolic win, without any financial impact on the
state or city, is more likely to occur than the financially costly court case.
The money based decisions exclusively concerned the property tax exemption given
to houses of worship. The land decisions were more difficult, as there are several types
of land use cases which are rightly seen as having no cost to the state. The coding rule is
then 1 for land use cases which bear cost to the state, all others 0. Examples of cases
coded as these economic impact cases include: all tax exemptions, all zoning regulations,
suits brought against churches for material and specific damages (i.e. not punitive)
stemming from their ownership of land, adverse possession (squatter‘s rights) cases, and
two cases about the safety codes of churches (fire sprinklers) were considered.182
Examples of cases not included in this variable are: questions of variances on
steeples, variances to historic preservation ordinances, cemeteries (if no damages are
sought), sign regulations, codes regulating proselytizing and free speech areas, and
landlords‘ rights.
Results
The variable has 606 economic impact votes, which make up 19% of the dataset, and
fall in 233 cases. 547 of the votes come in land use cases, and 322 come in tax cases,
which leave 263 votes overlapping.
The effect on the dependent variable of these cases was not to decrease it, as
predicted. Religious actors did not receive significantly different favorable votes in the
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In Peace Lutheran Church and Academy v. Village of Sussex, 2001 WI App 139 (2001) the Village
pressed for fire sprinklers in a new parochial school for the safety of the inhabitants, but also to reduce the
Village‘s vulnerability to suits if a catastrophe were to occur.
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overall economic impact cases (44%), or in land use cases (46%).183 But in tax cases, the
success rate actually rose to 50%, which was significant at the .05 level. That effect
though evaporates when instead of looking at votes, the unit of analysis is cases won and
lost: 49% of cases won in tax contexts in 123 cases.
When the actual cost of the case was mentioned in the opinion (which occurred in
only 102 votes cast in 41 cases184) there was a non-linear pattern of the lower and higher
priced cases winning at around 50% and cases seeking a middle value between $5,000
and $40,000 winning at lower rates.185
The Institutional variables do show that these economic impact cases are brought
more in the states which attempt to raise religious freedom, but the effect is driven solely
by the land use cases in legislatively increased states, which also show a negative
correlation on protective voting. Judicially increased states and tax cases show no
significant patterns in appearance or success of votes cast.
Votes in more expensive cases correlated with the states attempting an increase in
religious freedom with the moderately strong .234 score. But that relationship, like
others here, is driven wholly by the method: judicially attempted states heard the more
expensive claims and voted at higher favorable rates for those claims.186
Men, who already make up more than 80% of the claimants with a known gender,
tend to make up even more litigants in these economic impact cases. But the more
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When economic impact and specifically land use votes are aggregated back to whole cases, the results
do not change: 44% and 46% cases won, respectively.
184
The cost variable is a categorical variable where <$5000 is coded 1, $5,000-$40,000 is coded 2 and
>$40,000 is coded 3.
185
A parametric correlation of .208, significant at the .05 level is also supported by an Eta 2 which is five
times higher than the R2, .129 to .025.
186
And even though this is with only 102 votes, it is enough for the pattern to emerge and be corroborated
with significance at the .01 level.
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interesting conclusion that has been mentioned above can be drawn here as well: when
the religious actors are a small group of three or less, the win rate is much lower than
when the gender could not be collected because of a larger size of the group. This
claimant size effect is discussed in the last section of this chapter. But here, single or
smaller groups receive protective votes 14.5% of the time in these economic impact
cases, and religious groups without a coded gender (generally because the litigant was a
church or large group) succeeded more than three times better at 48%.
Claimant religious tradition was significantly patterned as Mainline and Evangelical
Protestants were positively correlated, and the rest of the religious traditions (minus
Jewish claimants) negatively correlated, all at the .001 level. Evangelicals also distinctly
brought the lower cost cases and Jewish claimants brought the higher priced claims. But
no significant difference in favorable vote-rate showed up among the traditions.
Judge race, gender, and religious tradition all failed to show an effect when
considered in these economic votes. Judge Politics, as is clearly becoming a pattern, did
show the pattern of more liberal judges hearing more and voting more protectively for the
religious claimant.187 The liberal judges here appear to be more classically liberal
(valuing private property over regulation) than liberal in a contemporary sense.
Geography also had a patterned look: there is a strong Northeast-ward tilt to the
hearing and pro-religious voting in economic impact cases. Simplifying the nation into a
South, North, West scheme, the North has correlation scores over .1 for the economic
impact variables, as well as cost. The West has scores lower than -.1 for all of the same
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Correlation score of .09, p<.001, for Judge Politics and Economic Impact votes. That correlation is
driven almost wholly by the 208 votes at the state supreme court level, as their correlation is .179, p<.001
and lower level judges show no significant correlation.
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variables, and both the West and North are significant at the .001 level. The South has
moderated, but still negative correlations for the same. The North‘s favorable vote-rate is
52%, the South is 33% and the West is 26%.
The population based variables show that these cases tend to occur in the less
populated, less religious, but more religiously homogeneous areas, which vote more
Republican.
The conclusions drawn from an analysis of the variable are a) the prediction was not
true as there was little to no difference in success even though these cases impose a clear
material cost on the polity. B) These cases were brought more and won more by the
religious traditions which are closer to a nationwide status quo and which tilt rightward
when compared to other religious traditions. C) Politically left leaning judges at the
higher levels of courts ruled more favorably, and since the cases arose more in the
Northern states, and in the increased religious freedom states (both of which positively
and strongly correlate with liberal judges), they had the opportunity to hear more.
Although that opportunity is tempered by d) the tendency for these cases to be brought
outside of more populated and Democratic areas.

Conclusions Drawn from Analyzing the Claimant Variables
All four of the variables have significant patterns that would likely have a dulling or
distorting effect in the model if not controlled. Specifically, controlling the Prisoner and
Claimant-Area Agreement effects allows the more protective votes in judicial states to be
seen. Controlling the economic impact votes makes sure the lack of protection in
legislative states is known. Deviancy controls help make interpretations of claimant

129

religious tradition easier to read as these strange Catholic and Mainline Protestant effects
will be bracketed off to the side.
So to briefly sum up those larger effects, the patterns for minority religious traditions
largely were as predicted once the variable was tied to local context. The deviancy
variable appears to be driven by the sexual scandals that have wracked the Catholic and
other churches for the last decade or more. The drug related votes performed very
differently from the sexually related votes, and make for an uneasy fit. The prisoner
variable largely performed as predicted: lower success rates overall, and the Other
religious actors are the subject of more than half the votes, yet those actors win more than
average. And the economic impact cases show regional, judge and claimant size patterns
to land use and tax cases, but no overall tendency to vote for religious actors less even
when they ask for tangible public resources.
For all four variables, 1) the institutional attempts of the states were significantly
correlated with the judicial more protective than the legislative states, 2) more liberal
judges were more protective, 3) geographic region of the country was very significant, if
in idiosyncratic ways, 4) claimant religious tradition was patterned, and judge religious
tradition was not.

Legal Reasoning Variables
The legal reasoning variables are an attempt to capture the possible judge bias behind
the study‘s case-selection method. When judges mention the separation of church and
state, are they priming the reader for a denial of a free exercise issue? Does a judge‘s
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mentioning of free speech correlate with civil libertarian rights versus governmental
license? These three variables will answer those questions.
Unfortunately, coding these variables with the precision that would differentiate a
free speech decision, for example, from decisions which are not formally considered a
free speech case proved unworkable. The two ways of attempting the legal
differentiation of what law controls the decision were a) reading and citing the judge‘s
logic, or b) using the fact patterns to determine the type of religious liberty case.
The fact pattern path meant looking for civil liberties groups as litigants and then
coding that case as a likely establishment issue, or looking for governments as parties
without civil liberties groups and coding these cases as likely Free Exercise cases. The
issue with this was that the Alabama ACLU was the only civil liberties group in the data,
leaving too little variance to continue using this method.
Taking it straight from the opinion proved too difficult because of the number of
cases and lack of clarity in state decisions. The vast majority of state opinions do not
clarify in headnotes which laws are controlling, and divining how important the several
legal points made were to the case was simply outside of my abilities. And since this is a
large N study with more than 500 cases individually read and coded, a second attempt is
unrealistic. So although this study would be more valuable if these legal variables had
been more accurately coded, with the limitations inherent in reading a trial opinion from
an Iowa judge, for example, the variables as constructed must suffice.
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Free Exercise Clause
Hypothesis 11: When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to
concentrate free exercise of religion, it is more likely to be supported than
if it is not.
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the effect of the judge
using state or U.S. Free Exercise Clause language in the case. If the judge recognizes a
religious freedom question in the case, and that the Free Exercise clause has some power
in answering that question, it is predicted to be more likely that the religious actor is
going to be protected than if the religious liberty was not brought up at all. The framing
of the foundations for the opinion foreshadow the outcome.
In a dataset of actors in court seeking protection for their religious act, you expect to
see plenty of cases where the free exercise clause is brought up. And that holds true here
as 1,212 votes (in 26% of opinions) were on cases where that clause, or an equivalent
concept, was mentioned.188 But in more opinions (1,340 votes, 30.4% of opinions), it
was not explicit. The missing data account for 702 votes, which makes up 44% of the
cases.
The prediction for the variable does not hold true, and in fact, the opposite does.
Once constitutionally based religious freedom is explicit in a case, the likelihood of a
negative vote approaches two times higher than the favorable vote. The favorable voterate for cases with religious freedom explicitly mentioned is 35%, versus a 58% win rate
for cases without mention of a constitutionally protected civil liberty.
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The phrasings that were coded as mentionings are ―First Amendment rights to Freedom of Religion‖,
―The First Amendment rights of the‖ actor, or a ―Constitutional Right of Religious Freedom‖. Phrasings
that were coded as both Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion are ―Freedom of Religion‖, ―First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution‖, ―Religion Clauses of the Constitution‖, ―Religious Liberty‖, or
―Ecclesiastical Abstention‖. Capitalization was not a consideration.
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One possible explanation for this is that the states, like the federal courts, tend to vote
down claims that rely on the Free Exercise clause rather than more current statutes or
laws. Imagine the amount of comfort judges would feel with legal arguments resting on
current statutes and codes, versus the comfort most judges would feel upholding a legal
argument made with only a less popular clause in a hundred-plus year old state civil
liberty clause. It is not too much of a stretch to imagine that the pure Free Exercise
arguments are legal arguments that judges rarely deal with, seem archaic and antidemocratic, and therefore tilt toward the legal arguments that are less grandiose. The
Free Speech clause strategy itself is based on exactly this: the notion that the Free
Exercise clause is not protective, so aim legal arguments toward areas that are more
respected or controlling. Or in other words, because judges are less likely to grant
religious exemptions, phrase the argument as one of viewpoint discrimination. Judges
probably feel more comfortable striking laws which regulate expression rather than
striking regulations which incidentally infringe one‘s supposed religious behavior.
States which institutionally attempt to increase religious freedom bring up the free
exercise rights more often, as is expected. And that is wholly driven by the judicial
attempt states rather than the legislative attempt states.189 Success is also higher in
institutional states, and more specifically so within the judicially attempted states.190
The occurrence pattern is pronounced in the time-series sets of variables, but the
success does not follow. RFRA states bring up this language 15 percentage points more
after passage, and precedent states 16 percentage points more after the case is handed

189

23% of Free Exercise mentionings occur in Judicial states, 20% occurs in no-attempt states, and at half
that rate, 10% of Free Exercise mentionings occur in the legislative states. P<.001
190
37% win rate in judicially attempted states, 35% in legislatively attempted states, and 32% in no attempt
states. That pattern is significant at the .001 level.
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down, to 55% and 58%, respectively. But in the judicial states the success rate drops
from 40% to 32%. And worse, the RFRA time-series sees the rate go from 61% in 89
votes to 36% in 216 votes. The smaller number of votes in this analysis makes the
outcomes less precise, but the significance of the direction and strength is clear at the
.001 level.
The claimants tilt toward being in the Other religious tradition, which prompts
attention toward the possible spurious drag on the success rate that can cause. Free
Exercise was mentioned in a startling 89% of the votes when the subject was an Other
religious tradition actor. The next highest rate came with Mainline Protestants at 48%,
while Evangelicals and Conservative Non Traditional were also in the 40s. Catholics had
the lowest mention rate at 28%.
And further, Other religious actors won 24% of these votes, which is the lowest rate
among the religious traditions. See table 24 below, for details.
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Table 24 Free Exercise of Religion Reference, Selected Characteristics
Rates at
which Free
Exercise
Issue was
Raised

Protective
VoteRates in
these
cases

No Attempt State
Increased Scrutiny
Legislative Attempt

.47
.57
.54

.31
.37
.35

506
834
255

.100***

Judicial Attempt

.58

.37

579

.092***

Pre-RFRA

.40

.52

89

Post-RFRA

.55

.33

216

Pre-Precedent

.42

.30

94

Post-Precedent

.58

.35

121

Male Litigants

.58

.23

634

Female Litigants

.46

.30

99

Conservative Non-Traditional

.49

.37

94

Evangelical Protestant

.53

.35

347

Mainline Protestant

.45

.70

83

-.050*

Black Protestant

.28

.60

25

-.103***

Catholic

.39

.41

182

-.156***

Jewish

.42

.47

45

Other Religious Category

.89

.24

300

Not Tax Related

.56

.35

1298

Tax Related

.17

.24

42

Not Related to Land Use

.55

.35

1180

Land Use Related

.39

.34

160

-.118***

West Coast

.61

.26

205

.064**

MS Valley

.60

.27

247

.067**

Interior

.55

.37

423

South Atlantic

.40

.26

106

-.088***

Metroliner

.47

.45

359

-.074***

SMA Adherent Rate
Claimant-Area
Religious Agreement
TOTAL

.53

Pearson
Correlation
Score

N

-.09**

-.050*
.321***

-.238***

1340

-.039*

1084

-.104***

2552

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
*** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed).
Insignificant correlation results not shown, nor are the redundant correlation scores of both sides of
a dummy variable.
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These votes correlate positively with drug related issues (.09***), and negatively with
tax issues (-.24***) and land use (-.12***) issues.
Liberal judges did not vote in more free exercise cases, but did vote for them more.
There is a positive correlation between these free exercise cases and the judge‘s vote
being a dissent. That may be because a dissenting vote is a safe time for a judge to favor
a civil liberty. In other words, the civil liberty can be cherished without actually allowing
the religious actor to trump a policy.
The votes in these cases are occurring more in the West and Midwest, and less so in
the South and Northeast. Yet the votes are more favorable toward religious actors in the
Northeast, and less favorable in the West, and all four of those correlations are significant
at the .01 level.
Free exercise cases also find more favorable votes in more populated areas* and areas
with higher adherent rates*** and more religious homogeneity***. And there is a clear
Democratic county tilt toward being more protective of religious actors with positive
correlations with votes for Gore in 2000, Kerry in 2004, and negative correlations with
votes for W. Bush in 2000, 2004, and rates of Republican voting in 2000 and 2004, all
significant at the .001 level.
After seeing the heightened amount of more significant and stronger than usual
correlations in the free exercise variable, I decided to run a logistic regression with it as
the dependent variable for some direction in seeing which of the predictors were stronger
once the effects were all considered at once. It was run as a forward, conditional,
stepwise logit model which essentially picks the strongest predictor from the list of
variables one at a time until the variables left are no longer adding explanatory power.
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And the result of that analysis showed similar results: 1) the poor results of the Other
religious actors, 2) the poor showing of female claimants,191 3) the poor showing of tax
related votes, 4) the smaller but clearer boost from metro adherent rate, 5) the tendency
for these votes to be against religious actors,192 and others.
These findings tend to support the impressionistic reason offered for why protective
constitutional language would lead to dismal results for religious actors. When a judge is
faced with a case regarding the payment of taxes, and one side relies more heavily on
common tax code language and notions of individual responsibility while the other side
uses ―Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion nor the free
exercise thereof,‖ the results do seem more logical.
In conclusion, special consideration is warranted with this variable as there appears to
be many more relationships with the controls and main independent variables than with
other independent variables. Since the appearance of free exercise language predicts less
protection rather than more, the appearance of it with the lesser protected single claimants
and Other Religious actors makes sense. As does its lack of appearing in the more
protective Northeast and with liberal judges, even though those liberal judges still vote
more protectively when they do use it in the opinion. Although judges in the increased
religious freedom states do hear more of these cases and may vote more favorably for
these religious actors, they still vote significantly less in favor of religious freedom
claims compared to the overall dataset average.

191

Not specifically detailed here. The analysis of claimant gender did not strike me as powerful as the
model found.
192
The dependent variable Religious Freedom was used as a predictor variable, that is.
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Establishment Clause
Hypothesis 12: When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to concern
the separation of church and state (an establishment clause), that claim is
less likely to be supported by the judge than if the separation of church
and state is not involved.
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the effect of the judge
using the state or U.S. [Dis]establishment Clause in the case. Citing the clause which
separates church and state193 was predicted to be a bad omen for the religious actor. The
prediction was based on the logic of a judge choosing a clause to justify a case; if the
clause is the one which limits religions‘ range instead of the one which protects religious
acts, the judge was more likely to be establishing why the religious actor did not get his
or her vote. Yet as in the Free Exercise variable, the prediction was wrong.
Establishment issues are raised in more than a quarter (26.7%, 868 votes) of the
dataset, and 52% of the time the case does not raise an establishment issue, while the
remaining 21% are missing due to being derived, and inaccessible. This is as one would
expect from a dataset of votes from cases where actors seek protection for a religious act:
6% free expression related, around half free exercise related, and around a quarter
establishment clause related.
And to complete the consistent pattern on these legal reasoning variables, it also does
not behave as the prediction suggests, correlating with, not against, religious actor
success, and clearly so as the pattern is significant at the .001 level. When an

193

Phrases which were coded for this variable include ―establishment of religion‖, ―separation of church
and state‖, and phrases that I found clearly alluded to the inability of governments to intrude in religious
spheres: ―Excessive entanglement‖, ―ecclesiastical question‖, and ―ministerial exception‖ or synonymous
phrases. And the phrasings which were coded both, again are: ―Freedom of Religion‖, ―First Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution‖, ―Religion Clauses of the Constitution‖, ―Religious Liberty‖, and ―Ecclesiastical
Abstention‖.
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establishment issue is raised, the religious actor gets the favorable vote 56% of the time,
and all other votes in the dataset with these removed come out at a 40% success-rate.
That means a religious actor seeing that the establishment clause was used in their
opinion can expect their probability for success to increase by 40%.
One large reason that the prediction did not hold here is because this language was
vastly used in the sexual abuse cases, which were weaker legal cases than average.
When states attempt to increase religious freedom, establishment language is less
likely to be used, and this is as the prediction suggests (states supporting the individual
religious act are less likely to bring up a constraint on their ability to affect regulation.)
Once establishment language is mentioned, the institutional states show the following
familiar pattern: Judicially increased states are significantly more likely to protect the
actor (61%* favorable vote-rate), legislatively increased states are significantly less likely
to protect the actor (47%**), and no attempt states show no significant difference.
The same pattern appears in the time-series variable: establishment language used
less after increase, and voting less protective in legislative states after, yet more
protective in judicial states after.
Claimants again tend to be more male than usual, and be Mainline Protestant, and
tend not to be Evangelicals or from the Other religious category (but when it was an actor
from the Other category, the vote correlated with less protection: -.107**).
Establishment issues arose more in 1) the sexually deviant cases, which makes
substantive sense as the questions there often involve when and how a government can go
about the case. They arose more 2) when there was a dissent in the case, and a same
logic from above is used here: there is an incentive to use constitutional language in
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dissents since a dissent is not affecting public policy. It is a safe place to use the
grandiose legal reasoning that judges rarely get to use. Establishment language arose
more 3) in opinions written by judges from more conservative religious traditions194, and
this makes indirect sense as conservative judges vote with less libertarian sympathies,
and this language was predicted to be an escape for exactly those situations. And
establishment language arose in 4) more populated areas, higher religious adherent rate
areas,* religiously homogenous areas*, more Democratic areas**, and favorable votes
followed*.
Establishment issues also arose more when the free exercise language was used. It is
worth pausing here. How is it that two variables performing strongly in the opposite
direction from the predictions, and performing in opposite directions, can positively
correlate with one another? The factual answer to that is easy: when the clauses appear
alone, their effect is more intense than when they appear together. Even though they
appear together more often.
Table 25 Comparison and Relationship of Favorable Vote Rates in Opinions
Mentioning the Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion

Not Establishment

Establishment

Total

Not Free Exercise

Favorable
Vote Rate
.54

N
914

Free Exercise

.24

773

Total

.40

1687

Not Free Exercise

.70

298

Free Exercise

.49

567

Total

.56

865

Not Free Exercise

.58

1212

Free Exercise

.35

1340

Total

.46

2552

194

Conservative Non-Traditional, Evangelical and Black Protestant judges used Establishment language
more than the average of 34% of the time for opinions when the judge‘s religious tradition was known.
73% of CNT opinions, 42% of Evangelical Protestant opinions, and 53% of Black Protestant opinions
contained separation language, 22, 67, and 17 votes, respectively.
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The substantive answer to the question is more elusive. And since this variable is
both semi-exploratory, as well as simply a control variable for the states-increasingscrutiny study variables, the separate study that this interaction effect demands cannot be
performed here.
Establishment language tended not to be raised in the economic impact cases (and
unfavorable votes followed when it did) which is unexpected as the tax abatements and
zoning claims have separatist notions at their core.
As in the other legal language variables, judges in the Northeast used this language
less, but still voted protectively when it was used.**
Similar to the other legal variables, winning positively correlated with the
demographic variables the Northeast, religious homogeneity, county population and
religious adherent rates, but less so than with the other two legal reasoning variables.
And like most variables, larger claimant groups, and metro-area religious agreement
were winning contexts here as well. These cases were more likely to be protective in
sexual deviance votes (and this makes sense as it is mainly the separation of church and
state which the Catholic cases relied upon) and with liberal judges casting the vote.
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Table 26 Establishment Issue Raised Votes, Selected Characteristics
Rate at which
Establishment
Issue is
Raised
.37

Establishment
Issue VoteRate
.56

406

Attempt to Increase Religious Freedom

.31

.56

462

Legislative Attempt

.29

.47

139

Judicial Attempt

.32

.61

323

Not Tax Related

.36

.58

831

Tax Related

.15

.30

37

Not Related to Land Use

.39

.58

829

Land Use Related

.10

.31

39

Not Sexual

.31

.53

615

Sexual

.42

.64

253

Not Drug Related

.34

.57

845

Drug Related

.46

.22

23

CNT

.41

.49

78

EP

.22

.57

146

MP

.52

.73

97

Catholic

.35

.54

163

Other

.24

.42

No Attempt

N

Pearson
Correlation
Score

81

Judge Politics

2052

Claimant-Area Religious Agreement

2054

SMA Herfindahl Index

2558

.048*

2558

-.089***

County Politics
TOTAL
N

.34

.56

868

2558

Thus as with the other legal reasoning variables, the basis for constructing the
variable proved to be questionable as it did not behave in the predicted way. When
bringing up the separation of church and state, religious actors found more protection
than when the opinion brought up the very right of citizens to behave religiously. But the
prediction may have had some traction as establishment language was more likely to be
used in states that did not attempt to increase religious freedom. And once it was used,
the judicially increased states again showed the protective tendencies and the legislative
states again showed a lack of protection.
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Free Speech Clause
Hypothesis 13: When the religious freedom claim is coupled with a free speech claim it is
more likely to be supported than if it is not.
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the effect of the judge
using the state or U.S. Free Speech Clause in the case. As mentioned in the introduction,
a weakened Free Exercise clause has meant religious actors are searching for successes
with different civil rights claims that courts continue to uphold with rigor. So if the judge
cites a free speech clause as controlling some aspect of the case, a more protective ruling
is hypothesized.
The variable was constructed by coding the case 1 if any reference to free speech
rights (not just the religious actor‘s) were mentioned in the case. A substantial number, if
not most of the cases here, had expression rights mentioned in the many precedential
decisions which are used to support the legal opinion. These can be binding cases within
the opinion, or can also simply hope to be persuasive on other points but not binding, also
called obiter dicta.
The almost 700 derived cases were not coded either way because the information was
inaccessible.
Free speech rights were coded as present or not present in more than ¾ of the votes,
and were coded as an affirmative mention in only 6% of those instances (151 votes). For
those seeking support for the Christian interest group strategy of using the free speech
clause more, once prisoners and the tangible economic cases are set aside (because those
were not considered in the theory), that six percent grows to eight.
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The outcome of these free speech cases does not support or contradict the prediction,
as they show no significant pattern, but they are negatively correlated with winning the
vote.
Within states that attempt to increase religious freedom, free speech is brought up less
than in no-attempt states, and this decrease is significant at the highest level. Breaking
the increased attempt states down to legislative and judicial components finds that both
retain the pattern, and significantly. 195 Vote rates within this categorization of states,
though, do not show any significant differences.
Free speech tends to be mentioned in cases with single claimants rather than groups,
but as is the pattern uncovered here, groups tend to win votes at a much higher rate in
these cases than single claimants: 59% to 37%. And that difference is significant at the
.001 level.
Evidence of a free speech based Christian legal strategy does find some support in the
fact that evangelicals make up 48 of the 86 votes when free speech in mentioned and
when the claimant religion is known. And further, the favorable vote for the evangelicals
is 50% . That makes a pattern which is significant at the .001 level.
Free speech was significantly more likely to be the subject of a more conservative
judge‘s vote,196 but it is the more liberal judge that votes more favorably in these free
speech cases, although not to a significant degree.

195

-.117 correlation score between Free Speech and State Attempt, p<.001, in 2,555 votes. The scores drop
to -.07 for the legislative variable and the judicial variable, and the scaled versions also show a negative
and significant relationship with a -.08 score, all significant at the p<.001 level.
196
This effect is limited to the original PAJID scores, which are at the supreme court level. The score is .08, and is significant at the .01 level.
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The regional pattern, which is closely related to those judge patterns, adds to the
explanation by showing the use of free speech language as a very significant negative
correlation with the Northeast. Or in the simple North-South-West scheme, free speech
language is related to the regions in this way: the North is -.05***, the West is .08**,
and the South is negative, but not significantly.
And also like the above pattern, the Northeast is significantly more likely to vote for
the religious actors in those cases: 68% of the time they did, versus 37% for all the other
regions.197
The broader conclusion of the Free Speech Raised variable is that it is not likely to
capture any significant pattern of religious actors relying on this aforementioned morerespected civil liberty post Smith-Boerne rather than using the more immediate Free
Exercise clause. There is not a large number of (judge recognized) attempts, nor is the
surface level success rate any better than normal, and it is brought up more in single
claimant cases rather than larger claimant groups, which is contrary to what one would
expect from an interest group strategy. So at this point there is no support for the
hypothesis here that when the freedom of expression is mentioned in the opinion, the
religious actor‘s claim is more likely to be supported than if it were not brought up.

Conclusion of the Legal Reasoning Variables
The predictions on all three legal opinion-based variables were unsupported. Or
better, the simple predictions failed all three times to capture the complex effect that

197

This pattern was significant at the .01 level. Although with only 17 successes in 25 votes in the
Northeast, small sample size disclaimers apply here.
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occurred when free speech, free exercise and establishment issues were written into the
opinion.
Speculating once again on why all three variables did not behave according to the
logic laid out, it often appeared that the language in these cases was used when describing
other cases that were used for support of the case at hand. And one would be tempted to
write off the variables as so indirect and filled with noise as to be useless.
But if that is true, what about the amount of significant patterns found throughout the
variables? What about the fact that liberal judges and judges from the Northeast hear
significantly fewer of these cases laden with civil liberties rhetoric, and then vote
significantly more protective? What about larger claimant groups appearing in
significantly fewer, and winning the vote in significantly more? What about these votes
significantly occurring more in Democratic areas, or (for two of the three) in more
populated, religious and religiously homogenous areas?
It appears that these three variables are capturing a tendency for judges to speak to the
grander issues raised by a religiously motivated act. This is supported by judicially
increased state judges using the language more, and voting most protectively. Along
with that, there is a tendency for some to stay away from that grander speech, like larger
(and perhaps by extension, better funded and more legally strategic) claimant groups, and
the litigants who simply want to keep a tax exemption or zoning variance.198 And
further, the advantage gained from higher metro-claimant religious tradition agreement is
not apparent in these cases. All of this is support for the theory that the judge is voting
with a keener sense of holding biases in check.

198

There are negative relationships between all three legal variables and both economic impact variables,
for six iterations in all, and all are significant at the .001 level.
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Collected Variables Not Included In The Model
Judge Gender
Gender was drawn generally from the first name of the judge. When the first name
was not clear or available, further searching was done via the same sources used in the
party identification variable: Songer and Spill Solberg lists, CQ Judicial Staff Directory,
American Bench, Lexis search in the state source, and a Google search.
78% of judges in the data were male, and only 2% of judges were missing a gender
coding. Women do not significantly differ from men in a simple voting comparison.199
Women judges do appear significantly more in the institutionally increased states
compared to the no-attempt states, 25% to 19% respectively.200 Probing that difference
further finds that it is the judicially increased states that drives the pattern, as women
make up 26% of the judges there versus the insignificantly different 23% in Legislative
states. And even further, the scaled version of the institutionally increased states
introduced above further supports this pattern, showing the lowest protection category to
have the lowest rate of female judges, the second lowest protective category to have the
second lowest rate, and the highest protective category to have the highest rate of women
judges (minus the category with only 28 votes cast).

199

The literature on female judge voting is not in accord. Some of the latest work is finding that when
controlled for party and region, women judges may vote slightly to the left in obscenity and death penalty
cases. See Songer, Donald R. and Kelley A. Crews-Meye. 2000. ―Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision
Making in State Supreme Courts.‖ Social Science Quarterly. 81 (3): 750-762
200
Correlation score of .07, p<.001
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Women tend to adjudicate at the higher appellate levels of the court systems,201 and
tend to self-identify with the Democratic party, and be more liberal.202 And again, the
voting patterns that emerge in this simple description are not significantly different from
male judge voting patterns.
Regions are quite patterned as 31% of the judges on the West Coast are female, and
the lowest rate in the Midwest at 17.6%, both significant at the .001 level.
Table 27 Characteristics of Female Judges

In States Which Have Not Increased Religious Freedom
In Increased Religious Freedom States
In Judicially Increased States
In Legislatively Increased States
In First Scaled Category “Most Protective”
In “More Protective”
In Unclear States
In Last Scaled Category “Rational Basis States”
In Courts of Last Resort
In Intermediate Appellate Court
In Trial or District Court
Republican
Democrat
In California
In the Northwest
In the Southwest
In the South
In the Midwest
In the Northeast
Overall

201

Proportion of
Female
Judges
19%
25%
26%
23%
32%
22%
20%
16%
26%
20%
17%
20%
27%
31%
25%
25%
19%
18%
24%
22%

N
1447
1730
1182
548
155
839
1129
236
1179
1523
475
1023
1324
191
371
288
573
823
931
3177

-.08 correlation score with court level (1 highest, 3 lowest), p<.001.
.07 and .06 correlation scores, p<.001. Female judges have 3 more PAJID points, on average, which is
significant at the .01 level.
202
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Judge Religious Tradition
Judge religious tradition was originally to be a control in the model. Although
collection of this information is more difficult than it used to be,203 712 identifications
were coded.
The information that was collected was done so through the same avenues as the
judge‘s political identification. When a religious identification was found, a 1 was coded
in that religious tradition, and a zero was coded in the 7 other traditions.204
456 of the 712 positive identifications come from the second level of courts, 96 from
the lowest level, and 160 from the highest state court.
The most interesting finding from this variable is just how much a judge‘s religion
appears not to differentiate him or her from other judges. When the judges are lined up in
the ad hoc conservative to liberal faith system ordering mentioned in the judge politics
section above (CNT, EP, MP, BP, Catholic, Jewish, LNT, Other), the correlation with
protective voting is not significant, and not even pointed in the predictable direction (.056, .134 sig.).
When judges vote on a member of their own religious tradition, the outcome was a
49.6% success rate in 123 votes, which is not significant. When specific issue areas are

203

A librarian at the National Center for State Courts attributed the decreasing availability of that
information to a general reluctance to publicize one‘s religion after September 11, 2001. Speculating
further, it also seems likely that the declining social or public benefits of belonging to a denomination since
the middle of the 20th century could contribute to the decrease. Not only was atheism more shunned then
than now, but publicizing one‘s religious affiliation served as a social networking tool in more ways than
commonly seen today. See Robert Wuthnow‘s The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith
Since World War II New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1988.
204
An exception to the rule is when Liberal Non-Traditional judges were coded as 0 in CNT and
Evangelical categories, but left missing in all others. This is because more liberal belief systems are more
likely to have believers who claim multiple systems.
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correlated with this lineup, favorable voting is positively correlated with a known
religious identification, but not significantly so.

Judicial Attempt

TOTAL

Jewish Judge

Liberal Nontraditional Judge

Mean

.64

.45

.43

.67

.43

.32

.50

.50

N

22

84

255

18

247

74

4

8

Mean

.20

.50

.03

.18

.08

.07

.00

.02

N

315

315

316

315

315

315

315

316

Mean

.10

.30

.02

.48

.13

.00

.01

.01

N

396

392

392

392

392

396

396

392

Mean

.16

.31

.03

.38

.18

.01

.01

.00

N

121

120

120

120

120

121

121

120

Other Religious
Tradition Judge

Catholic Judge

Legislative Attempt

Black Protestant
Judge

Increased Scrutiny States

Mainline
Protestant Judge

No Attempt

Evangelical
Protestant Judge

Judge‟s Pro-Vote-Rate

Conservative
Non-traditional
Judge

Table 28 Judge Religious Tradition Characteristics

Mean

.07

.29

.01

.53

.10

.00

.01

.01

N

275

272

272

272

272

275

275

272

Mean

.14

.38

.03

.35

.10

.03

.01

.01

N
711 707 708 707
707 711 711
708
The N of “Judge‟s Pro-Vote-Rate” is limited to only that religious tradition, while the N of the other rows is the
number of all judges with a religious identification. The TOTAL rows are not uniform because coding for
Liberal Non-Traditional was not exclusive. See footnote 204 above.

The judges are roughly evenly split between the increased scrutiny states and others,
56% to 44%, which fits almost perfectly the amount of votes cast that occur in the
increased scrutiny states versus the others, 55% to 45%.
The religious judges in the increased contexts do not vote inordinately more or less
protective than the non-religious identified judges.
It should be noted that when judge religious traditions are singled out and examined,
significant differences can be found. But since those differences appear to regress to the
mean with more votes, this analysis of all of the judges‘ religious traditions ends up
showing similarities more than differences.
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Claimant Gender
The gender of the religious actor was collected and coded 1 for females, males 0.
When the religious actor(s) was a church or organization or too numerous, no gender was
coded. Since coding multiple actors presents statistical difficulties, and since there were
only 19 vote contexts that fit this description, those cases were discarded for this variable.
Only 17% of the known gender votes were cast with women as claimants, and with
around half of the data unknown on the gender variable, only 8% of the database is a
known vote on a woman claimant.
Women claimants tended to not be the subject of a vote on a deviancy case, prisoner
case, or any of the three legal language cases. Women tended to win more often than
men, and tended to show up in the increased scrutiny states more often. Women
claimants had a negative correlation with the West Coast, and a positive correlation with
the Northeast. And women claimants saw no bump in the successful vote-rate from
women judges.

Claimant Size
During the data collection, claimant size actually was not coded. But during the
analysis, it appeared to be a meaningful way of understanding some of the patterns that
were emerging. Since claimant gender was collected only when there were three or
fewer claimants, a claimant size variable which codes larger than three claimants 1, and
smaller numbers of claimants 0 was constructed.
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Claimant groups conveniently come close to halving the data, with 53% of votes on
groups with less than three claimants, and 47% on groups with more than three. The vast
majority of larger groups were churches.
One of the most interesting findings of the study is that groups with more than three
claimants won 58% of their votes, while groups of three or fewer won 33% (p<.001).
This phenomenon occurs slightly more in the increased scrutiny states, but is wholly
driven by the legislative states rather than the judicial, as the judicial states see less of the
phenomenon than average. And further, the scaled judicial variable sees a negative
correlation at a significant level.
Institutional context does not make a significant difference to voting here: 57%, 57%,
58% for no-increase contexts, legislative, and judicial contexts, respectively. But the
smaller claimant size does show a significant pattern to voting and context. 34%, 26%,
35% are the rates from no-increase, legislative and judicially increased contexts,
respectively. Which makes a recurring difference (a less protective scenario in the
legislatively increased states) that is significant at the .05 level.
Also related to claimant size is the amount of metro-claimant religious agreement.
Larger claimant groups are the subject of votes in contexts of more agreement (32%) than
smaller groups (26%). This relationship, though, might be slightly tautological though as
claimant size is directly tied to a church being the claimant, and area agreement is also a
function of churches. And significant relationships between a claimant religious tradition
and claimant size have this same tautological possibility. Yet the results show what
would likely be predicted: Catholics, Mainliners and LNT tend to go to court in larger
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groups, and tend to win more. CNTs and Other religious believers tend to go singly, and
to lose the vote more often, and the correlations for these are very strong.205
There are strong correlations between liberal judges and claimant size,206 but the
related regional correlations are significant as well, and likely covary here. Weaker
patterns of correlating with Democratic areas show up at the .05 level.

Judicial Selection System
Research on judicial selection systems has shown that they are realistically not very
meaningful to case outcomes.207 But the data here present an opportunity to see if on
religious matters the theoretical, if not supported, differences among the systems show
some variance. The five general methods for choosing judges in the states, ordered from
most democratic to least are: partisan elections, gubernatorial or legislative appointment,
nonpartisan elections, combined appointment with merit selection, and a solely merit
selection system.
To briefly describe the variable, votes appear to be close to normally distributed
among the selection systems with Combined Merit systems owning the highest
percentage of votes with 25%, and the formalized Gubernatorial and/or Legislative
Appointment systems with the smallest amount at 16%.
In this model, judicial selection systems could be expected to allow more majoritarian
outcomes in states with the more democratic selection systems. Majoritarian outcomes

205

CNT: -.146, Other Religious Tradition: -.340, Mainline Protestant: .137, Catholic: .285. All significant
at the .001 level. LNT: .066, p<.01.
206
.133, p<.001 correlation with Judge Politics. And the regional score are .09, p<.001 for the North, -.07,
p<.001 for the South, and -.05, p<.01 for the West.
207
See Harry Stumpf‘s excellent judicial selection system literature review in chapter five in his American
Judicial Politics. 2nd Ed. 1998. NJ: Prentice Hall.
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can look either like the vote upholding local policy against a religious exemption, or it
could be higher levels of area-claimant religious agreement in winning votes versus
losing votes.
The first hypothesis regarding majoritarian outcomes gets some support here as the
only two selection systems which show a significant (p<.05) pattern are partisan and
nonpartisan elections, and both of them are negatively correlated with pro-religious
freedom voting.
The second hypothesis regarding more area-claimant religious agreement in the
systems more open to democratic pressure finds support as well. The most majoritarian
system has the highest level of agreement, the second-most majoritarian has the second
highest agreement, and two of the following three systems show the same pattern with
only the most insulated system (Merit) breaking the pattern by having around an average
amount of agreement. This overall pattern is significant at the .001 level.
Another way of corroborating this hypothesis of judicial selection system allowing
more or less local control is by looking at the judges themselves in their systems. If the
judge‘s religious tradition looks more like the area religious tradition in the more
democratic system, then that is considered support for this hypothesis.
Expected patterns here do not emerge. As table 29 below shows, there are significant
patterns, but the three relationships are in the opposite direction than the prediction: less
agreement among the political appointment and more agreement among the merit
systems.
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Table 29 Judicial Selection System, Select Correlations

Type of Judicial
Selection System
Partisan election
Gubernatorial or
Legislative
Appointment
Nonpartisan election

Protective
Vote Rate

State Institutional Attempt To Restore
Religious Freedom
Attempted
Religious
Freedom
Legislative
Judicial
Restoration
Attempt
Attempt

.47*

.52***

.32***

.20***

.32*

.52

.46

.21***

.03***

.18***

.32**

.45***

ClaimantArea
Religious
Tradition
Agreement

% of County
Agreeing
with Judge
Party ID

.41*

.72***

.00***

.72***

.27*

.52

Combined Merit

.43

.68***

.24***

.44***

.25***

.54**

Merit

.48

.50*

.22**

.28***

.29

.56***

.37

.29

.52

Total

.45
.55
.17
*** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

States
Do the institutional responses of states correlate with each state‘s favorable voting
records? The answer is no. If you look at all the votes in the states prior to their
institutional attempt to increase, and compare those votes to the votes that come after the
state hopes to increase religious freedom, not only is there is not an increase in
protection, there is a decrease. And further, the decrease is significant at the .01 level.
This information is largely covered in the time-series version of the institutional
variables.
States that will eventually try to increase religious freedom have a 50% winning
percentage in 678 votes before the institutional attempt, and a 42% vote-rate in the 723
votes after the attempt.
A closer look shows that most of that variance is due to the legislative states rather
than the judicially increased ones. Before passing a state RFRA, those states (and DC)
voted for religious actors 53% of the time, and after passage, 41% of the time. Judicially
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increased states had a 48% winning vote percentage before the more protective landmark
case was handed down, and a 44% vote-rate after.
One possible emerging reason for the legislative decrease which is three times larger
may be an antagonism that exists between the judicial and legislative branches like that
which existed at the federal level. The language used in the national RFRA in 1993 was
unwisely harsh toward the Smith decision, and the judicial response to that harsh
language in Boerne was itself overreaching.208
A second possibility is that the state RFRAs are covered in the local media not as
increases in civil liberties, but instead as opportunities for sensationalism. Stories about
religious minorities trumping democratic policy are likely to sell more newspapers and
stop more channel surfers than will stories about a strengthened religious liberty. And if
this is so, state courts, with less insulation from democratic majorities, are more likely to
see a negative effect due to that reporting which makes the law unpopular.
This second possibility can get support by looking at the states with a judicial
selection system that is more democratic, and seeing if that is where the effect came
from. When legislative state success rates were compared to the judicial state success
rates within each selection system, the result is no support for the hypothesis. Legislative
states find most of their variance in the states with merit selection systems rather than
partisan elections or gubernatorial/legislative systems.209 RFRA states with the more
democratic judicial selection system, prior to passage, protected religious actors 49% of

208

As evidenced by the effective nullification of the separation of powers language in the decision. The
remaining effect of Boerne is solely in the relationship between states and federal government.
209
To be sure, this assumption here is not that merit systems are immune to democratic pressure, but that
they are more immune to the pressure that would come from a grassroots unease that this media tendency
would provoke.
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the time. After passage, those same states protected religious actors 42% of the time.
But the RFRA states with merit systems saw a larger decrease in protection: from a 57%
protective vote-rate to 44%, and in 154 and 311 votes, respectively, the difference is
significant.
Judicial states vote without any significant effect from the selection system in this
matter.

Region
The fifty political geographical variables will be used where appropriate, but
understanding geographical patterns through larger regions can highlight tendencies that
might be lost with 50 units. So creation of several variables based on regions of the
country was done for exploratory purposes. Three sets of regional variables were
created. The first is a simple North, South, West classification. The North and South are
separated in the same way they were during the Civil War but with Oklahoma added, and
the line separating them from the West goes North on the West side of Texas and Kansas,
and the East side of Nebraska, North and South Dakota. See the map below.

A second set of geographical variables separates the nation into six regions: the
Northeast, the South, the Midwest, the Southwest, the Northwest which includes Alaska
and Hawaii, and California.
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The third set of geographical variables attempts to capture the political differences
better than the two previous. The five regions created here by Michael Barone in an
introduction for the 1998 Almanac of American Politics210 are the Metroliner Northeast
(Barone‘s creative term to add Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland to the Northeast),
the South Atlantic, the Mississippi Valley stretching from Louisiana and Alabama to
Minnesota to Ohio, the Interior which stretches from Texas to Idaho and includes Alaska,
and the Pacific Rim which also includes Hawaii. Each region encompasses around a
sixth of the population except the Mississippi Valley which has around a third of the
nation‘s population, and each region also has a political underpinning which justifies the
grouping. Metroliners are the base of the Democratic party, and the South Atlantic is
deeply religious, anti-union, and growing. The Mississippi Valley is largely the ballast
of the nation with a populist flavor in both Democratic and Republican voters. The
interior is driven by ―local interests over federal control‖. The Pacific Rim is ―the
homeland of America‘s computer creativity and its connection with the surging East
Asian economies‖, and also a less tradition-laden view of Republicanism embodied by
Ronald Reagan.

210

Barone 1997, which was adapted from Barone‘s and Grant Ujifusa‘s introduction to the 1998 Almanac
of American Politics. I reference the National Journal version. Barone puts ―up-state New York‖ into the
Mississippi Valley region, but separating states was not done in this study.
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Population is not well represented, as the Interior and Northeast each have around
30% of the votes in this dataset. The Northeast has a population 275% higher than
California, for a specific example. But with those differences in mind, the rates statistics
from these more socially and politically congruous groupings can perhaps capture more
of the tendencies sought after in the analysis.
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Table 30 Characteristics of Geography

Average
Context
Religious
AdherentRate
0.39**

Average
Context
Religious
Homogeneity
Rate
0 (hetero.) –
100
(homogeneity)
0.06**

-.83**

0.52**

0.12**

.52

.00**

0.50**

0.10**

.62**

-.43**

0.41**

0.06**

66.0**

.68**

.61**

0.56**

0.16**

.45

50.0

.54

-.13

0.50

0.11

South

.43

35.5**

.45**

-.48**

0.48**

0.10**

West

.40**

47.6**

.37**

-1.17**

0.44**

0.09**

North

.48**

58.7**

.67**

.51**

0.53**

0.13**

Average

.45

50.0

.54

-.13

0.50

0.11

California

.47

53.4*

.15**

-1.70**

0.43**

0.09**

Northwest

.34**

51.5

.60*

-.79**

0.42**

0.07**

Southwest

.45

31.2**

.43**

-.26

0.52**

0.14**

South

.42

36.1**

.39**

-.72**

0.46**

0.10**

Midwest

.44

47.2**

.59**

.11**

0.49**

0.09**

Northeast

.51**

66.0**

.68**

.61**

0.56**

0.16**

-.13

0.50

0.11

Pacific Rim

Favorable
Vote Rate
.40

Judge
PAJID,
0 (Cons.)
-100
(Liberal)
56.4**

Chances a Vote
Occurs Under
an Institutional
Attempt To
Increase
Religious
Freedom
.40**

MS Valley

.37**

33.3**

.40**

Interior

.45

45.1**

South Atlantic

.43

37.6**

Metroliner

.51**

Average

Average
.45
50.0
.54
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Scaled
Institutional
Protective
Rate
-3 (Least)
to 3 (Most
Protective)
-1.04**

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance or explanatory power of
geography in this dataset (and that goes for social research in general, as well.)

Levels of Courts
The three levels of courts recognized here are the court of last resort, the intermediate
appellate court, and the trial or district court, coded 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
The votes are not distributed normally, with 36% in the supreme courts, 47% in the
intermediate appellate courts, and 17% in the lowest court. Within the lowest level, 87%
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of the votes were derived from parent cases, leaving 70 votes (and 70 cases, since each
case had one judge) that were original.
The lowest level voted for the religious actor more, with a 48% success rate versus
the 43% at level two, and 46% at level one, but the difference is not significant.
The institutional variables show a significant and strange pattern with the level of
court: the intermediate appellate level is the more institutionally protective level. 48% of
supreme court votes and 49% of lower court votes occur in institutionally increased
contexts, but the intermediate appellate votes occur in these contexts significantly more
often at 61% of the time.211 This likely has to do with the dates of the intermediate
appellate courts being a bit later than the COLR, and much later than the district court
votes. And with time comes more adoptions of increased scrutiny.
It is the legislatively increased states that account for most of the difference as it is
their appellate courts which have a doubled increased-scrutiny rate compared to the other
levels of courts. Judicial states also show an increase in level 2 cases over levels 3 and 1,
but not significantly.
And yet the voting in those intermediate appellate contexts is less protective with a
43% vote-rate, for a difference that is significant at the .05 level. And again it is the
legislatively increased states that drive the outcome. Their favorable vote-rate at the
intermediate appellate level of 39% drags down the overall, as the judicial states vote at
45% which leaves the average at 43%.
Claimant characteristics show several significant correlations with level of court.
There is a negative relationship between claimant size and level of court, with

211

That 25% increase is significant at the .001 level, one-tailed test.
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significance at both the lowest level and highest.212 This is likely a function of the higher
success rate of larger claimant groups. Once a claimant is satisfied with the decision,
they do not pursue it further, and if they are a larger group with presumably better
counsel, they are not taken further by the opposing side as much.
Votes on prisoners and sexual deviancy are resolved at lower levels and votes on
taxes, higher priced issues, and establishment issues appear significantly more at the
highest level.
It is counter-intuitive that supreme court decisions occur in less populated contexts
than both intermediate appellate and trial court decisions, and by a factor larger than two.
This is due to Albany being the capital of New York, and Springfield of Illinois, and
Sacramento of California, among others. And since more populated areas are also the
areas with higher adherent-rates, supreme court decisions occur in less religious areas as
well. And yet supreme court decisions still occur in Democratic leaning areas.213

Education, Public and Private
The dataset includes a variable on whether the vote was education related, and if so,
whether it was a public or private education question. These data were collected because
many of the U.S. Supreme Court religious liberty (if establishment clause specific) cases
have been at this intersection of private faith and public institution.
Around half of the education cases coded here were of a) non-custodial parents
adjudicating their responsibility for private school bills, b) school responsibility for
sexual abuse cases, or c) teacher free exercise rights and other individually based cases.

212

The correlation between claimant size and trial/district courts is .05**, and between claimant size and
the supreme court is -.07***.
213
-.10*** correlation with County W. Bush Vote Rate 2000, as well as 2004.
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The other half does capture the church state nexus that was expected: financial
responsibility for shared resource programs between city and religious body, ability to
regulate school inoculation, unemployment and labor law policies, and more.
338 of the 3,254 votes were education related, and 82% of them concerned a private
school, 38% involved public schools, leaving 69 votes regarding both.
The votes tilting positive for overall education cases, negative for public education
cases and positive for private education cases, yet neither are significant.
The states in which these occurred were not significantly patterned overall, but some
pattern exists in the interaction. Private education cases occur more in states which
attempt to increase religious freedom,214 and voting is consistently more protective in
these same states, even after considering the method of increase.215
Government Employee
Because there seemed to be plenty of cases of governmental employees seeking
protection for an act, I created a variable and began coding for it. In the end, 377 votes
were cast on questions regarding public employees. The employees in question were
primarily jurors and prosecutors, and other actors were judges, teachers, and police
officers, a fireman and a city councilor. The prosecutor and juror cases were mainly
about the propriety of a Biblical reading or preemptory strikes for religious reasons.
Teachers were kept solely in the public education variable.
The favorable vote-rate in these cases was 53%, which is significantly higher than
average. These cases, like the education cases, also strongly tended to occur in the states

214

Correlation scores of .05**, -.05** and .04*, respectively.
Success rate of private education related religious actor in Legislative states: 34%, in Judicial states:
43% and in No attempt states; 62%. The three of these are significant at the .05 level with 56, 102 and 116
votes, respectively.
215
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which have not attempted to increase religious freedom. And also like the education
cases, the protective vote-rates were higher in those non-increase states.216
Judges who voted on these cases tended to be more conservative, and more
conservative judges offered more protection to these actors.217
The cases occur more in higher population areas and Democratic areas, and in the
South and in California.218 And California and the South were significantly more
protective (59% and 68% successful vote-rates, respectively), but the Northeast, where
the cases appeared at significantly lower rates, also receive significantly lower protection
(41% vote-rate, versus their average 51%, and the overall average of 45%.)

Conclusions On The Control Variables
The Judge and Community variables are clearly the strongest and clearest of the
control variables. Their effect is straight-forward: left-leaning counties, liberal judges,
more adherents and more religious homogeneity all provide a more hospitable context for
a religious litigant. However, left-leaning politics does have an ambiguous relationship
with the attempt to increase religious freedom (legislatively increased states tend to be
more Republican.)
The Claimant and Case Characteristic variables should be handled individually. The
Claimant-Area Religious Agreement variable appears strong, and has a curvilinear shape
of being highest and lowest in the increased states (legislatively and judicially increased,

216

The favorable vote-rate for the ―rational basis‖ and ―static state‖ categories was 61% in 243 votes,
versus the vote-rate for the two most protective categories at 26.5% in 64 votes.
217
PAJID average for these votes is 6.5 points more conservative than overall average in these 328 votes,
and winning PAJID average is 2+ points more conservative than the PAJID average votes against the
religious actor. Both significant at the .001 level.
218
All four contexts have increased appearances, significant at the .001 level.
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respectively), and average in the no-attempt states. The Prisoner variable is predictably a
low winner, but very responsive to the increased states.
The Deviancy variable, though, is ambivalent. Sexual issues appear to be difficult
convictions to get, and drug related deviancy are tough winners (but getting outside of
pro-religious freedom states can more-than-triple your chances.) And the Economic
Impact variable simply does not appear to have the effect one might reason it would.
The Legal Reasoning variables all performed against expectations. Separation of
church and state was generally not used as a rationale in votes against, and free exercise
and speech were not used as a rationale in votes for religious actors. Instead, the clear
patterns appear to be pointing to a seriousness or gravity of the issue lessening the effect
of other predictors. When judges use constitutional language and lines of precedent,
other usual sociological explanatory factors lose much of their strength.
In the next chapter, the model laid out in the preceding pages is run and analyzed.
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CHAPTER 5
MODEL ANALYSIS

To clarify a common issue in modeling, a logit model differs from a logistic
regression only very slightly (if at all, actually.219) The difference, to be exact, is in the
two ways of expressing the outcome. If in interpreting the model one refers to the logit
coefficient, then it is a logit model. If instead the coefficients are transformed into
probabilities, then it is thought of as a logistic regression.220 This slight difference is
inflated by different perceptions of the models among researchers221, and a difference in
the software. SPSS, for instance, has two different places for the two models. Logistic
regressions are located under the Regressions menu option, and Logit is located under the
Loglinear option. And the different limitations and outputs of each tend to play to the
differences in perceptions.222 And all of this occurs while statisticians wonder what all
the hullabaloo is about.223

Collinearity Diagnostics
The software package used for this study (SPSS) has multicollinearity diagnostics,
although for regressions that were located only in the linear regression menu option. So

219

The two Wikipedia entries on logit and logistic regression are, as of this writing, being questioned as
redundant. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Logistic_regression
220
Liao, Tim Futing. Interpreting Probability Models: Logit, Probit, and Other Generalized Linear
Models. Sage Publishing. Number 101. 1994 p.11-12
221
Pampel 2000. The difference between researchers who are drawn to the certainty offered by crosstab
and ANOVA based models versus the realism offered by continuous outcomes of linear regressions.
222
SPSS limits the number of independent variables to 10 in logit models, but is unlimited in logistic
models. And further, in logit models continuous variables have to be entered in a different way and are
handled differently than in the logistic regression.
223
Liao (1994) goes on to couple the terms together and refer to them both as logit for the rest of the book.
P.12
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although these come from that option, the statistics closely approximate the same
tolerance and value inflation factor test scores that would result in the logistic regression.
Multicollinearity here is going to be multicollinearity there, in other words.
Table 31 Collinearity Diagnostics for Judge & Community Variables
Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance
VIF
Claimant-Area Religious Agreement
.917
1.091
Judge Politics
.979
1.022
Metro-Area Adherent Rate
.987
1.013
Metro-Area Herfindhal Index
.986
1.014
County Voting
.982
1.019
a Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Religious Actor Vote Outcome, Land Use, Deviant Drug, Prisoner,
Free Exercise Issue Raised, Deviant Sexual, Establishment Issue Raised, Taxes
b Dependent Variable: Integrated, Scaled Variable with Amici Adjustment

The values all look good, here. Claimant-Area Religious Agreement has the lowest
tolerance, yet is still offering more than 90% of a new explanation.
The Eigenvalues and corresponding Condition Index do show that there is
redundancy on two variables entered into the model once all 14 are entered. And as the
model is run as the appropriate logistical regression, a stepwise method of regressing that
will address these redundancies will be chosen as a way of insulating the model from the
ill-effects.224

The Results
The Loglinear Logit Model
The logit model shows that the model is indeed explaining enough of the variance to
be considered a ―well-fitting‖ model, as the Pearson Chi-square and Likelihood Ratios
are insignificant.

224

Looking ahead to the model that will eventually be the fruit of the study, the Eigenvalues and Condition
Index and Variance Proportions all indicate low/acceptable levels of collinearity.

167

The two measures of association, entropy and concentration, show that the model
accounts for .164 and .190 of the dispersion, respectively. These measures are similar to
a linear regression‘s R2 statistic.
The parameters in the model which are significant at the .05 level listed below.
Table 32 Loglinear Logit Model Results
Parameter Estimates
Estimate
Std.
Parameter
or logit
Error
Z
Sig.
[ReligProtected = 1] * ClaimantReligAgreement
-1.394
.685 -2.036
.042
[ReligProtected = 1] * CountyVoteRepublican
-3.418 1.486 -2.300
.021
[ReligProtected = 0] * [EstablishmentClMentioned = 0]
.976
.174 5.624
.000
[ReligProtected = 0] * [FreeExerciseMentioned = 0]
-1.450
.156 -9.286
.000
[ReligProtected = 0] * MetroAdherentRate
9.459 2.942 3.215
.001
[ReligProtected = 1] * MetroAdherentRate
9.003 1.996 4.512
.000
[ReligProtected = 0] * [JudicialScaled = -1]
1.426
.437 3.259
.001
[ReligProtected = 0] * [JudicialScaled = 1]
.908
.327 2.774
.006
[ReligProtected = 0] * [LegisIncrease = 0]
.426
.181 2.346
.019
[ReligProtected = 0] * MetroHerfindahlIndex
-13.429 4.246 -3.162
.002
[ReligProtected = 0]
2.117 1.306 1.621
.105
Model: Multinomial Logit
Design: Constant + ReligProtected + ReligProtected * ClaimantReligAgreement + ReligProtected *
CountyVoteRepublican + ReligProtected * Deviantbehavior + ReligProtected * EstablishmentClMentioned +
ReligProtected * FreeExerciseMentioned + ReligProtected * Prisoner + ReligProtected * MetroAdherentRate
+ ReligProtected * MetroHerfindahlIndex + ReligProtected * JudgePolitics + ReligProtected * JudicialScaled
+ ReligProtected * LegisIncrease
Note: There were four variables with values that were percentages which had to be transformed into whole
numbers for the more intuitive coefficient to be interpretable in the model. Those four variables were
Claimant-Area Religious Agreement, Metro-Area Adherent-Rate, Metro-Area Herfindahl Index (homogeneity
measure), and County Majortarianness (effectively the Republican vote-rate). The transformation was
simply multiplying each by 100 to turn the percentage into a whole number.

Writing directly on the research question, two of the 12 possible parameters for the
Scaled Judicial Variable do have a significant effect even after controlling for all the
other influences. Specifically, when a vote is cast in the least protective judicial context,
the odds of an unprotective vote increase by log odds ratio of 1.43, or better, by a factor
of 4.26. So the win-rate, as was detailed in the descriptive chapters, drops from 55%
generally to 19% in the judicially declared rational basis category, all things being
equal.225 Likewise, the ―least protective judicial increase‖ category increases the odds of

225

19% is transformation of the 4.26 odds to a probability.
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an unprotective vote by the log odds ratio of .908, which puts the odds at 2.48, which
lowers the probability of a win to 28.5%, all things equal. And lastly, no legislative
increased scrutiny means an increase in the odds of an unprotective vote of 1.53.
The parameter with the largest effect on the model occurs when Free Exercise is not
mentioned in unprotective cases, as measured by the Z-score. An interpretation of that
parameter is when Free Exercise is not mentioned, the odds of an unprotective vote
decrease by a factor of 1.45. Despite the double negative and suggestion of a lack of an
effect, the model shows this vacuum-like effect to be the strongest in the model. The lack
of establishment language in the vote‘s opinion increases the odds of an unprotective
vote, and is the second most influential parameter in the model. See Table 25 for a
simpler visual of this effect.
When both languages appear in a decision, the effect is somewhat. It is only when
they occur separately that the strong positive and negative effects occur.
In the logit model, five of the seven significant parameters occur with covariates
(continuous variables) rather than factors (discrete variables.) Covariate interpretation is
at a disadvantage in loglinear logit models as the specific values of each cell are a)
arithmetic means calculated by the software, which b) means that the shape or variance of
the variable is altered, and c) is not transparent in the results, so the distortions are not
open to analysis. Thus, the parameters for covariates are better used as controls on the
main factor variables studied rather than as independent variables in their own rights.226

226

Help on this interpretation was received from G. David Garson‘s excellent ―Quantitative Research in
Public Administration‖ class website, http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logit.htm.
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The Partial Correlation
A partial correlation is the second method for seeing the direction and strength of
relationship between two variables (religious freedom and state attempt to increase that)
after controlling for the effect of other variables (all of the control variables.)227
The following tables 33 and 34 are the results of the correlations, in a truncated form,
which shows columns only for the dependent variable, state attempt to increase,
legislative attempt, and judicial attempt.
The first table below is the controlled correlation with missing information excluded
only from each pair of variables being correlated. The three correlation scores in bold
type, centered at the bottom of the table, are answers to the research question. When all
of the variables discussed in this dissertation are controlled, the legislative, judicial and
integrated, scaled version of the attempt to increase scrutiny all failed to reach
significance.

227

The control method is by determining which variance is predicted by the control variable on each
correlated variables, and extracting those predicted values. Hays 1994, 675.
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none

Control
Variables

Table 33 Partial Correlation Version of Model
Missing Cases Excluded Pairwise

D.V.
Favorable
Vote
Outcome

Legislative
Attempt at
Increasing
Religious
Freedom

Judicial
Attempt at
Increasing
Religious
Freedom

DEP. VARIABLE Favorable Vote Outcome

1.000

-.016

.013

Legislative Attempt at Increasing Rel. Freedom

-.016

1.000

-.355(**)

.013

-.355(**)

1.000

Integrated, Scaled Increased Scrutiny

.035

.343(**)

.518(**)

Claimant-Metro Religious Agreement

.142(**)

.109(**)

-.128(**)

Judicial Attempt at Increasing Religious Freedom

Deviant Act was Sexual

.121(**)

.025

.051(**)

Deviant Act was Drug Related

-.065(**)

.011

.005

Claimant is a Prisoner

-.181(**)

.012

.048(**)

.037(*)

.026

.000

.006

.059(**)

.002

Case is Related to Taxes
Case is Related to Land Use
Free Speech Mentioned

-.019

-.069(**)

-.067(**)

Establishment Issue Raised

.156(**)

-.048(*)

-.024

Free Exercise Issue Raised

-.233(**)

.012

.092(**)

Judge Politics (Liberal)

.062(**)

-.093(**)

.373(**)

Metro-Area Adherent Rate

.055(**)

.039(*)

.009

Metro-Area Homogeneity Index

.060(**)

.054(**)

.010

-.087(**)

.097(**)

-.228(**)

DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Favorable Vote Outcome

1.000

-.006

.023

Legislative Attempt at
Increasing Religious
Freedom

-.006

1.000

-.346(**)

Judicial Attempt at
Increasing Religious
Freedom

.023

-.346(**)

1.000

Integrated, Scaled
Increased Scrutiny
Variable with Amici
Adjustment

.041

.413(**)

.469(**)

County Vote (Republican)
Control Variables
Claimant-Area Religious
Agreement & Act was
Sexually Deviant & Act was
Drug Related Deviant &
Claimant was Prisoner &
Taxes were Sought & Land
Use was Issue & Free Speech
Language Raised &
Establishment Language
Raised & Free Exercise
Language Raised & Judge
Politics & Metro-Area
Adherent Rate & Metro-Area
Homogeneity Index & County
Vote Normalized, Rep+ and
Dem-

** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level

Table 33, though, treated missing data differently than the two logit models do.
Missing information in the above model excluded the immediate pair if one of the cells of
information was missing, but did not exclude the whole case, as the logit models do. The
two ways of dealing with missing data are referred to here as pairwise and casewise
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exclusions. And in SPSS, the only model of the three that offers a choice on how to deal
with missing data is the correlation. So table 34 below shows the partial correlation with
the other way of excluding data.
Table 34 Partial Correlation Version of the Model
Missing Cases Excluded Listwise
Favorable
Vote
Outcome

Control Variables
Claimant-Area Religious Agreement
& Act was Sexually Deviant & Act
was Drug Related Deviant & Claimant
was Prisoner & Taxes were Sought &
Land Use was Issue & Free Speech
Language Raised & Establishment
Language Raised & Free Exercise
Language Raised & Judge Politics &
Metro-Area Adherent Rate & MetroArea Homogeneity Index & County
Vote Normalized, Rep+ and Dem-

Legislative Attempt at Increasing
Religious Freedom

.058(*)

Judicial Attempt at Increasing
Religious Freedom

.086(**)

Integrated, Scaled Increased
Scrutiny Variable with Amici
Adjustment

.155(***)

*** Correlation is significant at 0.001 level
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level

Prior to accounting for the effects of judges and contexts and case types (the
―pairwise‖ table 33), there is no significant pattern to religious freedom and states that try
to increase it, even when categorized into judicial and legislative states, and even after
accounting for lesser attempts at increasing. After accounting for the effects of judges,
contexts, case types, legal language and all other variables, three of the four correlations
are significant and in the predicted direction. Legislative is weaker than judicially
attempted states, as the descriptive parts of the study clearly showed. The scaled version
of the institutional attempt is strongest.
Why the large difference between the two? The very conclusion of the study hangs
on the answer to that question.
The ―complete information‖ partial correlation did not consider information unless
each variable is coded for every variable chosen, so only half of the dataset was
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considered. If a simple correlation is run with only the 1,612 votes that the partial
correlation considered for the control variables, the correlations show the same strength
and direction.

Table 35 Correlations for Only the Cases Considered In the Model
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
Favorable Vote
Outcome
Increased Scrutiny

.076(**)

Legislative Attempt at Increasing Religious Freedom

.021

Judicial Attempt at Increasing Religious Freedom
Integrated, Scaled Increased Scrutiny Variable with
Amici Adjustment
N = 1,612
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

.057(*)
.110(**)

To make the data more clear, here are the correlations for the same variables from
inside the missing data.
Table 36 Correlation Scores for Cases Excluded from the Final Model
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE
Favorable Vote
Outcome
-.071(**)

Increased Scrutiny
Legislative Attempt at Increasing Religious Freedom
Judicial Attempt at Increasing Religious Freedom
Integrated, Scaled Increased Scrutiny Variable with
Amici Adjustment
N = 1,638
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

-.056(*)
-.033
-.092(**)

It was something of a mystery as to why this very clear pattern occurs when the data
are spliced in a seemingly unrelated way. Seeking the answer began with an analysis of
the missing data.
The missing data were largely drawn from the inability to collect from three areas:
claimant‘s religious tradition, the legal variables in derived cases, and judge politics.
Where do the derived cases and harder to find judge politics logically reside? The
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answer is in the lower levels of courts. The missing data included 95% of the district and
trial court votes.
Why would rows of data with some missing cells that are more heavily drawn from
lower courts show states attempting to increase religious freedom negatively correlated
when compared to the overall dataset? The answer is time. Date was not controlled in
the model. Therefore the rise in states increasing scrutiny is not captured in the missing
data because the missing data occur earlier.
For evidence of that, see table 37 below showing the characteristics of votes in a
variable which splits the dates of the data into ten roughly equal segments.
But also see the second part of the mystery in the column for pro-religious freedom
vote-rate.
Table 37 Comparison of Means for Selected Variables

Increased
Scrutiny

Integrated,
Scaled
Increased
scrutiny
Variable w/
Amici Adj.

Favorable Vote
Rate

N

Prior to 1998

.30

-1.04

.47

298

to July 1998

.30

-1.32

.46

296

latter half 1998

.34

-.77

.50

296

most of 1999

.55

-.03

.46

294

1999-2000

.47

-.19

.40

296

latter half 2000

.63

.02

.45

297

2001

.54

.12

.46

294

2002

.63

.30

.42

297

2003

.74

.42

.48

299

2004

.77

.51

.41

292

2005

.74

.29

.42

295

Total

.55

-.15

.45

3254

Date assigned to
the case (Banded)
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DEPENDENT
VARIABLE

The number of votes occurring in protective states clearly goes up with time, as does
the average scaled level of protection. But the vote-rate does not increase. It does not
even stay the same: it decreases over time.228
And it is specifically that dynamic which characterizes the strange difference between
the complete data used in the model and the data with a missing judge party ID or legal
reasoning coding – the difference between the pairwise and listwise tables 33 and 34, in
other words. See Figure 4 for a visual representation of this dynamic.
Figure 4 Comparison of Increased Religious Freedom
and Actual Protective Voting
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To be sure, further analysis was done on the missing data and it only confirmed this
conclusion. The regional categorizations do not show any over or under representation in
the missing data, nor do the judicial selection systems, surprisingly, since judge party
identification was one of the three largest missing data variables. Other variables that are
significantly correlated with the missing data include a positive correlation with
population and number of claimants. But in both of those the reason behind their

228

To be sure, the correlation score is -.03, with a significance of .104.
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correlation is the bent toward the lower courts, as lower courts have twice the average
population as the Supreme Court, and larger claimant groups tend to end cases on a lower
level.
And to be clear, this piece of evidence is one of the most probative in the search for
whether state institutional attempts at increasing religious freedom actually work:

Does a partial correlation on the time-series variables support or question this? This
model supports those findings of futility, but in a way that will relieve state government
officials. Remember that when we look solely at RFRA contexts with votes before and
after passage, we found -.120** correlation with protective voting. And indeed, for all
pre-increased contexts through the increase and end of the data, we found a -.086**
correlation with protective voting. All six possibilities (three dummy and three scaled
variables) for an increase to correlate positively with voting failed, and three of them
failed significantly. Increasing scrutiny saw voting get worse.
With all the described controls in place in the partial correlation, all of the negative
significance evaporates, and only the pre- and post-legislative contexts are negative
(discounting the -.003, that is).
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Table 38 Partial Correlation of Time-Series Institutional Variables
Control
Variables
-none-(a)

DV Vote Outcome

Corr.

DV Vote
Outcome
1.000

Pre- and Only Post-Increase

Corr.

-.086(**)

Pre- and Only Post-Legislative Increase

Corr.

-.120(**)

Pre- and Only Post-Judicial Increase

Corr.

-.036

Pre- and Only Post-Increased Contexts, Scaled

Corr.

-.045

Pre- and Only Post-Legislative Increase, Scaled

Corr.

-.132(**)

Pre- and Only Post-Judicial Increase, Scaled

Corr.

-.019

Corr.

1.000

Corr.

-.003

Corr.

-.040

Corr.

.039

Corr.

.020

Corr.

-.045

Corr.

.075

Control Variables
Claimant-Area
DV Vote Outcome
Religious Agreement &
Claimant was Prisoner
Pre- and Post-Increase
& Act was Sex or Drug
Related & Taxes were
Sought & Land Use was Pre- and Post-Legislative Increase
Issue & Free Speech
Language Raised &
Pre- and Post-Judicial Increase
Establishment
Language Raised &
Free Exercise
Pre- and Post-Increased Contexts,
Language Raised &
Scaled
Judge Politics & MetroArea Adherent Rate &
Pre- and Post-Legislative Increase,
Metro-Area
Scaled
Homogeneity Index &
County Vote
Pre- and Post-Judicial Increase,
Normalized, Rep+ and
Scaled
Dem** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level
a Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations.
Missing data is excluded pairwise.

The Logistic Regression
A third way of searching for a controlled measure of the relationship between
religious freedom and the state attempt to attain it is via a logistic regression. Logistic
regressions can determine effects on a binomial or categorical variable with predictor
variables that are categorical, or if not as precisely, continuous. The difference between
this model and the loglinear logit model is not great, but is helpful. This regression will
display coefficients which are more directly related to the effect on the dependent
variable than the parameter interpretation.
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Or better, it would display those coefficients if it was an adequately fit model. But
this model fails the goodness-of-fit test by not explaining enough of the dispersion to beat
a variable-less model.229
It is telling that when the judicial and legislative increase attempt variables are
removed from the model altogether, the goodness-of-fit test grows closer to significance,
from .002 to .041, when .05 is considered a model which explains enough to be
considered adequate.
Instead of entering all the variables as a whole block, a model was attempted where
the variables are entered stepwise, or by picking the most explanatory variables (as
determined by the Wald statistic) one at a time until the pool of variables left contains
only insignificant ones. With this method, the variables left out are: Deviancy, Economic
Impact, County Politics, Free Speech Issue, Metro Adherent Rate and Metro Religious
Homogeneity. The model does then show an adequate goodness-of-fit (.110 where
avoiding .05 is success). The pseudo R2 measures show 15% and 20% of the dispersion
explained by the model.230

229

The -2 Log likelihood score is not lower than the predicted score, and the Hosmer & Lemeshow test is
significant, which rejects the hypothesis that randomness does not explain more.
230
The two measure are Cox & Snell and Nagelkerke R Square, respectively.
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Table 39 Logistic Regression of Model, Stepwise Method
B
Claimant Area Religious Agreement
.010
Prisoner(1)
-.823
Establishment Issue Raised (1)
.995
Free Exercise Issue Raised (1)
-1.298
Judge Politics
.014
County Voting (Republican)
-.008
Judicial Increase Least Protective
Judicial Increase 0
1.456
Judicial Increase 1
1.261
Judicial Increase 2
.839
Judicial Increase 3
1.525
Judicial Increase Most Protective
1.732
Legislative Increase
.192
Constant
-2.312
N = 1,616. Missing data excluded listwise.

S.E.
.003
.217
.131
.124
.003
.005
.334
.363
.407
.344
.336
.171
.365

Wald
16.865
14.421
57.980
110.265
17.280
2.304
35.278
19.058
12.081
4.256
19.629
26.615
1.259
40.023

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Sig.
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.129
.000
.000
.001
.039
.000
.000
.262
.000

Exp(B)
1.010
.439
2.706
.273
1.014
.992
4.290
3.530
2.313
4.597
5.651
1.212
.099

The model does predict more than 2/3rds of the votes, which is 11.9 percentage points
more than the variable-less model (55.4% explained).

Table 40 Predicted and Observed Cases, Logistic Regression
Predicted
Observed

Lost
Step 1

Percentage
Correct

Vote Outcome
Vote Outcome

Won

Lost

603

292

67.4

Won

255

466

64.6

Overall Percentage

66.2

Interpreting the variables in the model confirms what the loglinear logit model
showed us: using the Wald statistic, the two most influential variables in the model are
the occurrences of establishment or free exercise language. If establishment related
language is used, the odds of a successful vote increase by a factor of 2.706 when
compared to votes without establishment language. And when Free Exercise is brought
up in an opinion, the odds of a protective vote drop to only 27.3% as likely as votes on
cases without that language.
The scaled judicial variable has five protective levels, and in a logistic regression,
each factor is understood as the effect on the model with a one unit change in that factor.
179

So interpret each row as the change in probability when that row is changed to the least
protective row. This scaled judicial variable, when taken as a whole, has the third most
explanatory power in the model as indicated by the Wald statistic.
The judicial variable does not look linear at first blush, but note that each of the
variables is a fairly drastic increase when compared to the reference category which is the
least protective category. It is indeed the least protective when compared to all the
others, in other words. The second to least protective category, coded 0, was the category
which held all the institutionally ambiguous and not-yet-increased contexts. That it is
higher than other categories is not a surprise. After accounting for those two dynamics,
the variable makes more sense.
To interpret this judicial variable in light of the study‘s research question: in all of the
data considered by a listwise logistic regression, states which increase their scrutiny do
succeed when those states use the courts to do so.
The Legislative attempt variable is a) insignificant, but at least b) in the direction of a
positive effect on religious actor success in court. So the research question here is
answered negatively for RFRAs.
Both the legislative and judicial effects appear consistent even as other control
variables are added to the model, such as the claimant size variable, the political
geography variable, and the judicial selection system variable.231
Judge Politics shows that with each increase by one PAJID point, the odds of a
successful vote grow by 1.4 percent. That effect is the fourth most predictive, followed
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Claimant size would be the third most explanatory variable, and predicts a 240% better chance at a
successful vote. The political geography variables were insignificant, as were the judicial selection system
variables.
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by Claimant Area Religious Agreement, which has a similar predictive rate as one point
of increase in the rate of agreement translates into 1 percentage point more likelihood of a
successful vote.
The last significant variable is the Prisoners dummy variable which shows that the
odds of a prisoner winning are .44 times the odds of non-prisoners, which are actually
better odds for prisoners than the simple comparison of means on the data which showed
prisoners winning only 33% of the time that others win (16% versus 48% nonprisoners.).
Judge Politics, Claimant Area Religious Agreement and County Voting all show very
stable effects as shown by their small standard errors.
Variables which proved insignificant once all these effects were held constant include
judge and claimant gender, judge and claimant religious tradition (minus being an Other
religious claimant). There are only 359 votes coded with a judge religious tradition
known, which lent to the insignificance, presumably. But the outcomes, if insignificant,
give one pause: the most protective judge religious tradition was the Conservative NonTraditional Mormon or Jehovah‘s Witness. And the least protective category? Jewish
judges, in 39 votes.232 These outcomes surely give texture to the simple political
generalization that left-leaning is more protective, which would be easy to take away
from this study.
State judicial selection system and dissenting votes showed no patterns. County
population is insignificant, but metro population is significant at the .05 level, but with a
b and EXP(b) of .000, has no direction.
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A simple comparison of means confirms this outcome as well.
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But the model suffers from the same issue the Loglinear Logit model suffers from:
the votes included are biased by time in such a way that cannot be controlled. But as the
simpler descriptions throughout, and specific discussion above shows, the larger
conclusions drawn regarding the effectiveness of state institutional abilities would not
suddenly become effective if these models were to control for the effect of time.

Conclusion
Both judicial and legislative attempts to increase religious freedom fail. Judicial
states are more protective of religious actors, but this appears to be the case even before
the court handed down the verdict which increased scrutiny. Legislative states do not
appear to be more protective than other states. RFRAs and religious freedom increasing
landmark decisions have no effect, in other words. Or better, they have no positive
effect.
If one is interested in the control variables as more than simple controls, as this
exploratory dissertation is, then seeing the things which contribute to religious freedom
more is quite a benefit to the research and analysis. And this list is lead by the legal
language used in the opinion, even if not in the way predicted. Sociological and
demographic factors like the judge‘s gender or judge‘s religion, or region of the country,
or judicial selection system all fail to explain much beyond luck when compared to a
judge‘s using constitutional language.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This study assessed how state attempts to increase religious freedom fared in terms of
actual votes for religious actors in state courts. The simple answer to the question is that
state institutions, especially statehouses, do not fare well at all. Based on the research
conducted and the results of the model above, I offer a summary of the major findings,
and some concluding remarks.
The following are some selected findings presented in the order reported in the study.
Institutional attempts to increase religious freedom failed to increase the rate at
which judges vote to protect religious behavior, even when the controls were
added. (ch. 3, 5)
The Other Religious category, with Muslims as the largest religion represented,
saw its favorable vote-rate double after September 11, 2001. (p. 41)
When the focus is narrowed to only the states which will increase scrutiny, the
favorable vote-rate before increasing scrutiny is 50%, and after increasing it the
rate drops to 42%. (p. 65, 157-159)
The unclear states that did not increase or decrease scrutiny have a favorable voterate of 57%, which is 22% better than the average of 45%. (p. 69)
Counties which voted more Democratic had more protective voting occur in their
courts. (p. 77) Liberal judges voted to protect religious actors more than
conservative judges. (p. 101) States which attempt to increase religious freedom
have more liberal judges than conservative judges. (101-102)
Claimants with popular religious traditions receive more favorable votes than
claimants with unpopular religious traditions. (p. 119)
Prisoners receive favorable votes 24% of the time in judicially increased states,
18% of the time under RFRA contexts, and 5.6% of the time when scrutiny is not
increased. (p. 130)
Female judges do not vote differently than male judges, but do populate the bench
in increased scrutiny states at significantly higher rates. (p. 152-153)
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Religious litigants in groups of more than three received favorable votes more
than twice as often as smaller groups. (p. 156-158)

Inter- And Intra-Branch Power Sharing
Questions about legislative and judicial power sharing are raised by RFRAs which
fail to produce higher favorable vote-rates in this study. And this goes against recent
research which finds that ―state supreme courts are usually deferential to [state]
legislative will.‖233
Judicial attempts did not increase that favorable vote-rate either, but that is a less
clear rejection of the prediction that the rate would go up. This is so because court
decisions which increase scrutiny can be seen as a simple clarification of the state‘s
judicial religious freedom doctrine, rather than a cue to increase that vote-rate which was
then ignored. Scholarship on intra-judicial relations is showing them to be cooperative as
well,234 but this does not speak to the issue of what generally is expected from a judicial
ruling on increased scrutiny. The answer is likely to be unique to each case and state
rather than something that can easily be generalized.

Left-Right Or Center-Periphery Variance
The study originally intended to construct the continuous variables (county voting,
judge politics, area religious adherence and homogeneity, and claimant‘s religious
popularity) so that the poles were the variable‘s average and the furthest from average.
Or better, with a center and periphery construction, rather than the more conventional
conservative ranging over to liberal construction. So to be clear, originally, judges were
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234

Stumpf (1998, 428) citing the then-upcoming second edition of Canon and Johnson (1999).
Stumpf 1998, 431.
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going to range from those with average PAJID score over to those with the extreme-right
and extreme-left PAJID scores. And also to be clear, these constructions produced
significant results. But they did not capture as much of what the variable refers to as did
the right-left construction. So the study went with the latter. But the former, centerperiphery construction strikes me, after having completed this study as a very fertile
ground for future study. The difference between conservative and liberal areas, judges
and religions explains more of what was studied here, but the difference between the
status quo and those outside the normal politics and religions is explanatory of
something, and that something deserves to be explored.

Future research on interest group activity at the state level may also find that the
conservative religious legal groups put fewer resources into state cases. That finding is
predicted, actually, since the use of free speech language (which is the strategic tack
taken by these groups because of the lack of success in either advancing a Free Exercise
of Religion claim or Establishment of Religion defense) in this study was somewhat rare
and not helpful when employed.

Applying Directly To The Literature
This study can add to the state judge characteristic literature, or as Carp and
Stidham‘s assessment put it, judges who are ―overwhelmingly older, white, male []
Protestant… homegrown [and] moderately conservative.‖235 While those characteristics
are still common, the makeup of the state court system is evolving to include more
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Carp and Stidham, 1998, 260.
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women and racial minorities, and may not be moderately conservative. Women judges
cast 26.5% of the COLR votes in this study, which shows an increase from a 2002 study
finding 24% of justices on state courts of last resort were women.236 But as scholars note,
the percentage diminishes with the level of court: 20.4% of intermediate appeals votes,
and only 16.6% of trial court votes were cast by women.
As mentioned above, female judges tended to vote against the religious actor more
once all the controls were in place, although not significantly so. This result appears to
be another counter-intuitive point in the unsuccessful search for compelling evidence that
women jurists vote differently.237 But the significantly positive correlation between
women being judges and increased scrutiny states suggests that evidence could be close.
A further step in this research could attempt to determine whether women judges
fostered the increase in scrutiny, or whether women judges appear more because the
context is more hospitable.
Regardless of the answer, one implication of the findings here is that searching for a
female judge effect could be more fruitful (finding an effect or confirming the absence of
one) by shifting from an individual level of analysis to one which considers the size of
the female judge populations. This suggestion is not new, though, as feminist
jurisprudence has long held that the socializing influences and peer pressures within legal
institutions mean that the judges who are women are not representative of women as a
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Martin and Pyle, 2002, 39-40.
For a good literature review on the difference between the theory and evidence in gender specific
judicial behavior studies, see Stumpf (1998, 157), and McCall, Madhavi and Michael A. McCall. 2007.
―How Far Does the Gender Gap Extend? Decision Making on State Supreme Courts in Fourth Amendment
Cases, 1980-2000‖ The Social Science Journal. 44(1):67-69. Related research is showing that female
judges sentence criminals more often and to longer sentences, but there is not yet a consensus around
women being tougher judges, so this study does not confirm or negate, but instead continues to fill in the
picture.
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whole. With larger groups of women judges (in a county or state, for example), that
socializing influence and pressure to conform to the male created traditions would wane.
It is that dynamic that may be driving the correlation between increased scrutiny and
women judges.

Recent research on state judge religious identification has found that Evangelical
judges uphold death penalties more, vote against obscenity more, and vote more
conservatively in gender discrimination cases.238 And this study finds Evangelicals to be
significantly more conservative on the PAJID scale and to identify as Republican more.
But for reasons that are not immediately clear, and in a comparison that is not fully
commensurate in issue areas, the findings here show a very different picture. If I redefine
the variable for Evangelicals to mirror the Songer and Tabrizi construction, this redefined
group of Evangelicals was more protective of religious freedom overall. And this finding
was not inflated by rulings in favor of other Evangelical or Conservative NonTraditionals (where, surprisingly, Evangelical judges were a bit less protective.)
Evangelical judges in this study were more protective than non-evangelical judges of
each religious group minus Catholics, where Evangelicals voted only one percentage
point lower than the average. And the largest difference came with the Other Religious
category, where this altered version of Evangelicals voted to protect 60% of the time239
versus non-evangelical judges who voted to protect 18% of the time.
Evangelical judges here were more protective of deviant behavior (59% in 29 votes
versus a 56% favorable vote-rate from non-evangelicals), and more protective of
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Songer and Tabrizi, 1999
Albeit with only 15 votes, so the small number may be responsible for the outcome.
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prisoners (15% in only 13 votes versus a 13% favorable vote-rate from non-evangelicals.)
This study therefore stands in contrast to the Songer & Tabrizi 1999 findings.

A third way this study adds to an on-going discussion is in the area of minority
success in the courts. As already mentioned in the section on claimant religious
popularity (p. 115-116) these findings generally confirm that minority religious litigants
are less successful than average, but so are the more numerous Evangelical Protestants.
Newer evidence that Catholics and Baptists win at lower rates than minor religions is not
fully rejected or confirmed here.240 Ultimately though, this study posits the question in a
new way. Rather than asking whether, for example, Baptists win or lose more, I asked
how Baptists fared in areas with many or few other Baptists. Instead of understanding
the popularity of the religious traditions fixed at the national level, which is what studies
have inadvertently done to this point, I assess popularity at the immediate, metro or
county level. My results, as reported elsewhere, are significant.
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See p. 115-116 for more details. See Sisk (2005), Brent (1999) and Lupu (1998).
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Implications Of This Research
One implication of this study is that the state courts are a better venue for religious
actors. Religious actors won more cases before the time frame studied here, and they
won more during the time frame. And despite the impotence of RFRAs and pro-religious
freedom precedent, that more favorable context is likely to remain because a), the federal
institutional attempts have mattered (and they are currently allowing religious behavior to
be regulated by rational laws), and b) states have been more protective all along and there
is no reason to believe they will lower their actual pro-religious freedom voting rates.
But to temper this forecast, that states are friendlier venues as a whole does not help
potential litigants in Oregon or Nebraska or the other six states where the rational basis
standard has been accepted and judicial voting is less protective. Nor is it likely that
legal interest groups will focus efforts on state decisions because federal decisions are
(conceptually at least) fifty times more encompassing than a single state decision. Going
from this generalized picture to the more specific picture of religious freedom is the next
step in this line of research.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1: States with RFRAs result in more judicial votes favoring religious
freedom than states without RFRAs.
Hypothesis 2: State court precedent providing for the use of strict scrutiny or the
equivalent protecting religious freedom result in more judicial votes
favoring religious freedom than states without such precedent.
Hypothesis 3: County-level Republican presidential voting is associated with less
favorable religious freedom votes for religious actors than County-level
Democratic Presidential voting.
Hypothesis 4: More liberal judges will vote more in support of religious freedom than
more conservative judges.
Hypothesis 5: Judges whose courts are in high religious adherence areas will support
religious freedom claims more than judges from lower religious adherence
areas.
Hypothesis 6: The more religiously diverse the area in which the judge sits, the greater
the likelihood the judge will support the religious freedom claim.
Hypothesis 7: Religious freedom claimants from minority religions will meet with less
success than those from majority religions.
Hypothesis 8: Religious freedom claims based on sexual or illicit drug usage will be less
likely to be supported than those that are not.
Hypothesis 9: Religious freedom claims of prisoner are less likely to be supported than
claims from non-prisoners.
Hypothesis 10: Religious freedom claims that do not require public resources (tax money
or land usage) are more likely to be supported than those that do.
Hypothesis 11: When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to
concentrate free exercise of religion, it is more likely to be supported than
if it is not.
Hypothesis 12: When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to concern
the separation of church and state (an establishment clause), that claim is
less likely to be supported by the judge than if the separation of church
and state is not involved.
Hypothesis 13: When the religious freedom claim is coupled with a free speech claim it is
more likely to be supported than if it is not.
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APPENDIX B
COMPLETE LIST OF DENOMINATIONS IN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS
The following is a reproduction of the Appendix from Brian Steensland‘s 2000 article
detailing the religious traditions categories used in this study.241
314 / Social Forces 79:1, September 2000

APPENDIX
The following list includes all denominations within the classification scheme described above. Catholic
(RELIG = 2) and Jewish (RELIG = 3) traditions are not listed because there are no further subspecifications
available in the General Social Survey for these affiliations. In addition to the denominations listed, “Other
Affiliation” includes faith traditions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Eastern Orthodoxy (RELIG = 510, 12). Numbers in parentheses refer to the numeric value label for that denomination under the variable
listed (DENOM or OTHER).
Black Protestant
Using Variable “DENOM”
African Methodist Episcopal Church (20)
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church (21)
b
American Baptist Association (10)
b
American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. (11)
b
Baptist, Don‟t Know Which (18)
b
Methodist, Don‟t Know Which (28)
National Baptist Convention of America (12)
National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc. (13)
b
Other Baptist Churches (15)
b
Other Methodist Churches (23)
b
Southern Baptist Convention (14)
Using Variable “OTHER”
African Methodist (15)
Apostolic Faith (14)
Christian Tabernacle (128)
Church of God in Christ (37)
Church of God in Christ Holiness (38)
Church of God, Saint & Christ (7)
Disciples of God (88)
Federated Church (98)
Holiness; Church of Holiness (56)
House of Prayer (104)
Missionary Baptistb (93)
Pentecostal Apostolic (103)
Primitive Baptist (133)
Sanctified, Sanctification (78)
United Holiness (79)
Witness Holiness (21)
Zion Union (85)
Zion Union Apostolic (86)
Zion Union Apostolic–Reformed (87)
Evangelical Protestant
Using Variable “DENOM”
c
American Baptist Association (10)
c
Baptist, Don‟t Know Which (18)
Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod (32)
c
Other Baptist Churches (15)
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Steensland, 2000, 314-16.
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Other Lutheran Churches (34)
c
Other Methodist Churches (23)
Other Presbyterian Churches (42)
c
Southern Baptist Convention (14)
Synod (33)
Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran
Using Variable “OTHER”
Advent Christian (10)
Amish (111)
Apostolic Christian (107)
Apostolic Church (138)
Assembly of God (12)
Bible Missionary (109)
Brethren Church, Brethren (20)
Brethren, Plymouth (22)
Brother of Christ (132)
Calvary Bible (110)
Chapel of Faith (122)
Charismatic (102)
Chinese Gospel Church (135)
Christ Cathedral of Truth (108)
Christ Church Unity (29)
Christ in Christian Union (26)
Christ in God (101)
Christian and Missionary Alliance (9)
Christian Calvary Chapel (125)
Christian Catholic (28)
Christian Reformed (32)
Christian; Central Christian (31)
Church of Christ (35)
Church of Christ, Evangelical (34)
Church of Daniel‟s Band (127)
Church of God of Prophecy, The (121)
Church of Prophecy (5)
Church of the First Born (116)
Church of the Living God (39)
Churches of God (Except with Christ and Holiness) (36)
Community Church (41)
Covenant (42)
Dutch Reformed (43)
Evangelical Congregational (2)
Evangelical Covenant (91)
Evangelical Free Church (47)
Evangelical Methodist (112)
Evangelical United Brethren (120)
Evangelical, Evangelist (45)
Faith Christian (139)
Faith Gospel Tabernacle (124)
First Christian (51)
Four Square Gospel (53)
Free Methodist (13)
Free Will Baptist (16)
Full Gospel (52)
Grace Brethren (100)
Holiness (Nazarene) (18)
Holiness Church of God (90)
Holy Roller (55)
Independent (24)
Independent Bible, Bible, Bible Fellowship (3)
Independent Fundamental Church of America (134)
Laotian Christian (146)
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Living Word (129)
Macedonia (131)
Mennonite (63)
Mennonite Brethren (115)
Mission Covenant (92)
c
Missionary Baptist (93)
Missionary Church (117)
Nazarene (65)
New Testament Christian (6)
d
No Denomination Given or Nondenominational
Open Bible (27)
Other Fundamentalist (97)
Pentecostal (68)
Pentecostal Assembly of God (66)
Pentecostal Church of God (67)
Pentecostal Holiness, Holiness Pentecostal (69)
People‟s Church (140)
Pilgrim Holiness (57)
Primitive Baptist (133)
Salvation Army (76)
Seventh Day Adventist (77)
Swedish Mission (94)
Triumph Church of God (106)
Way Ministry, The (118)
Wesleyan (83)
Wesleyan Methodist-Pilgrim (84)
Mainline Protestant
Using Variable “DENOM”
c
American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. (11)
c
Methodist, Don‟t Know Which (28)
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (40)
American Lutheran Church (30)
Presbyterian, Don‟t Know Which (48)
Episcopal Church (50)
Presbyterian, Merged (43)
Evangelical Lutheran (35)
United Methodist Church (22)
Lutheran Church in America (31)
United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (41)
Lutheran, Don‟t Know Which (38)
Using Variable OTHER
American Reformed (99)
Baptist (Northern) (19)
Christian Disciples (25)
Congregationalist (40)
Congregationalist, First Reformed (71)
Disciples of Christ (44)
Evangelical Reformed (46)
First Christian Disciples of Christ (49)
First Church (48)
First Reformed (50)
Friends (54)
Grace Reformed (89)
Hungarian Reformed (1)
Latvian Lutheran (105)
Moravian (8)
Quaker (70)
Reformed Church of Christ (73)
Reformed United Church of Christ (72)
Schwenkfelder (148)
United Brethren, United Brethren in Christ (23)
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United Church of Canada (119)
United Church of Christ (81)
United Church of Christianity (96)
Other Affiliation
Using Variable OTHER
CONSERVATIVE NONTRADITIONAL
Christadelphians (30)
Jesus LDS (62)
Christian Scientist (33)
LDS (59)
Church of Jesus Christ of the LDS–Mormon (60)
Restoration (145)
LDS–Reorganized (61)
Church Universal and Mormon (64)
Triumphant (114)
True Light Church of Christ (130)
Jehovah‟s Witnesses (58)
Worldwide Church of God (113)
LIBERAL NONTRADITIONAL
Christ Church Unity (29)
Religious Science (74)
Eden Evangelist (17)
Spiritualist (11)
Mind Science (75)
Unitarian, Universalist (80)
New Age Spirituality (136)
United Church, Unity Church (82)
New Birth Christian (141)
Unity (95)
a Also included within the Catholic tradition are those who belong to the Polish National Church
(OTHER = 123).
b Included only if race of respondent is black
c Included only if race of respondent is not black
d Includes only those who responded “no denomination given or nondenominational” (DENOM = 70).
From this pool, those who attend church less than “about once a month” (ATTEND < 4) or those who
responded “don‟t know or no answer” (ATTEND = 9) are excluded. This also includes additional respondents
who responded with “Christian” or “interdenominational/no denomination” on the 1998 RELIG variable
(RELIG = 11 or 13).
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